fall of the lower places almost insured the fall of those above. One blow on the trunk of a tree goes further towards its destruction than many on its branches. All, however, that is expedient, is not practicable. Kingston was at that time defended by a fleet as well as by land forces. That fleet was nearly equal to our own. Commodore Chauncy might have considered the disparity in his favor more than made up, as it no doubt was, by the batteries then ready to coöperate with his antagonist. There were many reasons which justified a departure from the original plan. Something like the main body of the forces with which General Dearborn was to operate was upon the Niagara frontier. It may be asked, why they were not all concentrated upon Sackett's Harbour. Had such been the case at the opening of the campaign, these forces must have been dependent for all their movements on the fleet, a very inadequate transportation.

General Dearborn, no doubt, regarded his land force at Sackett's Harbour as sufficient for the capture of York (Toronto), and knew that the fleet could easily transport it. Proposing only the reduction of that comparatively small place, the capture of its public stores, (said to be considerable, including a vessel on the stocks,) and also, if possible, its garrison, Fort George was his next object. Being of much greater importance, having a strong fort and a large garrison, the force to be brought against it must be augmented in proportion. This augmentation he would find at Niagara. In the mean time, it was expected that Sir James Yeo would be out, and met on the broad lake. A victory over him there would deprive Kingston of half its defence, and render its reduction comparatively easy and certain.

These were probably among the prevailing motives, which induced the general commanding to change the order of attack in some degree. Pursuing the order prescribed at Washington, he might have failed, indeed, with only the force he had at Sackett's Harbour, no doubt he would have failed, in the beginning; a failure that would have cost him the campaign. The change insured success in the first step; made the second nearly as certain; and multiplied the chances in favor of the third. Thus far, therefore, we think General Dearborn exercised a sound discretion. Whether the execution of the plan thus changed was as prompt and energetic as it might have been, and ought to have been, is another ques

tion, but which is best answered by following the order of events as they arise.

It was evident, Fort George being threatened as well as Kingston, that the enemy must hold the garrisons of those two places, and of York also, immovable, until some decisive demonstration should show the object of immediate attack. Cooperation would then, of course, be too late. Each post must stand on its own resources. The embarkation was made as soon as the navigation opened in the spring, but with no published designation of its object, unless Kingston, by way of feint, were given out as that which wias in vew. York was carried without difficulty, and the loss sustained was owing principally to the explosion that took place after the landing had been fully made. We hope we misunderstand the "Notices," when they seem to imply that the-Commander-in-chief should have been with the landing party. The force was no more than a Brigadier-general's command, and was specially put under the immediate charge of an officer of that rank, who was peculiarly competent for the station. General Dearborn was on board merely as a passenger, on his way to Niagara.

The death of General Pike may have diminished the amount of success that crowned the day. He was brave and enterprising, and eager for distinction, having the unbounded confidence of his command. The pursuit, had he survived the explosion, would probably have been made with more spirit, but no better success, as he, no doubt, would also have listened to the overtures for a surrender, and, like his successor, have been beguiled out of valuable time. Had either of them, however, taken the unusual step of promptly rejecting them, and passed on to capture and destroy, (as many, under the exasperation naturally excited by a supposition that the explosion had been the result of design, felt inclined to do,) it is not at all probable that General Sheaffe, or his party, would have been overtaken, furnished, as no doubt they were, with all the facilities of a rapid movement which the place afforded, and which would have been wholly wanting to the pursuers. All was probably acquired, which any circumstances would have permitted. The vessel, which could not have been launched, would of course have been burnt by us, had it not been set on fire by the enemy. According to the plan of the campaign, no further delay was made at York than was necessary to withdraw such public stores found there as could be moved.

A prompt reembarkation then took place, and the fleet sailed. for the neighbourhood of Niagara.

The "Notices" animadvert somewhat lightly on the delay that postponed the next step, which should have been taken with all possible rapidity, consistent with due preparation. Such preparation was certainly not complete when the brigade came over from York. Many boats had to be collected or constructed, as the proposed transit was to be made in such craft. But this was done before many days had elapsed, when a bombardment of Fort George from Fort Niagara, serving the double purpose of injuring the enemy's works and of covering the descent of many boats which were up the river Niagara, seemed to finish all preliminaries. But the fleet, after landing the York brigade, had sailed for Sackett's Harbour, and its return was regarded as indispensable to the coming attack.

Commodore Chauncey most naturally feared for the safety of the vessels he had on the stocks at Sackett's Harbour, and hurried back for their protection. When he sailed thence again, had he left all the troops there which he found there, that protection would not have been diminished by his visit ; but, bringing away Colonel Macomb's regiment as he did, (of course, it is presumed, at the request of General Dearborn,) he left his ship-yard and naval stores much more weakly guarded than he found them. Hence, had the fleet remained at anchor off Niagara, instead of going to Sackett's Harbour, the crossing at Fort George would no doubt have been made a week or two sooner, and the latter place would have been much less perilled, than it actually was, in the attack by Sir George Prevost, which followed soon after his departure. We may remark further on this exposure of Sackett's Harbour, that, had the enterprise of Sir George been as successful as it might have been and should have been (for the defence of the place had been almost given up when the enemy desisted), General Dearborn would have stood convicted before the public of exposing himself to a blow behind, while looking only to his front. Indeed, he escaped the mortification of such a conviction only by an accident.

It was probably deemed important that the fleet should accompany the troops at their crossing. Its presence was certainly an imposing accompaniment, and two of its small vessels. rendered most beneficial service at the landing. They took their stations near the bank where the troops were to strike, VOL. LIII. - NO. 112.

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and soon silenced a one-gun battery there; thus freeing them from an annoyance which might have dealt much destruction among the crowded boats.* These two vessels were therefore almost essential to the expedition. More than they might have been dispensed with, excepting for the purpose of holding the reserve,-Colonel Macomb's regiment, — more at hand, as well as giving the Commander-in-chief a distant view of the landing. Whether such a detachment from the fleet might not have been left behind, and thus avoided considerable delay, is a question that has often been asked.

Fort George was finally taken on the 27th of May, about a month after the capture of York. The plan of the campaign intended that but a few days should have intervened. The "Notices," in remarking upon this attack, point out several errors in the arrangement of the troops. It is not the first time that leaving open the Queenstown road has been instanced as one. Attention was undoubtedly turned to this side of the enemy. But to have made it the main point of crossing, was forbidden by many considerations. In the first place, the boats, necessary to the transit, could not have been properly concealed or protected on the river within convenient distance. In the next place, to have shut up that avenue for his retreat, would have still left open to the enemy the road by the lake and shore, by far the most desirable for a rapid junction with the country below. There was not force enough to admit of closing up effectually both these avenues. And a division, under such circumstances, would have been against all rules of warfare and prudence.

Operating upon the lake-shore presented many advantages. The boats were all at hand, ready to receive the troops, without any molestation, the point of departure being some three or four miles east of the mouth of the Niagara river. Landing, moreover, on the lake-shore of the enemy, closed up the avenue of retreat along the lake, and threw him, whenever he chose to fall back, on the Queenstown route, which retarded his retreat towards the head of the lake a day or more, important gain of time to us, had we wisely improved it.

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* As the troops were approaching the shore during this operation of the two vessels, a small boat was seen passing to and fro between them, in much contempt of the shots that this one gun threw into the lake until it was silenced. This little wherry had Lieutenant Perry on board, who then gave an earnest of the daring which, before the season closed, lighted up another lake with a blaze of glory.

The capture of the garrison, therefore, was out of the question, unless the British had come to the improbable determination of maintaining the fort. The pursuit was not taken up with the spirit, after the enemy fell back from the lakeshore, which might have been expected. His cannon opened from the village of Newark as if he had determined to make defence there. It appeared afterwards that this battery was intended only to cover his evacuation of the fort above. As soon as it was silenced or withdrawn, the pursuit was directed by the senior general on the ground. The remark of the "Notices," that it was made without orders, may apply to the advance, but not to the brigades which followed.

Thus far, then, the plan of the campaign would seem to have been followed up with spirit, as well as with satisfactory success. Here, however, that spirit, and, of course, that success, ended. From the first day of the occupation of British ground a series of movements began, which showed little regard for that plan, and still less for the rules of warfare. When the pursuit of the enemy, after the evacuation of Fort George, was resolved upon, there was clearly but one course which held out encouragement of success. Any pursuit that proposed, like that taken up on the day of the evacuation, merely a rear-chase, was not of this character. The enemy fled through weakness, and would continue to fly as long as his relative strength remained the same, with the advantage of many hours' start, and of all such facilities as bridges, unobstructed roads, &c., which he would take good care should not remain in his rear for the benefit of his pursuers. Had there been no alternative, however, even such a hopeless chase might have been undertaken as a pis aller. But the choice was without any such restrictions. The retreat having been made on the Queenstown route, the lake road was open, which intersected the other route at about twelve miles' distance, giving our troops the advantage of some eight or ten miles. Under such circumstances there was no time to be lost. few hours might be fatal. It is true, the troops were fatigued with the labors and exhaustion of the day. Those actually engaged had had no relaxation from the dawn to the time when the evacuation took place, about noon. But there was the reserve, a strong regiment, entirely fresh, the third brigade nearly so, and the second brigade not much diminished in vigor, as the contest at the landing had been maintained

A waste of even a