It

errors. He thought the remark of Mr. Gorham a just one. was impossible to say what would be the effect in Great Britain of such a reform as had been urged. It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the crown, which went under the name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution."- p. 938.

Chief Justice Yates reports the same observations somewhat differently ;—

"In all general questions which become the subjects of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. I confess there is danger where men are capable of holding two offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious; their passions may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting how far it was necessary to support a good government. We have taken up many ideas upon trust, and, at last, pleased with our own opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of the British constitution confirms the remark, that there is always a body of firm patriots who often shake a corrupt administration. Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is, that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of those passions in order to make them subservient to the public good, for these ever induce us to action."

The man who could give utterance to such a strain of remark may have been a great politician, but he was not a good moralist. To such a man Sir Robert Walpole might easily appear the paragon of statesmen; Sir Robert, who openly declared that in his belief every man had his price, and yet who used his ill-gotten influence for the best interests of the king and country he was serving. There may be, and doubtless is, great truth in every unfavorable estimate of human nature; though it is equally likely that there will also be much of falsehood. But the good part of man's nature is not likely to have a fair chance of developement, when the hypothesis is once assumed as true, that it does not exist, or that it must be made subordinate to the bad one. Political men are too apt in all countries to rest satisfied with the narrow view, and hence VOL. LIII. - No. 112. 10

their own minds very soon share something of the taint which they are always on the watch to perceive in those of other men. For our own part, we would rather that a higher standard of public virtue be professed, even where there is not always perfect success in attaining to it. We would rather that a statesman should not avail himself too much of the passions of men even for a good purpose, and should strive a little more to arouse their principles. We would rather that he should himself set the world an example of noble aspirings, that his fellows might respect and admire even when they felt unable to follow it.

Such was, however, the texture of Mr. Hamilton's mind as we see it in the extract already quoted; and the consequence will be that for ever after posterity may adjudge him to stand in the very front rank as a practical politician, but they will refuse to put him on a level with the best of our patriots. There was in him a mixture of correct moral conception and laxity of practical application, which must qualify our respect for his memory. Although a great man, he has gained no solid hold upon the American heart, and his lamentable end only serves to confirm the conviction which grows out of the observation of his life, that he knew too distinctly what was positively right, to admit of our palliating or excusing his fault in conduct absolutely wrong.

The other gentleman of whom we would speak is James Madison. He belonged to a different order of human beings. Possessing a mind far more of a meditative cast than that of Hamilton, he inclined to study measures in their abstract principles, and the movement of life through the primal impulses which occasion it. He was a student of facts rather than of men, therefore much better calculated for the exposition of a rule of action than for the direction of it when it was to be executed. His temperament was calm, deliberative, perhaps slightly deficient in energy. He possessed a good judgment, with enough of expediency to suffer it to be biased by the impetuous force of such a bold speculator as Mr. Jefferson, whilst it exerted a more than compensating influence in restraining that boldness from making itself felt in unfortunate action. Better calculated for counsel than for the direction of events, he will appear to posterity a greater man as a framer of the Constitution in the Federal Convention, and as a legislator in the first Congress convened after it was adopted, than as a member of

the Cabinet of Mr. Jefferson or as President of the United States. When called upon to act a part in a great system of political measures devised for the purpose of securing the ascendency of his party, he approved himself a faithful lieutenant to a bold captain; but when himself afterwards promoted to the chief station, he was destined to prove, in the course of the trial to which he was put, the truth, that it is far easier to counsel than to perform. The most marked defect which he exhibited as President was in the knowledge of men. His most characteristic merit was his sound sense. He was fated to ascertain by his experience in the executive station, that doctrines which sometimes best aid a party to mount to power, are not the most serviceable in the use of it. He had none

of the false pride which put him above profiting by his lesson. The consequence was, the surrender of the system of national policy introduced by Mr. Jefferson, and the decided, though tacit, return in the last period of his administration to all the doctrines of the Washington school.

On the whole, there are few men who deserve to be regarded as more fortunate in their lives than was Mr. Madison, if indeed that may be called good fortune which was rather the result of capacity and prudence acting upon favorable circumstances. Many persons have had more than he without succeeding in using it as well. He fell into the exact position best calculated for the developement of his powers, and he filled it skilfully. The task of assisting to found a system of government for a people, in itself one of the most exalted that the world can afford, was one which all the habits of his previous life, as well as the natural turn of his mind, fitted him to perform. Without having the vigor or originality of Hamilton, he possessed other qualities which in his situation were quite as valuable. He could by his moderation act as a mediator of differences, a softener of extremes in opinion, through which virtue he not only gained a useful power over his own immediate circle of friends, but he acquired the respect and esteem, if he did not always soothe the violence, of those who were opposed to him. He was called to administer the government he had taken so large a part in establishing, at a moment when its strength was more severely tested than it has been at any other time before or since. Foreign war and domestic discord came together upon him in a manner that would have tried the nerves of the strongest man. And although, upon

looking back, we find it impossible not to censure him as wanting in the vigorous preparation which we should expect in such an exigency; yet the fact that all difficulties were ultimately overcome, that the internal disaffection accomplished no harm, that his hold upon the people carried us through the danger, and, lastly, that an honorable peace and great prosperity subsequent to it crowned his labors, will go very far to place his name high in our annals upon the list of our capable, honest, and successful statesmen.

We have already in a preceding part of this article noticed the fact, that these volumes present two distinct matters of historical interest, the one subsidiary perhaps, but scarcely inferior in interest, to the other. We very much fear that the period of the confederation will never receive from the young students of this country the share of attention which its importance would seem to require. We have already so far transgressed the usual limits of an article, that it is impossible for us at present to go into any explanation of our views. But one remark we must be allowed to make ;-If there are any persons who desire to understand the origin, and trace the movement, of the parties that have agitated this Union during the past half century, they must begin here. The first part of the Madison papers will furnish a partial insight into the system of policy which has always marked the southern section of the country; a system which has, for a considerable portion of the period mentioned, preponderated in the national government. Although not in itself to be relied upon as a guide to a correct judgment, it is so rich in materials of comparison with documents from other quarters, that it is to be hoped, when placed in the hands of some future philosophical historian, our posterity may obtain the means of understanding the truth.

The Constitution of the United States has, thus far, by the admission of all parties, established a far better practical form of government than was anticipated by any one when it was made. But it would be a curious and not unprofitable task to compare the operation of the system, as it is now understood and practised upon, with what it was during the early administration of it, and with the declared intentions of its framers. We think that some deviation could be shown, that does not promise well for the future. But in this opinion we would not venture to be positive. For, after all, there are great obstacles in the way of correct judgment by persons who witness and

take interest in a train of present events. The tendency always. is to give undue weight to passing appearances, and to assign a durable effect to what may only prove a temporary disturbing cause. An energetic and highly popular chief magistrate can give to his station a moment's preponderance in the government, which will vanish with the accession of a person of different character. The blustering of a few state politicians may sometimes create uneasiness respecting the strength of the general government, which the course of events in a short time will prove wholly superfluous. Events like these only go to show how very nicely the balances of the system were adjusted, and what a self-correcting vitality actually resides in it, which proves the wisdom of its framers. But there are other indications which are not quite so promising. Across the disputed land of strict construction and consolidation, of state rights and centralism, of slavery and of free labor, we think we perceive the elements of a storm which will shake to its centre, if it make not a wreck of the fair fabric of our present institutions. The single element which has steadily gained ground of all the others, and which involves in it the destruction of almost every balance in the Constitution, is the democratic element, the very one which, as we have seen, it was the great object of its founders to put in check. And, strange as it may seem, the path which it has chosen for itself is the one which appears to have been the least anticipated ;- we mean that through the election to the Presidency. To that every other part of the system is now made in a great measure subordinate. And, instead of being regarded as the mere Executive head, charged with the duty of carrying into effect the laws, the President is looked to, by the great body of the people, as a person whose abstract sentiments upon every subject of public interest ought to be declared and made the subject of rigid examination. Should the practice of cross-questioning every candidate for the office become settled, the time will not be far distant when they will take the field in person, and solicit the people's votes. This can hardly fail to be attended with serious consequences to the Constitution, for it will have the effect of drawing the Executive and the people into a close union at the expense of the other departments of the government, as well as of consolidating the power of the national chief magistrate at the expense of that of the States. And the end may very naturally be a pure democracy, in which the