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CHAPTER XVI

WISCONSIN IN THE WAR OF 1812

The War of 1812, sometimes denominated the second War for American Independence, was entered upon for a variety of reasons. Broadly considered, it was but a minor part of a world-wide convulsion which had been precipitated by the outbreak of the French Revolution over a score of years before. In recent years the American nation, rich, populous, and powerful, has made the discovery that it could not hold aloof from a war in which were enrolled the chief powers of the world. Much less could the United States a century earlier, when relatively weak and insignificant, maintain its neutrality in the face of the convulsion which was then agitating the occidental world. The truth seems to be that in times of such convulsions, when the great powers of the earth are arrayed against each other in a conflict on whose outcome rests their continued existence as independent nations, the rules of intercourse between nations which have been formed to meet the needs of normal times become hopelessly inadequate, and there is no longer room in the world for neutral powers to ply their peaceful vocations.

The United States, in the years which preceded the second war with England, had no desire for war, and the government, under the pacifist leadership of President Jefferson wooed peace with unwearied enthusiasm. The theory which seems widely prevalent in the United States today that a nation can avoid war by the simple expedient of refraining from aggressions upon its neighbors and reducing itself to a state of military impotence which shall prevent it from resenting aggressions directed against it, finds its complete refutation in the case of the United States a century and a quarter ago. The history of that period no normal American can read today without experiencing feelings of anger and shame; anger over the long-continued outrages and insults inflicted upon our country by the two chief powers of Europe, and shame that our forefathers, by their failure to resent these outrages, so long permitted them to continue.

Goaded beyond endurance, the nation at length blundered, hesitantly and half-heartedly, into the War of 1812. It would be a difficult thing to demonstrate that England, against whom we finally decided to fight, had subjected the nation to greater outrages than France, whose

ally, to all practical intents, we became. Nor is such a demonstration necessary, for it is abundantly clear that we had accumulated an ample store of grievances against both nations; since we could not well fight both at the same time, our government was entitled to choose for itself against which the sword should be drawn.

Our concern in the present narrative is chiefly with Wisconsin and the West, rather than with the war in its entirety. In no other section were the people so eager for war. In New England, the dominant interests were so bitterly opposed to it, and to the party in control of the government, as to give rise to suspicion of their loyalty to the Union. The middle and southern states were, on the whole, favorably disposed toward the war. On the western frontier, however, the traditional enmity toward England, the inheritance of the Revolution, was but little modified by the commercial motives which committed New England to a policy of peace. On the other hand, the spirit of expansion was strong and the greed for land was unappeased. Moreover, the West had lived for a generation under the menace of the Indian, and all western men firmly believed that for this menace the British were principally responsible. By the conquest of Canada, a feat whose early accomplishment was confidently anticipated, the West would secure at once the removal of the Indian menace, dearly-anticipated revenge for ancient wrongs, and appeasement of the land hunger which possessed the pioneers.

The sincerity of the demand of the West for war can hardly be questioned in view of the fact, apparent to all, that upon the people of this section would fall a greater share of the burdens and dangers of war than upon those of any other part of the Union. Ohio and Kentucky must furnish the bulk of the fighting men for the defense of the extended northwestern frontier, which would once more reëcho the tread of marching armies and resound with the shrieks of tortured women and children.

For the defense of the western frontier there existed at the beginning of 1812 half a dozen widely-scattered army posts each garrisoned by a handful of regular soldiers. Detroit, Fort Wayne, Mackinac, and Fort Dearborn were the chief of these; stockade posts which might ordinarily be defended against an attack by Indians, but wholly inadequate to oppose the weapons of a civilized power. These garrisons were obviously of but slight account in the struggle that now impended, whose brunt must be borne by the citizens of the West enrolled as volunteer militia. Both in Ohio and Kentucky there was no lack of volunteers at certain times the government was even embarrassed by the numbers that presented themselves-but the militia, with little training or discipline, and even less inclination to acquire these neces

sary qualifications of a soldier, could not be relied upon for any extended operations.

The most hopeful thing that could be said about the American situation and prospects in the war is that the plight of their opponents was no better. In the warriors of the northwestern tribes, who were for the most part partisans of the British, they possessed an ally instantly ready for war and capable of inflicting great damage upon the Americans. Yet past experience had demonstrated over and over again the unreliability of the Indians as auxiliaries in a war between civilized powers; and fresh evidence of this inutility was to be afforded by the conflict about to begin. The main reliance of the British in the Northwest lay in the hundreds of men engaged in the fur trade, whom economic interest and patriotic sentiment alike united to enroll under the banner of Great Britain.

Wisconsin still remained a wilderness, inhabited chiefly by savages. Green Bay and Prairie du Chien were now considerable fur trade settlements, while at Milwaukee and La Pointe were centers of lesser importance. Although an American garrison had held Mackinac since 1796 and Fort Dearborn (on the site of Chicago) since 1803, the fur trade of Wisconsin was still dominated by British traders with headquarters at Montreal. The French residents of Green Bay, although nominally citizens of the United States, seem with but a single exception to have supported the course of Great Britain in the war. At Prairie du Chien the American influence was stronger, and divided sentiments prevailed, although the partisans of Great Britain were largely in the majority. With the outbreak of the war, the British, by capturing Detroit, Mackinac, and Fort Dearborn, gained complete control of the upper Northwest, and Wisconsin throughout the war was to all practical intents British territory. The line of the American frontier stretched from St. Louis eastward through Vincennes, Ind., and on through southern Ohio. The scene of the major military operations in the Northwest was around the western end of Lake Erie, and Wisconsin, as in earlier wars, served chiefly as a recruiting ground for warriors who went forth to fight the battles of Great Britain. The growth of St. Louis and other Missouri settlements, however, enabled the Americans to contest vigorously the British domination of the upper Mississippi, and out of this developed a long-continued contest over the possession of Prairie du Chien.

For the Americans, the opening months of the war were crowded with gloom and disaster. To General Hull, who had long been governor of Michigan Territory, the command of the forces in the West was entrusted. Hull had won an enviable reputation in the Revolution, but his administration as governor had not been conspicuously success

ful and he neither asked nor desired the responsible command that war now thrust upon him. He had repeatedly expressed to his superiors at Washington the conviction that the naval command of the lakes was essential to the success of the American arms and the retention of Detroit and the Northwest. The incompetent administration at Washington ignored his representations, and at the same time charged him not merely with the defense of the Northwest but with the invasion of Canada from Detroit. To accomplish this extensive program a force of 2,000 men was placed at his disposal, of which all but a small proportion were raw Ohio militia. With these he must cut a road through the wilderness of northern Ohio, establish blockhouses to protect his line of communications for 200 miles through the Indian country, protect the settlements, and conquer Upper Canada. The mere statement of the task is sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of executing it with the means at his disposal.

The northward march of the little army began from Urbana, Ohio, about the middle of June. Almost immediately a portion of the militia manifested grave insubordination, which was quelled only by calling out the one regiment of regulars against them. The advance was pressed with energy but incessant rains, combined with the labor of cutting a road and bringing forward supplies for the army, made progress slow. On June 26, when Hull received a message warning him that war was about to be declared and urging him to press forward with all possible speed, he had covered but seventy-five miles from Urbana and was still thirty-five miles from the Maumee Rapids. He reached this point four days later, and here committed his first serious blunder. To save transportation, his personal baggage, private papers, and hospital stores were embarked on a vessel for Detroit. Meanwhile, Congress had declared war on June 18, and the British, receiving early news of this, seized the vessel with all it contained. Thus they learned of Hull's strength, and of his instructions from the government.

On July 5, Hull reached Detroit and four days later received orders from Washington to begin the invasion of Canada. According to General Dearborn's plan of action, the main expedition was to invade Canada by way of Lake Champlain, while simultaneously flanking invasions would be begun from Detroit, Niagara, and Sackett's Harbor. In pursuance of this program, Hull crossed the river and occupied Sandwich. Here he settled down, instead of pressing the attack on Malden. Meanwhile, Dearborn, upon whose invasion of Canada by way of New York the success of Hull's operations depended, was accomplishing nothing. In this crisis of affairs the British discovered a great leader in the person of Gen. Isaac Brock. Taking prompt advantage of the inactivity of the army under Dearborn in New York,

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FORT CRAWFORD AT PRAIRIE DU CHIEN A CENTURY AGO Reproduced from painting by Henry Lewis in Das Illustrierte Mississippithal.

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