"Now do only for a moment remove that envious mask!" prayed the father of gods and men to the fair object of his pursuit, whom he had succeeded in chasing into a corner.

"For shame, sir!" was the indignant reply. "You can be no god thus to persecute a defenceless woman! I thought that in this society at any rate I should be free from insult! If I could but see any of my friends this way I would have you instantly ducked in yonder fountain, you low-lived fellow, you!"

"Fair and softly, my angel!" said Jupiter, "fair and softly! I have heard too many women's tongues before now to care much about them henceforth. If you knew who it was that knelt to you, you might perhaps be a little less haughty."

I

"Never, sir!" said the Unknown. "Leave me, command you, or I must raise the house, and put you to that shame you so richly deserve."

66

66

Never, lady fair!" said Jupiter with equal energy, ❝ till I have had one glance at that beauty which it is too cruel to conceal."

"And will you promise," said the lady rather more mildly, "to leave me unmolested for the rest of the evening if I comply for an instant with your request?" By Styx!" began Jupiter.

66

66

Spare your oaths, sir," said the Unknown, "their truth has been too often proved already!" Now then, have your wish!" The mask was suddenly flung to the ground, and Jupiter beheld-Juno!!!

Only fancy the hubbub which ensued when the Gods had taken their hasty departure, or, as Mercury (who from the society he was in the habit of keeping picked up all the newest phrases) expressed it, "cut their sticks like bricks."

"Celestial powers!" screamed the muse of Poetry. "Lawks-a-mercy!" drawled the muse of Prose. "Oh! the wretch!" said Diana to her sister old maid Minerva, as they wended their way home together, lantern in hand, "oh! the villain! wouldn't I give it him if I were Juno!"

And thus ended the Muses' masquerade.

[To be continued.]

K.

SOME EXTRACTS FROM THE WRITINGS OF DUGALD STEWART.

I ALMOST fear that if the words "Scotch metaphysics" catch the eye of many of my readers in the first line, they will be deterred even from following out this sentence to its close; but if they have been induced to bear with me even thus far, I beg at once to assure them that they will find nothing very abstruse or visionary in my speculations. It is true that I would wish them to take a peep into that cloud-country, from which so many have been driven by the not unreasonable objections of the sceptical tendency and idle disputation, which have too often characterized metaphysical speculations from the North.

That the philosophy of the human mind, however, is not necessarily connected with either of these objections, the works of Butler and Paley are sufficient evidence; though the want of elevation in the style of the one, and in the principles of the other, yet leaves a desideratum for the Christian moralist to fill up. He that shall expound the principles of Butler in the language of Paley, and extend his examination over the same

D

wide field as the author whose name stands at the head of this paper, will claim a higher pedestal than has yet been awarded to any writer on moral philosophy.

It would be equally beyond the powers of the writer and the patience of the reader, to attempt in the present instance anything like a review of the various theories which, after having successively gained a few expounders and followers, have been allowed by public opinion to dissolve themselves again into the thin air from whence they derived their origin. I therefore leave such speculative questions to themselves. The analysis of the human mind can in all cases be but a most imperfect process. It is impossible to test it by the same crucial experiments as those by which physical truths are elicited. We require some neutral ground on which to fix the fulcrum of that lever, wherewith we would move the sphere of our spiritual being. The aberrations to which we are liable in all mental inquisition, are analogous to those which affect the materials of which barometers are composed, or the substance of a standard measure.-Quis custodiet custodes? Who shall weigh a weight? Who shall measure a measure? And since it will be at once apparent that in experiments upon the mind we are open to an infinitely greater number of errors, (and which cannot be with certainty allowed for in our calculations,) it may fairly be asked, though with less antithesis, Who shall analyse the mind?

I have found it necessary to use terms wholly metaphorical to express my meaning, and indeed in no other way can we give any definite notion of the principles and operations of the mind. To me indeed, though I am willing to allow the defect to exist in myself rather

than in the theories that have been propounded, whenever an attempt has been made to build up a complete mental system, and classify every variety of mental operation, it appears a mere playing with words, or arguing in a circle. Thus the Ideal theory of Berkely leaves all evidence exactly in the same relative position as that in which it found it. And when Descartes argued "cogito, ergo sum," for all that I see, he might as well have said "sum, ergo cogito."

The abstract propositions from which most of the ancient schools set out, and the professedly experimental systems of the moderns, seem both unsuited to the subject which they take in hand. I see not how the mind is to sit in judgement on itself, and to come to a decision, true, complete, and impartial. It is as if the anatomist were to attempt to dissect his own right hand, or even still further, the very scalpel with which he performs dissection. The metaphysician may sit like Achilles,

Ὃν θυμὸν κατέδων,

"Ipse suum cor edens,"

but he must be like the Kilkenny cats before he can make a perfect digestion of it.

I trust that I shall not be deemed paradoxical if I immediately proceed to commend the study of that class of writers whose imperfection I have just acknowledged. I purpose, after sketching a slight division of the subject, to exemplify the mode of discovery in mental philosophy, and the practical applicability to its laws, by reference to the theory of the association of ideas ; gladly escaping from my own society, wherever the opportunity occurs, to lay before my readers Extracts from those great guides in a mazy region, the recommenda

tion of whose works is the object of the present slight attempt.

Mental science, deriving our division from the writers on the subject rather than from any distinction in the nature of the thing, may admit of three classifications:

1st, Metaphysical, which attempts to explain the nature and classify the operations of the mind.

2ndly, Ethical, which treats of the moral powers and their development in action.

And 3rdly, One which (at present undistinguished by any appropriate name, though it has sometimes loosely been called Philosophy of the Human Mind,) embraces the application of theories to character and manners, life and literature, taste and the fine arts.

The connexion of these branches is of course so intimate, and the separation so arbitrary, that few authors have given their attention to any one without bringing the others under discussion; nor have I been able, I fear, even in these few pages, to avoid altogether an inter-nomination of the several divisions above mentioned. My remarks will, however, be chiefly confined to the subject matter falling under the third head.

Now though we may admit the impossibility of perfecting any satisfactory theory of the human mind, there are certain truths at which we may arrive, without attempting a complete classification. As it has been well remarked by a talented writer in an early number of the Edinburgh Review, our knowledge in mental science must be acquired by observation rather than experiment; and we must proceed in recording our additional knowledge more on the plan of the geographer than the naturalist, mapping down the results of our observations in their proper places, without attempting to refer them on the first discovery to a predetermined arrangement.