quently differ in their judgment; and thus the matter would be left open, and must be determined by force.

In time, however, they would not only perceive the inefficacy of fuch jurifdiction to prevent contests by force, but families would become too numerous for fuch patriarchal government. Mankind therefore feeling the ill effects of ungoverned force, and occafions of conteft increasing as the fubjects of property multiplied, they were naturally led to devise some means for compelling every one to regulate his actions in conformity with those principles, which the dictates of Nature pronounced just.

CHAP.

CHAP, X.

Of the Progress of Jurisdiction.

TH

HE first expedient men would probably contrive to prevent the ill confequences of private revenge, would be to chufe fome one of diftinguished probity and understanding, whom they would appoint to determine all differences which should arise among them; agreeing at the fame time to affift him in carrying his decrees into execu¬ tion.

In this fimple model of government, if it deferves that name, we cannot conceive any legislative branch. The powers were only judicial and executive.

The

The Law, or rule of action, was declared ex poft facto, as occafions arose.

It follows that the decisions of fuch an imperfect and arbitrary judicatory must unavoidably be vague and inconfiftent. The magiftrate biaffed by his affections, might, through partiality to one, or prejudice to another, decree wrongfully; add to this, that human judgment being influenced by a variety of external and accidental causes, he would probably, at different times, view the fame circumftances in different lights, and his adjudications would of course clash with each other.

Was it reasonable however to fuppofe him fo exempt from human frailty, as to be always juft and confiftent in his decifions, yet it would be too much to expect that his fucceffors fhould inherit

the

the fame portion of understanding and integrity. Impelled by different motives, directed by different lights, each perhaps would reject the conclufions of his predeceffor, and pronounce different de

crees.

Amidst this contrariety and contradiction, there could be no established rule, by which men could frame their conduct towards each other. Unjuft or erroneous determinations would encourage the wicked to persevere in evil, and the injured would remain without any hope of redress, but from private revenge.

Mankind would be duly fenfible of the mischiefs arising from such an imperfect fyftem. Under the fenfe of evil, the mind is inceffantly occupied in contriving a remedy. And the remedy devised in this cafe, brought men on a

ftep nearer towards a more perfect frame of government.

To prevent the ill effects of fuch repugnant and inconfiftent determinations, they found it was neceffary previously to frame certain established rules or Laws, by which the members of the community were to regulate their actions with respect to each other.

Having agreed on thefe previous Laws or rules of Action, they then chofe fome perfon in whom they could confide, and appointed him Chief Magiftrate, under the obligation of judging all cafes agreeable to fuch stated Laws, and of directing execution accordingly.

Hence perhaps, ftrictly confidered, we may date the firft origin of Civil Compact;