with requirements looking to prevention of the spread of contagion, provided these requirements are not positively unreasonable in their character. Is the regulation now under consideration a reasonable one? That is to be judged of in the first instance by the city authorities and the school board. It is only in the case of an abuse of discretionary powers that the court will undertake to supervise official discretion. Vaccination may be, or may not be, a preventive of small-pox. That is a question about which medical men differ and which the law affords no means of determining in a summary manner. A decided majority of the medical profession believe in its efficacy. The municipal regulations of many, and I have no doubt of most, of the cities of this state and country, provide for it. In the present state of medical knowledge and public opinion upon this subject it would be impossible for a court to deny that there, is reason for believing in the importance of vaccination as a means of protection from the scourge of small-pox. The question is not one of science in a case like the present. We are not required to determine judicially whether the public belief in the efficacy of vaccination is absolutely right or not. We are to consider what is reasonable in view of the present state of medical knowledge and the concurring opinions of the various boards and officers charged with the care of the public health. The answers of the city and the school board show the belief of the proper authorities to be that a proper regard for the public health and for the children in the public schools, requires the adoption of the regulation complained of. They are doing, in the utmost good faith, what they believe it is their duty to do; and though the plaintiff might be able to demonstrate by the highest scientific tests that they are mistaken in this respect, that would not be enough. It is not an error in judgment, or a mistake upon some abstruse question of medical science, but an abuse of discretionary power, that justifies the courts in interfering with the conduct of the school board or setting aside its action. It is conceded that the board might rightfully exclude the plaintiff's son if he was actually sick with, or was just recovering from, the small-pox. Though he might not be affected by it, yet if another member of the same family was, the right to exclude him, notwithstanding he might be in perfect health, would be conceded. How far shall this right to exclude one for the good of many be carried? That is a question addressed to the official discretion of the proper officers; and when the discretion is honestly and impartially exercised the courts will not interfere. 19 School district not liable for the employment of a physician by the school board under act of 1899. 629. The school board quarantined the home of A. for small-pox and B., the physician, rendered medical services and charged the school district for attendance, although the physician admits that he had no contract with the school board to render the services, but claims that under the act of 1899 the school district is liable. The court said: "It is well settled by numerous decisions of our courts that 'school districts are those sub-divisions of towns or townships made for the purpose of maintaining schools. They are not bodies politic or corporate, with the general powers of corporations, but may be considered as quasi-corporations with limited powers co-extensive with duties imposed upon them by statute or usage and therefore the strict principles of law respecting corporations cannot in all cases be applied to these aggregate bodies created usually by statute.' Even if the plaintiff had shown a contract with the school board it would be incumbent upon him to show that the board had authority to make such a contract. He relies upon the act of April 11, 1899, P. L. 38. By this act school directors of the several townships are empowered to exercise the powers of a board of health in the township, to make rules and regulations to prevent the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, and to appoint and fix the compensation for a sanitary agent. By section 2 of said act, in case of the prevalence of any contagious or infectious disease in any town 19. Duffield vs. School District, 162 Pa. 476, 1894. Gerhard vs. Packer Township School District, 24 Pa. C. C. 339, S. ship, the board of school directors of such township shall have power by themselves or by a sanitary agent to be by them appointed, to enter upon any premises in said township in which there is suspected to be any contagious or infectious disease or nuisance productive of such disease or detrimental to the public health, for the purpose of examining the said premises and abating any nuisance found thereon detrimental to the public health. The appointment of the sanitary agent and the compensation which the board deems proper for his services must both be approved by the court of common pleas of the county in which the township is located, or by a judge thereof, otherwise he could not legally recover any compensation from the school board. Nowhere in the act are school directors authorized to appoint any other agents or employ any person to perform any services excepting that of a sanitary agent. "There is no act of assembly, however, which would authorize a school board to incur any expenditure for physicians or medical attendance of the family quarantined, and we are of opinion that if the family quarantined is not of sufficient ability to provide food and medical attendance that it would be the duty of the poor authorities to make provision for such expenditures. If the person quarantined was ill of any disease not contagious, or if any member of the family was in need of the services of a physician, and they or the head of the family are not of sufficient ability to pay for the necessary food and medical attendance during such illness, it would be the duty of the poor directors to care for and maintain such family and provide the necessary medical attendance or services, and unquestionably, if such person or family was legally put upon the county it would be a neglect of official duty not to give such care and attention. There is no reason why the same rule should not apply when the person ill and needing a physician is suffering from a disease which is contagious, unless the municipality is made liable for such expenditures by law. "In the case of boroughs and cities the statute expressly makes them liable for all necessary expenditures where the person quarantined is not of sufficient ability to pay for food and medical attendance. In the case of a town ship no such provision is made by statute, and the failure of the legislature to make such provision shows a clear intention in its part to leave such liability upon the poor authorities. Unquestionably if there was no provision in law for the maintenance of a person quarantined, who was a pauper, courts would impose a liability upon the authority enforcing the quarantine, but that would be done not by virtue of any statute, but from reasons of humanity. The only duty imposed by statute upon a school board is to enforce the quarantine, and this it should do rigorously. In case the person quarantined was not of sufficient ability to provide food and the necessaries of life and medical attendance the poor authorities should at once be notified and until notified the board make all needful provision for the family.20 Conflicting opinions as to the liability of school district under act of 1899. 630. Judge Savidge said: "A school district is authorized to erect and furnish a hospital for the care of small-pox patients and provide the necessary supplies for the occupancy thereof and a doctor to attend the patients at a fixed salary. The directors of the poor are required to furnish medicine, food and proyisions, including a nurse or nurses and a cook." 21 Judge Lindsey holds that the legislature has provided a full and complete method or means to suppress contagious diseases and has provided for the health and sanitary regulations of the people not only in incorporated cities and boroughs, but in the rural districts. This system is complete in itself. The power vested in boards of health to quarantine families and to provide hospitals, necessarily implies the right to maintain and support those families during the period of quarantine and while they are in the control of 20. Brown vs. West Salem School Dist., 30 Pa. C. C. 124, 1904. 21. Coal Township School Directors, 2 Pa. J. L. R. 237, 1904. the board of health. This system is complete and independent of the poor laws of the Commonwealth.22 Liability of a borough for expenses incurred by the local board of health in employing a physician to vaccinate school children. Opinion by Hampton L. Carson, Attorney General. 631. Samuel G. Dixon, M. D., Health Commissioner. Sir: “I am in receipt of your letter of the 24th ult., referring to this department a communication from J. K. L. Mackey, Health Officer of the borough of Shippensburg, requesting an opinion as to the liability of the borough for payment of certain expenses incurred by the local Board of Health in employing a physician to vaccinate school children whose parents were too poor to pay, for which expenses the Council of said borough refuses to make appropriation. "You ask me the question: Who is legally responsible for the payment of bills contracted by local Boards of Health for the protection of the health of the community, when the Council of the borough refuses to pay such bills or allow the board a sufficient appropriation to meet the obligations incurred? The facts relating to the communication of Mr. Mackey raise a question which is narrower than the one put in your letter of transmittal. Mr. Mackey's case is that of school children of poor parents, vaccinated by the physician of the Health Board of the borough by direction of the board. Your question would involve expenses of all kinds incurred in the protection of the public health, of which vaccination might be but a single item. It is necessary to discriminate between the action of local boards and the action of your department." "The Act of May 11, 1893, P. L. 44, relates to the organization of Boards of Health in boroughs, and in Sections 2 and 3 prescribes the duties and powers of such boards. Substantially they are the same, mutatis mutandis, as those of Boards of Health in cities of the third class, under the Act of May 23, 1889, P. L. 306. It is provided that all fees, which shall be collected or received by the 22. In re Kibby Family, 2 Pa. J. L. R. 167, S. C. 12 D. R. 527, 1904. Beaver County Commissioners, 14 D. R. 491, 1904. |