one of the witnesses, who objected to the conversion of the daughter of the plaintiff, Miss Jessica Shylock, upon the ground that 'the making of so many new Christians would raise the price of pork.' This court is of the opinion, that in moderation, a pork diet is both healthful and invigorating, and that sausages, when their origin is not involved in too much obscurity, are a 'dish fit for a judge.' "But if we know our own hearts, we would not allow a slight advance in the price of a favorite esculent to stand in the way of the genuine conversion of the humblest Hebrew in the land. And in this we believe that we speak the sentiment of the American people, even outside of Chicago and Cincinnati; while in those two cities, the fact that such a fulfilment of Scripture would tend to raise the price of pork, would doubtless be considered the strongest possible reason for the conversion of the whole world. To their citizens no two events could appear more desirable, than that the knowledge of the Lord should cover the earth as the waters cover the sca,' and that 'prime mess' should go up a dollar a barrel. Personal motives therefore have nothing whatever to do with our decision. It is the law of the land, and our own feelings of duty that call upon us to relieve the plaintiff from his unfortunate position. We have thus disposed of the questions raised by this appeal, but we cannot close without a word of warning to Mrs. Bassanio. The bench of justice is a hard seat, as many of us can feelingly certify, very different from the rocking-chairs in which the beauty and fashion of our land are wont to disport themselves; and if in the tender and appropriate duties of wife and matron she shall forget the spirit of recklessness and intrigue which led her to occupy the position of a referee in this case, we will gladly overlook the past. But if forgetting her duties to her husband and family she shall hereafter occupy the platform, and clamor for the suffrage with the Woodhulls and Cady Stantons of the day, we shall make it our business to see if there is not some provision of the common or statute law under which she may be punished for her audacious usurpation, — verbum sap. The result of the whole matter is this: We cannot compel restitution of the money paid by the plaintiff to his daughter, as she is not a party to the action. But the entire decree of the referee must be reversed, the plaintiff must have judgment for his three thousand dollars against the defendant, with interest from the date of the bond (as there is no proof that the tender has been kept good); and he must be permitted, if he so elects, to relapse into Judaism, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.' All the judges concurring, ordered accordingly." Professor von Ihring, an eminent German jurist, in his eloquent book, "The Struggle for Law," takes a more serious view of Shylock's wrongs, and discourses as follows: "I crave the law.' In these four words the poet has described the relation of law in the subjective to law in the objective sense of the term, and the meaning of the struggle for law, in a manner better than any philosopher of the law could have done it. These four words change Shylock's claim into a question of the law of Venice. To what mighty giant dimensions does not the weak man grow when he speaks these words! It is no longer the Jew demanding his pound of flesh: it is the law of Venice itself knocking at the door of justice, for his rights and the law of Venice are one and the same; they both stand or fall together. And when he finally succumbs under the weight of the judge's decision, who wipes out his rights by a shocking piece of pleasantry; when we see him pursued by bitter scorn, bowed, broken, tottering on his way, who can help feeling that in him the law of Venice is humbled? that it is not the Jew, Shylock, who moves painfully away, but the typical figure of the Jew in the Middle Ages, that pariah of society who cried in vain for justice? His fate is eminently tragic, not because his rights are denied him, but because he, a Jew of the Middle Ages, has faith in the law, we might say, just as if he were a Christian, —a faith in the law, firm as a rock which nothing can shake, and which the judge himself feels, until the catastrophe breaks upon him like a thunderclap, dispels the illusion, and teaches him that he is only the despised medieval Jew, to whom justice is done by defrauding him." "The jurist can only say that the bond was in itself null and void, because its provisions were contrary to good morals." But failing to take this ground, "it was wretched subterfuge, a miserable piece of pettifoggery, to deny the right to shed blood in cutting the pound of flesh. Just as well might the judge deny to the person whose right to an easement he acknowledged, the right to leave footprints on the land, because this was not expressly stipulated for in the grant." Contemporaneously, an English dramatic critic said, on the same topic, "There is something grandly pathetic in the fixed claim of the Jew, as he stands in the judgment-hall, a figure of Fate inexorably persistent, demanding the penalty of his bond; he is no mere usurer punishing a bankrupt debtor; if he avenges private injuries, he also represents a nation seeking atonement for centuries of wrong. By what a technical quibble is he denied justice, and tricked out of both penalty and principal! What a pitiful cur is Gratiano to yelp at his heels! One's sympathies follow the baffled and persecuted Jew as he slowly withdraws from the court: it is impossible to feel much interested in the release from peril of that very dull personage, Antonio.” Shakspeare, in his drama of "King John,” Act I., Scene 1, gives us a trial before the Aula Regis; the king himself being present in person, Fitz-Peter being chief justiciar, in a “legitimacy case," as it was called, which involved the legitimacy of one who was said to be the illegitimate son of Richard Coeur de Lion. In that trial the doctrine pater est quem nuptias demonstrant, subject, however, to the exception of the absence of the husband extra quatuor maria, was contended for: and Lady Faulconbridge having remained in England while her husband was employed in Germany, the defendant was found illegitimate; much stress being given to the testimony of Dowager Queen Eleanor, who declared that the defendant had a “trick of Cœur de Lion's face," and that "she read in his composition the token of her son, and she was sure that she was his grandame." So, by the advice of Lord Chief Justice Fitz-Peter, judgment was given for the plaintiff; while the defendant, kneeling before the king, rose Sir Richard Plantagenet. SHIRLEY has a "Moral dressed in dramatic ornament," entitled "Honoria and Mammon." These names describe two female characters, representing honor and riches. Phantasm, servant of Mammon, proposes to Traverse, a lawyer, an introduction to his mistress, with a design of making a match between them, telling him, "I have no mind the city would your client, sir, should break his back with burden of his gold." A sort of legal lovescene ensues between the lady and the lawyer: "Traverse. . . . I can court you In a more legal way, and in the name Mammon. Arrest me? [Embraces her. Trav. And hold you fast, imprisoned in my arms, Without or bail or mainprize. Mam. This does well. Trav. I can do better yet, and put in such A declaration, madam, as.shall startle Your merriest blood. Mam. I may put in my answer. Trav. Then comes my replication, to which You may rejoin. - Currat lex! Shall we join issue presently?" In view of his approaching alliance, the lawyer says, — "Since fame spread my intended marriage With Lady Mammon, methinks the people To make sure of the lady, he confines her to his house. Just then a doctor comes, informing Traverse that he is |