DE BOW'S REVIEW:

A MONTHLY JOURNAL

OF

COMMERCE, AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURES, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT, STATISTICS,

[THE subject of Cuba has certainly interest enough to warrant us in inserting the views of intelligent contributors, whether in every respect we agree with them or not. We are always disposed to have every important subject fairly discussed.]-ED.

any power or individual whatever."By the provisions of that treaty, had it been agreed upon, the United States would have been under the necessity, in connection with the other two governments, of resisting any attempt on the part of the people of Cuba themselves to render their island independent of the crown of Spain; such, in our opinion, is the proper construction of the proposed treaty, and such would, beyond all question, those two governments have placed upon it. Even if our government had no desire to come into possession of Cuba, either now or hereafter, still, we could not, without being false to our principles and duties, permit any other government to interfere in a contest between the people of Cuba and the Spanish government; much less could we ourselves become a party to any such interference with a view to continue the dominion of Spain over Cuba.

In our former article, published in the January number of the Review, we expressed the opinion that the best position which Cuba could occupy, would be that of an independent government, free from the control either direct or indirect of any other power. At the time that article was written, the correspondence between our government and other governments concerning Cuba, had not been published, and the discussion in the Senate of the United States, relative to Cuban affairs, had not taken place. We have, however, seen nothing, either in the diplomatic correspondence or in the Congressional debates, to cause us to change our views as expressed in that article, but, on the contrary, much to confirm and strengthen them. There seems to be no difference of opinion as to the propriety of the course pursued by our government in rejecting the proposals made by the governments of Great Britain and France, for a triparte Independently of the fact that it may, convention in reference to Cuba. This at some future time, under a different act of our government, doubtless, meets set of circumstances from those now exwith the hearty approbation of the whole isting, become necessary for the United people of the United States. The pro- States, as a measure of safety, to acquire position of these two governments was Cuba, the objectionable feature we have not merely that neither Great Britain, just alluded to would have been suffiFrance, nor the United States, should cient to cause our government to refuse either now, or at any future time, obtain to enter into any such treaty as the one possession of Cuba; but it went further, proposed. Whether we shall acquire and required those governments to "bind Cuba or not; or, if we do, at what time, themselves to discountenance all such and upon what terms, are questions attempts to that effect, on the part of solely between Spain, Cuba, and the

VOL. XIV.

1

United States, and in which we cannot people of Cuba are contented with it, or recognize the right of any other govern- are unwilling to make an attempt to ments to interfere. However they may throw it off, it is not our business, if view it, it seems to us too clear to admit they do not wish freedom, to interfere in of discussion, that both Great Britain the regulations of other governments, and France would be benefited by the under the pretext of giving liberty to the annexation of Cuba to the United States. oppressed. If we may judge from the The commercial advantages which they history of the past expeditions, we have would enjoy with Cuba, would then be every reason to believe the people of much greater than they are at this time. Cuba have very little sympathy with The development of the resources of those who go there for the purpose of Cuba and the increased productions enabling them to throw off the dominion consequent upon its annexation to this of Spain. If they are not contented country, would greatly benefit all the with their burdens, they at least seem commercial nations of the earth, and not to have energy and spirit enough to scarcely any more than Great Britain cause them to make an attempt to get and France. The burdens which are clear of them. How long this state of now placed upon Cuban industry are a things will continue, we cannot say. serious detriment to the whole commer- Unless, however, the Spanish governcial world, and the removal of these bur- ment shall greatly change its policy in dens, which would be the sure result of the reference to Cuba, we cannot believe annexation of that island to the United she will long continue to hold dominion States, would operate as a blessing to all over that island. Will she do this? nations. For these reasons we cannot That is the question. But even if she see why either Great Britain or France should change her policy, will she not should oppose the purchase of Cuba by sooner or later find it to be her interest the United States. But in determining to abandon her American colonies, on whether it would be good policy in our account of its being more expensive government to acquire Cuba, there are than profitable to retain them? Would other things to be considered besides the it not be more advantageous to her, even effect of that measure upon England now, to establish the independence of and France. We are to consider whe- Cuba, than to hold it as a colony? Great ther we would ourselves be benefited, Britain, it is universally admitted, has and whether such an acquisition can be been more benefited by the United honorably and safely made. We think States as an independent government, we are warranted in saying, that the than she would have been by continualmost entire public sentiment of the ing them as colonies. We believe the United States is against any other than time is rapidly approaching when all a fair and honorable acquisition of Cuba, the European governments will find it to no matter how desirable that acquisition be their true policy, to abandon all their may be. Such are the views which the colonial possessions on this continent, debates in Congress and the diplomatic and to permit them to become independ correspondence of our government show ent. We are satisfied that Great Britain to be the prevailing public sentiment would be greatly benefited by permitof the country. Hostile expeditions ing Canada to dissolve her political conagainst the Island of Cuba, made with a nection with the British government, view of wresting it from the crown of and to become an independent nation. Spain, do not meet with the sanction There may be, and perhaps are, reasons either of the government or people of for the establishment of colonies by the United States.

Great Britain and other European na tions, but when these colonies are firmly established, and become able to maintain a separate and independent existence, then the mother country, no less than the colonies, will be benefited by recogniz ing and securing that independence.

Many of our statesmen anxiously desire Cuba, and are willing, as they themselves say, to give an extravagant price for it; but there are none of any character who wish to violate our treaty stipulations, and to obtain it by unfair, clandestine, and violent means. There is One of the main objects of colonizabut little doubt that the present govern- tion is the extension of commerce, fot, ment of Cuba is one of the worst and by the establishment of foreign colonies, most oppressive in existence; yet, if the the mother country not only finds an

Proposed Treaty-Consequences of a War with Foreign Powers. 419

outlet for a portion of its surplus popu- ple of the United States are not provoked lation, but also enlarges its commerce into a war with Spain, they will not atand extends its trade. But when, in the tempt to get Cuba except by purchase; course of time, it is ascertained that even if they do that, of which we have these objects will be better accomplish- many doubts; but if a war should take ed by recognizing the independence of place between Spain and the United the colonies, and permitting them to States, those in this country who now establish a government of their own, believe it would be unwise to acquire then any wise government will pursue Cuba in any manner, could not prevent this course. After the colonies become its acquisition, even if they did not independent nations, they will naturally, themselves become convinced that, with

unless the war is provoked by her. This government is not so lost to all high and honorable feelings as to engage in a war with Spain merely to gratify those who, under the pretext of giving liberty to the oppressed, wish to make a

her own rash and imprudent course, force this government to take up arms in defence of her honor, and the rights of her citizens.

on account of their sympathies with the all its evils, acquisition was our only mother country, be more apt to trade alternative. If then Spain wished to with her than with any other nation; prevent the annexation of Cuba to the if she has pursued a wise, liberal, and United States, she would do well not to just course towards them. This is owing bring on a war with the United States; to the fact, that, though they be different for we are satisfied that our government governments, they are similar to each will not engage in a war with Spain, other in tastes, feelings, laws, institutions, and race, and, although two nations, they will be in many respects one people. We, therefore, believe that many of the European governments will eventually give up most, if not all, of their colonial possessions, finding the expenses of conquest of Cuba; but Spain may, by maintaining them greater than the profits derived from them as colonies. Such, we think, is even now the position of Spain in reference to Cuba. The expense of the large naval and military establishments, which Spain finds it necessary to keep in Cuba, together with the other expenses incident to the government of the island, are now, perhaps, almost as great as the revenues derived from the island. Were Cuba independent, all this heavy expenditure would be dispensed with, and her commerce with Spain, as well as with other nations, would be greatly increased. The people of Cuba, being of Spanish origin, would naturally prefer trading with Spain, rather than with any other nation, if she would pursue a liberal course towards them, and would permit them to become independent. Spain seems to feel that her hold upon Cuba is very precarious, and that is, perhaps, the reason of the harsh and stringent measures adopted by her in reference to that island. But the measures which she adopts are the very ones most likely to produce the result which she seems so much to dread. She may, by her own imprudent course, provoke a war with the United States; and if she does, the inevitable result of that war will be not only the loss of Cuba without any compensation, but the annexation of that island to the United States. If the peo

In that event we consider the annexation of Cuba to the United States as a sure result. But this is not the only way in which the same effect may be produced. Should Great Britain, or France, attempt to intercept any citizens of the United States, who might be supposed to be engaged in an expedition against Cuba, the result would be war. For our government cannot and will not permit Great Britain and France to take upon themselves the protection of the Spanish authorities in Cuba against expeditions from this country. Those who engage in such expeditions, become liable to their own government, and the government of Spain. If they fail, they will have to pay the penalty of their own misconduct; but they are in no sense responsible to the governments of Great Britain and France. These governments have no right to interfere with them in any way, and if they do so, it would be a just cause of offence to our government. By some such interference as this, war may be produced between the United States and Great Britain, or France; and the result of that war would, we think, be the conquest of Cuba, by the United States, and its incorporation into our Union. The at-all

hazards advocates of Cuban annexation in this country, are aware that such results would follow a war between the United States and any of the great maritime powers; and, therefore, they are not at all unwilling to see such a war commenced.

What the consequences of such a war would be to the island of Cuba, we do not think it very difficult to foresee. Its commerce would be seriously injured, and its value, as a producing country, would be greatly diminished. If we should then gain Cuba, as we believe would be the case, we would have to take it stript of its wealth, and deprived of much of its present value.

such would not be the result, she would, we believe, be willing before long to see Cuba independent.

This is, in our opinion, the best position that she could occupy; and were she now an independent government, we do not believe there would be as much danger of her annexation to the United States, as there is under existing circumstances. Many of the arguments in favor of annexation would then be removed. She would then be in no danger of being transferred by Spain to any of the great maritime powers, to prevent which, many of our people wish our government to acquire her immediately. There would then be no danger of a war between the United States and any European power, growing out of an attempt to free Cuba from the dominion of Spain. The institution of slavery would then be under the control of the Cubans themselves, without the danger of foreign interference, and thus one great cause of apprehension to the people of the southern states would be removed. The slave trade would be effectually abolished, and many of the harsh and forbidding features which now characterize slavery there would cease, and it would assume more of the humane and domestic features of that institution, as it exists in the southern states of this Union. The commanding military position of the island would not then endanger any of the nations engaged in the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. This gateway of the Gulf would be open to all nations, and thus the rivalries and jealousies of the great maritime nations on account of Cuba would be at an end.

Cuba, as she now is, contributes much to the commerce of the United States. Our imports into Cuba amount to more than $8,000.000 per annum, and our exports from that country amount to between thirteen and seventeen millions. These would be greatly increased if the Spanish government would reduce its rates of duties, and would give to the people of Cuba a milder and a more just government, but would be in a great degree destroyed in the event of a war for the acquisition of that island. If Spain would give to Cuba a good government, or if Cuba were independent, the United States then would enjoy most, if not all, the commercial advantages that could be obtained by its annexation to this country. Not only would the United States be benefited by a change in the policy of Spain towards Cuba, but so would also Great Britain and France. We, therefore, think that those nations, instead of endeavoring to form a treaty with the United States, for the purpose of securing to the crown of Spain the island of Cuba, would be better engaged in using their efforts to induce the Spanish government to change its policy towards Cuba, or to permit it to become independent. They would thus be more wisely and properly employed than in issuing orders to their naval officers to protect Cuba from hostile expeditions or in proposing tripartite conventions in reference to Cuba. Spain would doubtless be much more willing to see Cuba independent, than to see her annexed to the United States; and one great objection she has to the acknowledgment of her independence is the fear that she would in that event enter into the American Union. If she could be assured that be settled.

If Cuba can remain safely in the hands of Spain without endangering the peace of the world, she can much more safely be independent, enjoying the friendship of all nations, opening her ports alike to all, and enabling them to reap the rich rewards of an extensive commerce with her. Were Cuba independent, there would then be no pretext for hostile expeditions against that island, under the disguise of wishing to give liberty to the oppressed, and consequently the peace of the world would not then, as it is now, be endangered by such expeditions, and thus many of the delicate questions which are likely to arise between the great maritime powers, in reference to Cuba, would

Arguments in favor of Annexation considered.

421

Mr. Calhoun, whose words of wisdom part of our own country. If our object should never be forgotten, said "We have is to acquire territory, to furnish homes now most of the commercial advantages for our growing population, we had much without the expense of administering better acquire a portion of Mexico than the government." If this is the case Cuba. The objection to the acquisition of with Cuba, as at present governed, how Cuba, growing out of the fact that it is much better would it be if she were in- settled by a population differing from us dependent. We would then have all the in race, institutions, laws, religion, mancommercial advantages without the ners, habits and feelings, is insuperable. danger and expense of administering the It may be, and has been said, that if we government. We cannot see any possi- owned the island it would soon be Ameble advantage that we would have from ricanized. We ask, is this reasonable? the annexation of Cuba, that we would If there were only a few there of the not have from its being independent.- Spanish race, this might be the case; The reasons urged in favor of annexa- but we think it idle to talk of Americantion are far from being satisfactory. We izing an island having a population of are told that we must get possession of 600,000 Spaniards, or descendants of that island, to keep the gateway of the Spaniards, upon an area less than that gulf from being closed, and our com- of either Tennessee, Alabama, or any of merce seriously injured. However this the southern states. The fact is, that may have been formerly, that danger is but few of our people comparatively now removed. Great Britain and France would go to Cuba to live, even if it were both disclaim any intention to acquire a part of this confederacy; since so Cuba; and they both well know, that many of our states and territories furnish any attempt of the kind would lead to so many more inducements and advana war with this country. tages to those desirous to emigrate, than Cuba would. That island would remain, as now, Spanish in its population and Spanish in its character.

Again, we are told that our revenues would be increased by annexation.This may be true, but still it furnishes no argument in favor of that measure. Our revenues are already sufficiently large, and there is more danger of our having too much money in the treasury, than there is of having too little. A surplus revenue is a much greater injury than benefit. This is upon the supposition that we are to get Cuba without any internal or external difficulties; and even then, we do not see that we are to be so much benefited; but if we are to get it at the end of a war, then there would be no danger of a surplus re

venue.

It is sometimes said the South will be strengthened by the acquisition of Cuba. This is a fatal mistake. That island has now a population consisting of 600,000 whites, 400,000 slaves, and over 200,000 free blacks, upon an area much smaller than many of our southern states. There is more land in cultivation in Cuba, in proportion to the whole extent of its territory, than there is in the southern states of this Republic. The natural increase of the present population of Cuba will be sufficient for all purposes in that island. Those of our citizens who wish cheap lands would greatly prefer going to our western states and territories, than going to Cuba, even if it were a

In

The situation of Cuba is not similar to that of Louisiana when we purchased it. There were but few French or Spanish inhabitants in that territory when it was purchased, and the area of Louisiana was much greater than that of Cuba. 1810, several years after the purchase, there were less than 100,000 inhabitants in Louisiana, and there are more than 1,000,000 in Cuba. Even at this time Louisiana has only about half the population of Cuba upon a much larger extent of territory. The cases, therefore, are not similar. The annexation of Cuba would not restore the numerical strength of the South in the Union, because even after its acquisition the North would have a large majority in Congress; and when we reflect that the annexation of Cuba would be made a pretext, on the part of the North, for annexing Canada and other free territories, ought not the South to take care not to furnish the excuse? With what grace can those in the South, who advocate the annexation of Cuba, oppose the proposition which will certainly be made to annex Canada? The same or similar arguments will be made in favor of annexing Canada that are now made in regard to Cuba. We will find it as easy to get Canada, wheth