"But what is number? It is, in the last analysis, such or such a number; for every number is a determinate number. It is then a finite number, whatever it may be. Raise the figure as high as you please, the number, as such, is only a particular number, an element of succession, and consequently a finite element. Number is the parent of succession, not of duration; number and succession measure time, but are not adequate to it, and do not constitute it.

"The reduction of the infinite to number is, then, the reduction of time infinite, to its measure indefinite, that is, to the finite; just as, in regard to space, the reduction of space to body is the reduction of the infinite to the finite. Now to reduce the infinite to the finite is to destroy it; it is to destroy the belief of the human race; but as before observed, it saves the system of Locke."- Elements of Psychology, p. 111.

"Every number is a determinate number." What mean then the "surds," the "imaginary quantities," and the "infinite series," of the algebraist? As to the remainder of the argument against the infinity of number, we have only to remark, that it is equally applicable to our ideas of infinite space and time. Whatever force the reasoning may have, in Cousin's theory it is suicidal. If we were disposed to profit by the unlucky admissions of our author, the sentence which immediately succeeds the passage quoted above would afford a rich field for comment. "In fact, the infinite can be found neither in sense, nor consciousness, but the finite can be found there wonderfully well." We would fain be told, where the idea of the infinite is found upon this hypothesis. In the reason, doubtless; but how does reason manifest itself, except through consciousness? If we are not conscious of any ideas or truths given by this faculty, for all practical purposes, it would seem, they might as well be withheld altogether.

The criticism upon Locke's account of Personal Identity is, in the main, just and clearly expressed. The chapter upon this subject is one of the most unsatisfactory passages in the whole Essay, the doctrine leading to the most absurd consequences, which were perceived, and yet intrepidly avowed and supported by the writer. We are at a loss how to account for the error, especially as the natural course of Locke's speculations by no means leads to such a wild doctrine, and the great blunder in it, that of confounding the witness or evidence of identity with identity itself, is at variance with every other portion of the theory.

But as the remarks on our idea of Substance in general present no such unfortunate matter for criticism, Cousin, as usual, manufactures a theory on the subject, which he puts into the mouth of Locke, and then proceeds to refute it with great earnestness and ability. The account which Locke really gives is one that coincides perfectly with all later speculations on the subject; namely, that our conception of any particular substance is a mere congeries of our ideas of various qualities or properties, together with a supposition of something else, in which these attributes inhere, and which we call Substance in general. On this plain and self-evident statement, he goes on to build up his argument against the materialists of his day,

an argument which, as it uproots from the foundation the degrading hypothesis against which it is directed, has been reproduced in one form or another by almost every metaphysician since his time, who has adopted the distinction between body and spirit. The version of it by Dugald Stewart we extract from the first volume of his work on the "Philosophy of Mind."

"The notions we annex to the words matter and mind, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid, are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter, I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, colored, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same being; to that being which he calls himself; a being, which he is led by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs."

With his usual candor and deference towards his old instructor, Stewart here avows, that he borrows from Dr. Reid; but with how much justice he attributes the origin of the argument to this writer, our readers may judge by the following quotations from Locke.

"As clear an idea of spirit as body. The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. which we, concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some other substance, which we call spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other idea or notion of matter, but something wherein those many sensible qualities which affect our senses, do subsist; by supposing a substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist, we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. It is plain, then, that the idea of corporeal substance in matter, is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions, as that of spiritual substance or spirit: and therefore, from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of body; it being as rational to affirm there is no body, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of a spirit.”

"Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of both parts of nature, the corporeal and spiritual. For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, &c. that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation; I do more certainly know, that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being."Locke, on Human Understanding, Book 2. Ch. xxiii. §§ 5, 15.

The impossibility of defining substance in general, otherwise than as something in which certain attributes inhere, is what induced Locke to repeat so frequently the assertion, that we have no clear and distinct idea of this common substratum. But that he did not intend thereby to question or deny the reality of substance, or of our idea of it, such as it is, appears from his indignant disavowal of the charge in the letters to Bishop Stilling fleet. We must confine our extract to a single sentence, but it is a decisive one.

"As long as there is any simple idea or sensible quality left, according to my way of arguing, substance cannot be discardVOL. LIII. - NO. 112. 4

ed; because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities, carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in, and of a substance wherein they inhere; and of this that whole chapter is so full, that I challenge any one who reads it to think that I have almost, or one jot, discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world."

It appears almost incredible, that Cousin, with these passages before him, should accuse Locke of "everywhere repelling the idea of substance," of "converting substance into a collection and making all things to be words," of "a systematic identification (nec meus hic sermo est) of substance and qualities, of being and phenomena. But let him be judged by his own words and quotations.

"Locke, however, everywhere repels the idea of substance, and when he officially explains it, he resolves it into a collection of simple ideas of sensation, or of reflection. B. II. ch. XXIII. §§ 3, 4, 6; ***** no other idea of substances than what is framed by a collection of simple ideas.'* ** ** ' It is by such combinations of simple ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves.' Elements of Psychology, p. 119.

The mistake here is so gross, that we can only account for it on the supposition of the writer's imperfect acquaintance with the English language. Cousin speaks of "substance,' in the singular, that is, in general; Locke, of "substances," in the plural, that is, of particular bodies. Of course, the latter's real opinion is the very one, which his critic seeks to establish against him. One other quotation is made, but as it only contains the denial that we have any "clear and distinct" idea of substance, the point at issue is not affected by it. Cousin's arguments are wholly misapplied, and his rhetoric is thrown away.

We have thus far followed Cousin's criticism step by step, that our readers might judge of the correctness with which Locke's theory is expounded by him, not from a few instances culled here and there, but by following the critic's own track from the very commencement, taking all the subjects. which he selected for attack, and considering them in his own order. Out of the first five points examined, Locke is grossly misrepresented upon four, in which a doctrine is charged upon him that he repudiates with quite as much earnestness as his critic. We do not accuse Cousin of intentional mis

representation, but he seems to have commenced his work with a preconceived opinion, that in all essential respects the system developed in the "Essay on Human Understanding must coincide with the theory of Condillac. He can see nothing which makes against this hypothesis, but fights most manfully against the Sensual system of his own countryman, thinking all the time that he is contending against Locke. So far as the English philosopher is concerned, his blows are all spent upon the air.

As our limits do not permit us to continue this minute examination of the lectures, we pass on now to those passages where the writer's own views are developed at greater length, and where the opposition between him and Locke becomes real and manifest. Cousin finds fault with the order which is given for the acquisition of our ideas; he denies that we begin with simple ideas and then proceed to those which are complex, because, as he argues, many of our faculties come into exercise at once, and the compound idea that is formed by their simultaneous action must be analyzed by a subsequent effort of the understanding, before we arrive at simple notions. If this theory be given to account for the action of mind in its mature state, it is partially correct; but if intended to describe the first steps of knowledge, to give a history of the infant mind, and such was clearly the intention of Locke, it is wholly erroneous. Of course, many avenues to knowledge are opened at once, and several agencies are exerted at the same moment. But the question is, whether the different elements, coming through separate channels, are at once referred to the same object, and therefore are immediately united and bound together in one complex idea. All observation proves the contrary. The infant perceives the color of an object long before he ascertains its shape by touch, still longer before he connects the idea of figure with that of variety in light and shade, so that he can infer the tangible from the visible qualities. The child can count ten before he can a hundred. Even to the adult, it is probable that many ideas arrive in succession, which from the quickness of the mental operations appear to come together. The synthesis really precedes the analysis, though by the force of habit, the former operation is so quickly and easily performed, that it requires an effort to stay the process and watch the steps; just as the eye of a practised accountant runs over a column of figures and determines their sum, though a moment