whether, if they had, the majority of the United States would at any other time have assented to it.

So much of a lucky accident do we consider the formation of our government, that we confess ourselves very incredulous as to the value which these papers can ever possess to any one hereafter, who shall seek in them for guides to action upon some future contingency that may occur of the same kind. Their great value appears to us to consist in the lesson they teach us, respecting the necessity of maintaining the government we have, and in the opportunity they furnish to later generations of understanding the principles which were intended to regulate its application to human events; but in this they are of value to citizens of the United States, and to them only, of all the human race. One great merit of the Constitution is, that it was so well adapted to a preexisting system of confederated States, each already possessed of an organized government of its own, as to combine them all, with as little of disturbance to established ideas and of friction in the common movement of the whole, as could reasonably be expected to occur. But this is only a relative merit. It is not positive virtue, which should recommend the system to be introduced in other States that had never been subjected to the inconveniences of a confederation. If it became a question to any nation about to change its form of government, whether, for the sake of realizing the advantages that accrue from a constitution like that of the United States, it would be desirable to organize twenty or more distinct and independent States in the various sections of the country, for it to act upon, we think it would be easy to foresee that the decision would not be in the affirmative. The experiment has failed thus far wherever it has been tried. And the conclusion to be drawn is, not that the Constitution of the United States is, in the abstract, the most perfect system of government conceivable for all countries, but that it is admirably suited to the precise purpose in America for which it was created. If you did not presuppose the peculiar character of the people to be governed, and then presuppose the exact organization into separate social communities called States, which exist here, the constitution would be of scarcely more worth than the thousand and one paper forms which have hardly outlived the date of their creation. If we are correct in our conjecture, then, it is the fitness of that instrument which is more to be considered than its abstract excellence. Hence the Madison Papers

will scarcely teach the inquirer after truth any new and marvellous axioms in the science of government, so much as the application of old and established ones to the peculiar condition of a people already organized into separate communities, and seeking no more than for certain definite objects, expected to be gained thereby, to engraft upon their established system a few features of consolidation.

Let no one, then, take up the Madison Papers with any hope to find general receipts for constitution-making in its pages, or materials with which to cultivate a captious and amendment-seeking temper towards our own. If he should, then will he be converting the wholesome nutriment of the work into virulent poison for the body politic. No. Let him rather seek it as a searcher in history for examples of the difficulty which attends the establishment of all great political innovations; and, having perceived the manner in which that difficulty was in this one instance overcome, let him be wary how he attempts to overturn, to alter, or even to modify the results, he for one is so fortunate as to enjoy. It is doubtless true, that there are many imperfections in the constitution, which it might be advisable to remedy if possible. One of the greatest merits of its framers was, that they did not pretend that it was a perfect instrument. They recommended it simply as the best that could be expected to be gained at the time; and it doubtless was the best. What is not often it has worked in practice far better than was anticipated; so well, indeed, that we think it wholly unadvisable, in quest of fancied improvements, to run the smallest hazard of doing it permanent injury.

It is far more easy for us to conceive of the formation of a good plan of government, like that of the constitution of the United States, by a select number of wise and patriotic individuals, than that, when formed by them, the people of the several States of America should have deliberately assented to its adoption; and even more than this, that after it had been adopted, this bit of paper should have continued a permanent rule of action to millions of beings for a period of time now exceeding half a century. If there were no other source of interest in the Madison Papers, these considerations would alone be sufficient to excite it in us. The problem of man's capacity for self-government upon an extended scale, still depends for its satisfactory solution exclusively upon this exam

ple. It is then natural, that we should turn to the documents which relate to the commencement of the experiment with eager curiosity. The men who made the constitution are no longer here to explain the mode in which they arrived at their first result. We must now rely for instruction upon the expositions they may have left behind them. Among these, the work now under discussion must always claim a high rank, as coming from one of the leading minds in the formation of it, and as embracing the opinions of all the others which were engaged in coöperation. It may follow, that posterity will owe to Mr. Madison a larger debt of gratitude for his posthumous publication, than he created by his valuable services whilst in public life. The most brilliant productions of existing wisdom or genius not infrequently lose all their value with the departure of the spirit that set them into activity. The principles upon which the value of a form of government. rests, must be transmitted with it, or it will soon change its character. The constitution of the United States will become a piece of parchment, whenever its living force in the breasts of the American people shall have passed away.

But what is that force which many are so fond of lauding, without ever taking the pains to comprehend an atom of its nature? We hold it to consist in that voluntary abnegation of power by masses of men for certain useful ends, which in all other forms of government is compulsive. In short, Self-restraint. The records of time furnish no instance of successful resistance to the passions which ordinarily exercise the most unbounded sway over the popular heart, like that which moved the people of these States to adopt the Constitution. There have been innumerable examples of resistance to oppression when exercised by others; very few, of surrender of the means and the will to exercise it when they are actually possessed. The revolutionary war which established our Independence was a commonplace struggle in comparison with that which erected our present form of government. The one was in accordance with that love of the largest liberty, natural to mankind. It appealed not to the reason, but to the feelings. It was the offspring of noble impulses, which might not have required much of regulating judgment. But the spontaneous sacrifice of power when once acquired, the cheerful assent to a vigorous plan of selfcontrol, involved an exercise of powers both intellectual and

moral, and a rule over resisting passions, far more difficult to execute, as it was, we think, more creditable to accomplish. It is doubtless true, that the knowledge of the principles of popular government had been long practically understood in America, under the forms which had been established by charters granted from the mother country to the colonies. But these were, after all, systems imposed, and not originated. And however directly they might lead to the maintenance of the social system, much as it had been in the several States, they furnished no precedent for the union of those States under a form in many points of paramount obligation. The common cause of Independence for a moment joined them together in a common Declaration, but this was a very different thing from a permanent government. The necessity of combining to resist the common enemy in the most effective possible manner, made the want of it immediately perceptible. But no sooner did the representatives of the States in Congress turn their attention to the construction of a systematic union, than the obstacles to their success became on all sides fearfully manifest. The resolutions organizing committees for the purpose of preparing a Declaration of Independence, and of digesting a frame of government, were passed by the Congress on the same day, the 11th of June, 1776. The first instrument was reported, considered, and adopted, by the 2d of the following July. But the second was not reported until the 12th of that month, was not adopted by Congress until the 7th of November, 1777, sixteen months afterwards, and was not ratified by the Legislatures of all the States until March, 1781. Three or four years were spent in discussing it, and the final ratification of Maryland took place long after the minds of many had become made up, that, although it might be the best thing they could get at the time, it was not the less a perishing device.

It is no doubt true, that this long delay was not wholly owing to the character of the proposed system of confederation. Both the State and general Congresses were engaged during the period in question in the arduous duty of defending the country from the enemy, who at times pressed so hard upon them as to make all other considerations secondary to that of their own safety. But if this state of things had a tendency on the one hand to delay action upon the new frame of government, it presented on the other, the strongest pos

Yet such

sible inducements to secure its acceptance at last. were the obstacles in the way of all agreement, and so great was the unwillingness of the several States to part with the power they possessed, that it may reasonably be doubted whether any thing short of the enemy thundering at the gate would have overcome them. There were jealousies of the large States on the part of the small ones, the opposition between slavery and free labor, the conflict of right to the unoccupied territories, the fear of consolidation, and, above all, the terror of a new and untried experiment, each operating with so much power, it is rather a matter of surprise that the Confederation was accepted at all, than that it was disputed so long. That instrument purported to be a compromise between all interests. It was nothing more than an attempt to retain a form of union without conceding the means to establish one. Yet, feeble and inefficient as it was, it made a necessary and very important step to the accomplishment of better things which would never have been brought about without it. It may be considered as filling up the transitionstate of the country between its infancy and its manhood.

The history of the confederation is by far the most important, though we believe it to be the least studied, portion of our annals. We call it important, because it is the account of an attempt to reduce to practice a particular theory respecting government, which has always been, and for aught we know will always be, a favorite with young minds in the United States. The germ of our party divisions must be found here. It is so fascinating an idea, that a political organization wielding power is an evil, and one which is avoidable by those who are able to govern themselves, that we are never surprised at perceiving the extremes to which the doctrine has been sometimes pushed. For this cause it is that the road to popular favor in the United States has always been by the abnegation of power; and that to an extent sometimes much further than has proved advantageous to the country. But the great example of the practical operation of such a doctrine must be studied in the years of the Confederation. That system failed, because it was deficient in the indispensable vital energy which must necessarily reside in every form of government, to make it of any use to keep up one. It failed, because the jealousy of power that is liable to abuse had been carried so far as to cut off even that share of it