But admitting that they were; granting that he held a rank in energy and splendour of endowments far loftier than is occupied by the most happily gifted of his children, and that he was shorn, and all his descendants, of that su periority by his transgression-still it cannot affect our conclusions at all in regard to the manner in which his fall became the occasion of the disobedience of his posterity. For no retrenchment of his powers that left him still capable of holiness, could by any necessity of its nature prove a cause of his sinning. How could any reduction of his understanding subject him to such a necessity? or how could a diminution of his capacity to exercise any of the species of affection for which his nature was adapted? It has been shown that none of those kinds of affection are necessarily sinful; that their moral nature depends on the manner in which they are exercised; and that a being who has a capacity to exert them in violation of his obligations, has of course the same capacity to exercise them in conformity to the divine will.

No retrenchment therefore of those powers could constitute any unavoidable necessity of their being devoted to sin, or go at all to determine in what manner they would be exerted; but it would be left to be decided entirely, as in all other cases, by the nature of the moral influence under which he was placed.

Thus far then, the word of God goes entirely to verify the position under consideration. The statement made by the Most High of the influence of the fall, represents it as being expended wholly on the external condition of mankind, and as producing a set of effects therefore, whose agency on their voluntary conduct must necessarily take place through the medium of moral suasion. And the effects moreover represented to be produced by it,-want, toil, pain, sorrow, dependence, death,-are precisely those which manifestly from their nature are adapted, and which from all human experience are known to be the sources of the

most powerful temptations that ever assail the breast of man. But reader, this passage expresses all that the voice of revelation utters on the subject, except the single fact that the disobedience of mankind is a consequence of Adam's transgression. The only other allusion made to it is in the following passages.

First." By one man sin entered into the world." "By the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." But these merely express the fact, that men become sinners, in consequence of the offence of Adam. They convey no intelligence respecting the manner in which it takes place, and decide nothing therefore in the present discussion.

Secondly." In Adam all die." "By one man's offence death reigned by one," with several others of the same import. But these merely state the fact-expressed in the quotation from Genesis-that all mankind are subjected to death in consequence of the apostacy; and it is moreover represented as exerting this influence over the posterity of Adam, simply by leading them to the commission of sin, which death of course follows as a penal consequence. "Death passed upon all for that all have sinned."

It thus appears from all the light which the lamp of revelation throws on the subject, as well as from all the knowledge respecting it we gain from other sources, that the only manner in which the fall of Adam became a cause of the disobedience of his offspring was, by occasioning their subjection to temptation. Its influence was expended entirely on objects external to their minds, and employed in producing such changes in the material world, or in the course of divine providence toward them, and not improbably in their corporeal constitutions, that their lives are rendered of course a scene of unceasing and severe probation; that as a consequence necessarily incident to their condition, the storms of trial and temptation beat on them incessantly through

the varied avenues of desire, of suffering, and of enjoyment, from the earliest dawn of their moral existence, up to that dread hour, when death seals up the sum of their sublunary agency, and bears them away to the retributive scenes of the. invisible world.

Can the reader need to be reminded how unlike these views are to the statements ordinarily made on the subject, which utter so much respecting a "want of original righteousness, the corruption of their whole nature," and even "the guilt of Adam's first sin," devolved on all his posterity by the fall, and righteously subjecting them, antecedently to the exertion of any voluntary actions on their part, to the indignation and curse of God?

VII There is a moral influence which is adapted and adequate to lead mankind to holiness.

This follows from the fact that-as has been shown-the influence of motives is the sole instrument of determining the manner in which men act in regard to their obligations; and from the fact that they do in innumerable instances— that is all those who are renewed by the Spirit of God-act in conformity to the dvine will. Inasmuch as holiness thus actually results to such an extent from the influence of motives, it is clear that they have an influence which is adapted and competent to lead to holiness.

All man

Or to obtain the result in a different manner : kind as has been seen-are capable of acting in accordance with their obligations: All then are capable of being excited to act in conformity to those obligations. There must then exist somewhere among the objects to which they sustain relations, a set of instruments competent to excite them to that course of action. But there are no objects except motives that have any capability of exciting them to any voluntary action whatever. It follows, therefore, that there is a species of motives which are adapted and adequate to lead them to holiness.

There is manifestly no intermediate ground between this conclusion and the doctrine that men have no capacity for obedience. To deny that there is any thing within the whole circle of objects to which they sustain relations, that can excite them to holiness, is plainly to deny that they have any capacity of being excited to that species of action; and that is to deny that they have any capacity for that species of action itself.

This view is confirmed moreover by every other consideration that has any reference to it.

It is the only view that has any consistency with the nature of God's moral government. It has been seen that all the means which he employs as a legislator to lead men to holiness, exert their influence solely as motives; and that a vast portion of those means are obviously selected, simply on account of their peculiar adaptation to reach the heart, and turn the current of its affections to the side of obligation. But what conclusions are to be formed if it is denied that those means have any competence or tendency whatever to attain the end for which they are professedly employed? Has the Most High undertaken to gain an end by legislation, to which his means have no congruity whatever? which lies in fact without the sphere of possibility? Or has he instituted, and for near six thousand years employed all the vast and complicated machinery of his moral administration, without any object? Or again;

is the real object for which he employs it totally aside from that which its nature implies, and which all his language and demeanour unite in pronouncing it to be? Will any one venture to say that his commands, and expostulations, and calls, and entreaties, poured so incessantly on our ear, and in modes bespeaking such sincerity and earnestness, are not at all intended to induce us to submit ourselves to his will, and embrace his favour? That after all the threatenings of his justice, no evidence whatever exists that he regards sin with any indignation, or has any purpose of

punishing its perpetrators? For the denial of the position in question carries us inevitably to that result. For where can a particle of proof exist that he regards our sins with indignation, unless it at the same time constitutes equal evidence that he desired us to exercise holiness, in the place of those sins? But where can any evidence exist that he desires us to exercise holiness, unless he expresses it by efforts to lead us to exercise it? And where are any such efforts made, unless in his moral government? And how can his measures as a moral governour constitute such efforts, if— let their influence be carried to what extent it may-they have no adequacy nor adaptation whatever to attain that end? If the means of his moral administration are not fitted and employed to excite us to obedience, he surely has taken no pains to lead us to that course of action; and if he has taken no pains whatever to promote it, we are without a solitary indication that he regards holiness with approbation, or has any desire for its existence.

Thus apparent is it that the denial that there are any motives adapted and competent to lead men to holiness, is fraught with the most fatal inconsistency with the whole of God's moral administration, and the attributes of his character.

Its denial is equally inconsistent with all human experience. It will be admitted that there are innumerable individuals among mankind, who in many instances exercise obedience to the divine will; and that they exert all their holy actions under the influence of motives. But that is to admit, that the motives under which they exert those actions, in all those instances, lead them to holiness. It follows then inevitably, that as far as we have any evidence of the existence of holiness in our world, we have the same evidence of the existence of motives adapted and adequate to lead men to holiness. And this conclusion is of course as just. in regard to the first holy actions which men exert, as to those which they exercise at any other period of their lives.