Gen. Sheridan that he established this post, and it is believed he spent several months there. There is high military authority for saying that the assistant quartermaster who was sent to Fort Sill to build the post, reached there with "an establishment which he traveled with from Fort Harker to the post, of floored hospital tents, cooking-stoves, and teams for his own use that a major-general would never have thought of, and he a captain." He was allowed twenty mechanics. "He organized them into a party of clerks, agents, overseers, and head men, till he had no men to do any work. After hiring them a year and putting up one store-house, that had to be pulled down by his successor, he was relieved." Again, there is the same authority for stating that an assistant quartermaster, since the war, was stationed at Fort Gibson, Indian Territory, to build a military post. "He expended $350,000 there, mostly for building the post, yet $30,000, properly applied, would have produced all he could show for the money. The only action ever taken in this case was a letter of thanks from the quartermaster-general, for the efficient manner in which he had performed his duties. He at one time had sixteen young men as clerks, agents, etc., under pay." The same authoritymilitary authority-makes this general remark in connection with the performances of the assistant quartermasters at Fort Sill and Fort Gibson: "These men all get about them a great and costly establishment of aids and helps, that goes far to consume any funds put in their hands. Their head clerks become private secretaries, and are held under pay whether their chiefs are on duty or not. These officers, or at least many of them, have become more costly than useful." These quotations are the exact language of an officer of the army now in service. They are taken from letter addressed to Mr. Banning, the chairman of the military committee of the House of Representatives, under date of February 6, 1876, and he is informed in the same letter that the assistant quartermasters referred to as operating at Forts Sill and Gibson are still kept in the service. The writer (Gen. Hazen) adds: “I have given but two examples of a dozen I could name." The names of the other ten and the character of their operations

as assistant quartermasters were not called for by the military committee, who, as the result of their investigations on the 9th of March, 1876, made a report to the House, urgently recommending the transfer of the Indian bureau to the war department, as a means of insuring honesty, economy, and fairness in the administration of Indian affairs!

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE TRANSFER QUESTION IN THE 45TH CONGRESS.-A JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE SUBJECT.-ITS ACTION.-TESTIMONY OF GEN. SHERMAN AND OTHERS.-REMARKABLE TESTIMONY OF GEN. MEIGS.THE COST OF SUPPORTING THE ARMY COMPARED WITH THE COST OF SUPPORTING THE INDIANS, ETC., ETC.

IN the month of February, 1878, the committee on Indian affairs of the House of Representatives, reported a bill in favor of the transfer of the care and custody of the Indian tribes from the interior to the war department. With the report the committee submitted the testimony of several military officers as the basis for its action. Prominent among these was the testimony of Gen. Carleton. The reasons which this officer gave why the transfer should be made, were the following: Under the war department which controls the forces operating in the Indian territories, there would, if it had charge of the Indians, be no conflict of opinion as to what should be done in given cases; "for, as the fountain from whence might emanate instructions, whether to commanders, superintendents, or agents, would be one, so the different streams of authority and regulations descending through these subordinates should be of the same character. In my opinion (said Carleton) the office of commissioner of Indian affairs should be abolished, if it be incompatible with the law to have an army officer to fill it ex officio, contemplating the placing of the Indian bureau under the direction of the war department, and organizing it systematically, so that its operations should harmonize with those of the troops, and the two run together as parts of the same machine.

I would have not only the head of the Indian bureau an officer of the army, but each commander of a military department should be an ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the Indians in that department, and the commander of one post nearest any one tribe of Indians in that department

should be the agent ex officio for that tribe." Thus the Indians would be remitted to the care and management of commanders of departments and their subordinates without restraint, which is substantially in conformity with the views of Gen. Sheridan. He would have no military officer detailed to preside over an office in the war department, known as the bureau of Indian affairs, but remit the whole matter to the commanding officers of military departments in which Indian tribes are located, who should be ex officio in charge of the Indians therein. In Chapter X. of this work some detail is given of military operations in New Mexico in 1862-3-4, and in Arizona in 1869. At that time there were no civil agents in either of these territories, and hence the military operated in Indian matters without restraint. Gen. Carleton was then the commander in New Mexico, and exercised as full and unrestrained authority and power over the Indians as though his views and those of Gen. Sheridan had been embodied in a law of Congress. The reader is especially referred to this detail, since the facts contained in it exhibit Gen. Carleton acting without restraint, and as if, in fact, he was ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the Indians of New Mexico. In view of his conduct at that time, it is surprising that the committee on Indian affairs should, in the year 1878, present him as authority in favor of the transfer of the Indians to the war department, and embody his views in their report in favor of the measure.

The bill reported passed the House of Representatives. The Senate did not approve of the measure; but, in its stead, a clause was inserted in the army appropriation bill, providing for a joint committee, consisting of three senators and five representatives, with instruction to take into consideration the transfer of the Indian bureau to the war department. This joint committee was authorized to employ a clerk and stenographer, to sit during the recess of, and make final report to Congress, on or before the first of January, 1879. This joint committee was composed of Senators Saunders, Oglesby, and McCreery, and Representatives Scales, Boone, Hooker, Stewart, and Van Vorhes. It took the testimony of many witnesses, addressed letters of inquiry to the secretaries of the

war and interior departments, and visited sections of country between the Mississippi river and the Pacific coast, with a view to personal inspection of Indian tribes and agencies; and thus sought to obtain the information desired. On the part of Messrs. Scales, Boone, and Hooker, this was wholly unnecessary, since they were members of the House committee, and united in the report made in February, 1878, recommending the transfer. This joint committee laid before Congress the result of its inquiries, in the shape of two reports, being evenly divided-four in favor, and four against the transfer. The four who favored the measure were Senator McCreery and Representatives Boone, Hooker, and Scales. The four opposed to the transfer were Senators Saunders and Oglesby, and Representatives Stewart and Van Vorhes. All who favored the transfer were Democrats, and from the Southern States; and all who opposed it were Republicans, and from the Northern States. The testimony submitted by the joint committee to Congress covers more than four hundred printed pages. From the perusal of this testimony, it is quite clear that the members who favored the transfer relied mainly on the testimony of the officers of the army to support their view. Indeed, when quoting from the testimony of Gen. Sherman, they said, if space permitted, they could refer "to the statements of many other intelligent and distinguished officers of the army, who are supposed to know, and who, no doubt, reflect the feelings of the army officers generally, on this subject." In this connection, and at this point, the advocates of the transfer, in their report, introduced the substance of the testimony of Gen. Sherman. He concludes thus:

"The war department can employ civil agents for the the peaceful tribes, and military agents for the warlike tribes. "Christian and civilizing influences can be as well used by the military as the civil.

"There will be less hypocrisy and cant with the military agents than with the civil.

"The military will keep the peace, protect reservations against unlawful intrusions by the whites, and can allow and