as distinct from others. Please keep the Department fully informed of the movements and plans of different parties and the respective strength and character of following of each. Department insufficiently informed on this subject.

POLK

Japanese and American Public Statements Regarding Military Action, August 2 and 3, 1918-British Statement, August 8, 1918

File No. 861.00/7015

The Japanese Ambassador (Ishii) to the Acting Secretary of State MEMORANDUM

The Japanese Government, actuated by the sentiment of sincere. friendship towards the Russian people, have always entertained the most sanguine hopes of the speedy reestablishment of order in Russia and a healthy and untrammeled development of her national life. Abundant proof, however, is now afforded to show that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the chaotic and defenseless condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to the Russian far eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of the Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops, the German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted and they practically assume the position of command. The CzechoSlovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the cobelligerents to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern. In the presence of danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops are actually exposed in Siberia at the hand of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events and a certain number of their troops have already been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok. The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for an early dispatch of troops to relieve pressure now weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces.

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to

dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases whether political or military.

WASHINGTON, undated.1

[Received August 2, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/2449a

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

August 3, 1918. MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am sending you the following report merely as a matter of record.

The Japanese Ambassador called this morning and told me that his Government cordially apppreciated the frank expression of the views of the United States Government; Japan was glad there were no fundamental differences between us; they had no intention of sending more men than was necessary to assist the Czechs; and the only difference between the two Governments was as to the number that was necessary.

He said his Government still felt a larger force than proposed was essential, but in view of the necessity for immediate action, and in view of the attitude of this Government, his Government authorized him to say that they accepted our proposals, reserving the question as to the sending of additional troops to Vladivostok or elsewhere until circumstances should arise which might make it necessary.

He said that his Government had explained this last point by saying it might be necessary for the troops to move out of Vladivostok in order to prevent the slaughter of the Czechs, or it might be necessary to send reinforcements for this same purpose. He said his Government felt that such a slaughter would be a misfortune on humanitarian grounds and on political grounds, as it would hopelessly injure the prestige of all the Governments concerned if a

'Note in the margin of MS.: "Handed to me by Japanese Amb[assador] who said it was published on Aug. 2 in Japan. F. L. P[olk]."

slaughter took place which could have been prevented by prompt action of the Allied forces. He said that in such an emergency it was his Government's intention to consult this Government and the other Governments, but it was conceivable that there might be no time for consultation, in which case the Japanese Government wished to say frankly that they would be compelled for the reasons already stated to move without consultation. He said it meant a great deal to his Government to be in accord with the United States, and they felt that they had met our views on all the disputed points.

I asked him two or three times whether it was his understanding that the Japanese forces would be limited to ten or twelve thousand men, and he said that in view of the fact that such a number had been mentioned by me in our previous conversation, and in view of the fact that his Government stated they accepted our proposal, he felt there was no question on that point.

I asked him whether it was their intention to send troops anywhere else. He said no, not as far as he knew, and he thought that he had been fully informed on this point.

He showed me a copy of their proposed statement, and they had made the amendments we had suggested, that is, that his Government was in accord with the Allies as to this expedition. They had stricken out the reference to Japan's particular interest. He said that now that we were in agreement his Government had given out their statement in Tokyo on August 2, and they were getting ready to move the troops.

Yours faithfully,

File No. 861.00/2494

[File copy not signed]

Admiral Knight to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)

[Telegram-Paraphrase]

VLADIVOSTOK, undated.

[Copy received from Navy Department, August 3, 1918.] Conditions have been reported bad by Colonel Robertson, British military attaché from Peking, who has just returned from Ussuri. Czechs are greatly outnumbered and are withdrawing southwards. The roads and bridges which they recently constructed will be destroyed in their advance [retreat].

The 800 British troops arriving to-night will be pushed to the front immediately instead of remaining to hold Vladivostok. It is uncertain when the French troops will arrive who will also be rushed to Ussuri front.

The German force is from ten to twenty miles inside the Manchurian border, and the Semenov defeat is more complete than at first reported.

File No. 861.00/2412

[KNIGHT]

The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, August 3, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 4, 4.17 a. m.]

76. Replying Department's July 31, 6 p. m., and supplementing my July 31, 2 p. m. Do not believe rivalry between two governments mentioned or pro-German elements were responsible for the result of election to any large extent, but fear of and hostility toward Horvat government which is regarded by laboring classes as antirevolutionary appear to have induced some to go to other extreme. Disinclination of this class to fight again also probably had some effect. This feeling is shown in refusal of Russian workmen at local naval shops to make hand grenades for Czechs, saying they prefer no work and hunger to doing such work and threatening to damage machinery which necessitated placing of international patrol in navy yard to protect property. Figures now show 77 per cent of possible voters voted, as against 53 per cent at previous election, so that result cannot be attributed to failure to vote to the extent at first supposed. Czechs are being pressed for the release of Soviet member elected to city council and whom Czechs hold for agitation against them and for connections with Hungarian war prisoners; Czechs appeal to Allied Consuls for advice.

Czech commander is Major General Dietrichs, Russian, elected by Czechs; request for Japanese war vessels at Nikolaevsk was made by him to Admiral Kato during conference on Brooklyn, but did not come to the attention of Admiral Knight at the time. Request was due to reports that German war prisoner naval officers were operating the Russian river gunboats near mouth of the Amur River. Czechs announce that attack made on Bell [sic] Telegraph was a part of [anarchist?] plan, and that hereafter persons guilty of crimes will be tried by court-martial. Colonel [name garbled], who was appointed by Zemstvo to command Russian forces to date raised here, has declared this province in state of siege without consulting Allied commanders or Czechs, by whom matter now will be considered. Eight hundred British troops arrived this morning.

CALDWELL

File No. 861.00/2440a

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)1

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1918, 4 p. m.

Copy of following statement has been handed to Japanese Ambassador and given to the press: 2

In the judgment of the Government of the United States, a judgment arrived at after repeated and very searching considerations of the whole situation, military intervention in Russia would be more likely to add to the present sad confusion there than to cure it, and would injure Russia rather than help her out of her distresses.

Such military intervention as has been most frequently proposed, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, would in its judgment be more likely to turn out to be merely a method of making use of Russia than to be a method of serving her. Her people, if they profited by it at all, could not profit by it in time to deliver them from their present desperate difficulties, and their substance would meantime be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own or to feed their own men, women, and children. We are bending all our energies now to the purpose, the resolute and confident purpose, of winning on the western front, and it would in the judgment of the Government of the United States be most unwise to divide or dissipate our forces.

As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them and to steady any efforts at self-government or selfdefense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed will be to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own selfdefense.

With such objects in view the Government of the United States is now cooperating with the Governments of France and Great Britain in the neighborhood of Murmansk and Archangel. The United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined. The Government of the United States has, therefore, proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok, with the purpose of cooperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding,

'The same, mutatis mutandis, on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives in Great Britain (for repetition to the Ambassador in Russia), France, Italy, and China (for repetition to the Consul at Harbin).