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Ga., Strother of Va., and De Witt of N. Y. | cannot be retraced; and it appears to us that the
(all but the last from the slave region), were appointed said committee.
Mr. Strong of N. Y. that day gave notice of a bill To prohibit the further extension of Slavery in the United States."
On the 14th, Mr. Taylor of N. Y. moved a select committee on this subject, which was granted; and the mover, with Messrs. Livermore of N. H., Barbour (P. P.) of Va., Lowndes of S. C., Fuller of Mass., Hardin of Ky., and Cuthbert of Ga., were appointed such committee. A majority of this committee being Pro-Slavery, Mr. Taylor could do nothing; and on the 28th the Committee was, on motion, discharged from the further consideration of the subject.
On the same day Mr. Taylor moved : "That a Committee be appointed with instructions to report a bill prohibiting the further admission of Slaves into the Territories of the
United States west of the river Mississippi."
On motion of Mr. Smith, of Md., this resolve was sent to the Committee of the Whole, and made a special order for Jan. 10th; but it was not taken up, and appears to have slept the sleep of death.
In the Senate, the memorial of the Missouri Territorial Legislature, asking admission as a State, was presented by Mr. Smith of S. C., Dec. 29th, and referred to the Judiciary Committee, which consisted of, Messrs. Smith of S. C., Leake of Miss., Burrill of R. I., Logan of Ky., Otis of Mass.
DANIEL WEBSTER ON SLAVERY EXTENSION.
The following "Memorial to the Congress of the United States, on the subject of restraining the increase of Slavery in New States to be admitted into the Union," in pursuance of a vote of the inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, assembled at the State House on the 3rd of December, 1819, was drawn up by Daniel Webster, and signed by himself, George Blake, Josiah Quincy, James T. Austin, etc. It is inserted here instead of the resolves of the various New England Legislatures, as a fuller and clearer statement of the views of the great body of the people of that section during the pendency of the Missouri question :
"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled: "The undersigned, inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, beg leave most respectfully and humbly to represent: That the question of the introduction of Slavery into the new States to be formed on the west side of the Mississippi River, appears to them to be a question of the last importance to the future welfare of the United States. If the progress of this great evil is ever to be arrested, it seems to the undersigned that this is the time to arrest it. A false step taken now,
happiness of unborn millions rests on the measure which Congress on this occasion may adopt. Considering this as no local question, nor a question to be decided by a temporary expediency, but as involving great interests of the whole United States, and affecting deeply and essentially those objects of common defense, general welfare, and the perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, for which the Constitution itself was formed, we have presumed, in this way, to offer our sentiments and express our wishes to the National Legislature. And as various reasons have been suggested against prohibiting Slavery in the new States, it may perhaps be permitted to us to state our reasons, both for believing that Congress possesses the constitutional power to make such prohibition a condition, on the admission of a new State into the Union, and that it is just and proper that they should exercise that power.
And in the first place, as to the constitutional authority of Congress. The Constitution of the United States has declared that 'Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful other property belonging to the United States: rules and regulations respecting the territory or and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice the claims of the United States or of any particular State.' It is very well known, that the saving in this clause of the claims of any particular State, was designed to apply to claims by the then existing States, of territory which was also claimed by the United States as their own property. It has, therefore, no bearing on the present question. The power, then, of Congress over its own territories, is, by the very terms of the Constitution, unlimited. It may make all needful rules and regulations,' which of course include all such regulations as its own views of policy or expediency shall, from time to time, dictate. If, therefore, in its judgment it be needful for the benefit of a territory to enact a prohibition of Slavery, it would seem to be as much within its power of legislation as any other act of local policy. Its sovereignty being complete and universal as to the territory, it may exercise over it the most ample jurisdiction in every respect. It possesses, in this view, all the authority which any State Legislature possesses over its own territory; and if any State Legislature may, in its discretion, abolish or prohibit Slavery within its own limits, in virtue of its general legislative authority, for the same reason Congress also may exercise the like authority over its own territories. And that a State Legislature, unless restrained by questionable, and has been established by general some constitutional provision, may so do, is unpractice.
"The creation of a new State, is, in effect, a compact between Congress and the inhabitants of the proposed State. Congress would not probbitants of Missouri to form a Constitution of their ably claim the power of compelling the inhaown, and come into the Union as a State. It is as plain, that the inhabitants of that territory have no right of admission into the Union, as a State, without the consent of Congress. Neither party is bound to form this connection. It can be formed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents Congress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms? And if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not effectually bind both parties? Or if the inhabitants of the Territory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer to remain under a Territorial Government, has Congress deprived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, which, in its discretion, it had no authority to do? If the admission of new States be not the discretionary exercise of a constitutional power, but in all cases an imperative duty, how is it to be per.
formed? If the Constitution means that Congress shall admit new States, does it mean that Congress shall do this on every application and under all circumstances? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must be conceded that Congress must in some respects exercise its discretion on the admission of new States, how is it to be shown that that discretion may not be exercised in regard to this subject as well as in regard to others?
"The Constitution declares, 'that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year 1808. It is most manifest that the Constitution does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, that Congress possesses the authority to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves; for it limits the exercise of this authority for a specific period of time, leaving it to its full operation ever afterward. And this power seems necessarily included in the authority which belongs to Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.' No person has ever doubted that the prohibition of the foreign slave trade was completely within the authority of Congress since the year 1808. And why? Certainly only because it is embraced in the regula tion of foreign commerce; and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited since that period between the States. Commerce in slaves, since the year 1808, being as much subject to the regulation of Congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to enact that no slave should ever be sold from one State to another, it is not perceived how its constitutional right to make such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too plain to be questioned, that Congress did possess the power, before the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves into the territories (and in point of fact it exercised that power) as well as into any new States; and that its authority, after that year, might be as fully exercised to prevent the migration or import ation of slaves into any of the old States. And if it may prohibit new States from importing slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condition of the admission of such States into the Union, that they shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own Territories, Congress possesses a more extensive authority, and may, in various other ways, effect the object. It might, for example, make it an express condition of its grants of the soil, that its owners shall never hold slaves; and thus prevent the possession of slaves from ever being connected with the ownership of
"As corroborative of the views which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of Congress to the history of the national legislation, under the Confederation as well as under the present Constitution, on this interfering subject. Unless the inemorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation, at every period of its legislation, to have been, that the prohibition of Slavery was no infringement of any just rights belonging to free States, and was not incompatible with the enjoyments of all the rights and immunities which an admission into the Union was supposed to confer.
"The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the state of the question of the right of Congress to prohibit Slavery in that part of the former Territory of Louisiana which now forms the Missouri Territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the Treaty of the 30th April, 1803. The third article of that Treaty is as follows: "The inhabitants of the ceded Territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and
admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and im munities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess."
"Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides for the admission of the ceded territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause shows this must be according to the principles of the Federal Con stitution; and this very qualification necessarily excludes the idea that Congress were not to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission which were consistent with the principles of that Constitution, and which had been, or might justly be, applied to other new States. The language is not by any means so pointed as that of the Resolve of 1780; and yet it has been seen that that Resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authority of Congress, as to the introduction of slavery. And it is clear, upon the plainest rule of construction, that in the absence of all restrictive language a clause, merely providing for the admission of a territory into the Union, must be construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon the terms, which the Constitution itself would justify. This construction derives additional support from the next clause. The inhabitants shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.' The rights, advantages, and immunities here spoken of, must, from the very force of the terms of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the Constitution of the United States; such as are common to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. The clause cannot be referred to rights, advantages, and immunities derived exclusively from the State Government, for these do not depend upon the Federal Constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the different States, could be at the same time enjoyed by the same persons. These rights are different in different States; a right exists in one State which is denied in others, or is repugnant to other rights enjoyed in others. In some of the States, a freeholder alone is entitled to vote in elections; in some a qualification of personal property is sufficient; and in others, age and freedom are the sole qualifications of electors. In some States, no citizen is permitted to hold slaves: in others, he possesses that power absolutely; in others, it is limited. The obvious meaning, therefore, of the clause is, that the rights derived under the Federal Constitution, shall be enjoyed by the inhabitant of Louisiana in the same manner as by the citizens of other States. The United States, by the Constitution, are bound to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; and the inhabitants of Louisiana are entitled, when a State, to this guarantee. Each State has a right to two Senators, and to Representatives according to a certain enumeration of population, pointed out in the Constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, are also entitled to these privileges. The Constitution further declares,
that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' It would seem as if the meaning of this clause could not well be misinterpreted. It obviously applies to the case of the removal of a citizen of one State to another State; and in such a case it secures to the migrating citizen all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the State to which he removes. It cannot surely be contended, upon any rational interpretation, that it gives to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of every other State, at the same time, and under all cireumstances. Such a construction would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. It would at once destroy all the fundamental limitations of the State constitutions upon the rights of their own citizens; and leave all those rights to the mercy of the citizens of any other State, which should adopt different limitations. According to this construction, if all the State constitutions, save one, prohibited slavery, it would be in the power of that single State, by the admission of the right of its citizens to hold slaves, to communicate the same right to the citizens of all the other States within their own exclusive limits, in defiance of their own constitutional prohibitions; and to render the absurdity still more apparent, the same construction would communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable rights to the citizens of different States at the same time. It seems, therefore, to be undeniable, upon any rational interpretation, that this clause of the Constitution communicated no rights in any State which its own citizens do not enjoy; and that the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher or more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio. It would communicate to the former no right of holding slaves except in States where the citizens already possessed the same right under their own State Constitutions
"Upon the whole, the memorialists would most respectfully submit that the terms of the Constitution, as well as the practice of the Governments under it, must, as they humbly conceive, entirely justify the conclusion that Congress may prohibit the further introduction of Slavery into its own territories, and also make such prohibition a condition of the admission of any new State into the Union.
deep and earnest feeling of its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full consideration of the National Legislature.
"Your memorialists were not without the hope that the time had at length arrived when the inconvenience and the danger of this description of population had become apparent in all parts of this country, and in all parts of the civilized world. It might have been hoped that the new States themselves would have had such a view of their own permanent interests and prosperity as would have led them to prohibit its extension and increase. The wonderful increase and prosperity of the States north of the Ohio is unquestionably to be ascribed, in a great measure, to the consequences of the ordinance of 1787; and few, indeed, are the occasions, in the history of nations, in which so much can be done, by a single act, for the benefit of future generations, as was done by that ordinance, and as may now be done by the Congress of the United States. We appeal to the justice and to the wisdom of the National Councils to prevent the further progress of a great and serious evil. We appeal to those who look forward to the remote consequences of their measures, and who cannot balance a temporary or trifling convenience, if there were such, against a permanent, growing, and desolating evil. We cannot forbear to remind the two Houses of Congress that the early and decisive measures adopted by the American Government for the abolition of the slave-trade, are among the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That Slavery was ever tolerated in the Republic is, as yet, to be attributed to the policy of another Government. No imputation, thus far, rests on any portion of the American Confederacy. The Missouri Territory is a new country. If its extensive and fertile field shall be opened as a market for slaves, the Government will seem to become a party to a traffic which, in so many acts, through so many years, it has denounced as impolitic, unchristian, inhuman. To enact laws to punish the traffic, and, at the same time, to tempt cupidity and avarice by the allurements of an insatiable market, "If the constitutional power of Congress to is inconsistent and irreconcilable. Government, make the proposed prohibition be satisfactorily by such a course, would only defeat its own purshown, the justice and policy of such prohibition poses, and render nugatory its own measures. seem to the undersigned to be supported by plain Nor can the laws derive support from the manand strong reasons. The permission of Slavery ners of the people, if the power of moral sentiin a new State, necessarily draws after it an ex- ment be weakened by enjoying, under the pertension of that inequality of representation, which mission of Government, great facilities to comalready exists in regard to the original States. mit offenses. The laws of the United States have It cannot be expected that those of the original denounced heavy penalties against the traffic in States, which do not hold slaves, can look on slaves, because such traffic is deemed unjust and such an extension as being politically just. As inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws: between the original States the representation We appeal to this justice and humanity: We rests on compact and plighted faith; and your ask whether they ought not to operate, on the memorialists have no wish that that compact present occasion, with all their force? We have should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the a strong feeling of the injustice of any toleration slightest degree violated. But the subject as of Slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on sumes an entirely different character, when a new a portion of our community, which cannot be imState proposes to be admitted. With her there is mediately relieved from it without consequences no compact, and no faith plighted; and where is more injurious than the suffering of the evil. But the reason that she should come into the Union to permit it in a new country, where yet no hab. with more than an equal share of political im-its are formed which render it indispensable, what portance and political power? Already the ratio of representation, established by the Constitution, has given to the States holding slaves twenty members of the House of Representatives more than they would have been entitled to, except under the particular provision of the Constitution. In all probability, this number will be doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we deem it not an unreasonable expectation that the inhabitants of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renouncing the right in question, and establishing a constitution prohibiting it for Without dwelling on this topic, we have still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of Congress. We present it with a
is it, but to encourage that rapacity, and fraud, and violence, against which we have so long pointed the denunciations of our penal code? What is it, but to tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it, but to throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable all its professions of regard for the right of humanity and the liberties of mankind?`
"As inhabitants of a free country-as citizens of a great and rising Republic-as members of a Christian community-as living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling ourselves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity, we have presumed to offer our sentiments to Congress on this question, with a solicitude for
the event far beyond what a common occasion | restriction of Slavery, would, in their opinion, escould inspire."
Instead of reprinting the Speeches elicited by this fruitful theme, which must necessarily, to a great extent, be a mere reproduction of ideas expressed in the debate of the last session, already given, we here insert the Resolves of the Legislatures of New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Kentucky--the first three being unanimous expressions in favor of Slavery Restriction; the fourth, from a Slave State, also in favor of such Restriction, though probably not unanimously agreed to by the Legislature; the last against Restriction, and also (we presume) unanimous. The Legislatures of the Free States were generally unanimous for Restriction; those of the Slave States (Delaware excepted) unanimous against it. It is not deemed necessary to print more than the following:
"State of New-York, in Assembly, Jan. 17, 1820:
"Whereas, The inhibiting the further extension of Slavery in these United States is a subject of deep concern among the people of this State; and whereas we consider Slavery as an evil much to be deplored; and that every constitutional barrier should be interposed to prevent its further extension; and that the Constitution of the United States clearly gives Congress the right to require of new States, not comprised with the original boundaries of these United States, the prohibition of Slavery, as a condition of its admission into the Union: Therefore,
"Resolved (if the honorable the Senate concur herein), That our Senators be instructed, and our Representatives in Congress be requested, to oppose the admission as a State into the Union, any territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making the prohibition of Slavery therein an indispensable condition of admission: therefore,
Resolved, That measures be taken by the clerks of the Senate and Assembly of this State, to transmit copies of the preceding resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress." [Unanimously concurred in by the Senate.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Mr. Wilson of N. J. communicated the following Resolutions of the Legislature of the State of New-Jersey, which were read : "Whereas, A Bill is now depending in the Congress of the United States, on the application of the people in the Territory of Missouri for the admission of that Territory as a State into the Union, not containing provisions against Slavery in such proposed State, and a question is made upon the right and expediency of such provision.
"The representatives of the people of New-Jersey, in the Legislative Council and General Assembly of the said State, now in session, deem it a duty they owe to themselves, to their constituents, and posterity, to declare and make known the opinions they hold upon this momentous subject; and,
"1. They do resolve and declare, That the further admission of Territories into the Union, without
sentially impair the right of this and other existing States to equal representation in Congress (a right at the foundation of the political compact), inasmuch as such newly-admitted slaveholding State would be represented on the basis of their slave population; a concession made at the formation of the Constitution in favor of the then existing be inferred from any article or clause in that inStates, but never stipulated for new States, nor to strument.
"2. Resolved, That to admit the Territory of Missouri as a State into the Union, without prorepresentatives of the people of New-Jersey aforehibiting Slavery there, would, in the opinion of the said, be no less than to sanction this great political and moral evil, furnish the ready means of peopling a vast Territory with Slaves, and perpetuate all the dangers, crimes, and pernicious effects of domestic bondage.
"3. Resolved, As the opinion of the Representatives aforesaid, That inasmuch as no Territory has a right to be admitted into the Union, but on the principles of the Federal Constitution, and only part of the existing States, Congress may rightfully, and ought to refuse such law, unless upon the reasonable and just conditions, assented to on the part of the people applying to become one of the States.
by a law of Congress, consenting thereto on the
"4. Resolved, In the opinion of the Representatives aforesaid, That the article of the Constitution which restrains Congress from prohibiting the migration or importation of Slaves, until after the year 1808, does, by necessary implication, admit the general power of Congress over the subject of Slavery, and concedes to them the right to regulate and restrain such migration and importation after that time, into the existing, or any newly-tobe created State.
"5. Resolved, As the opinion of the Representatives of the people of New-Jersey aforesaid, That inasmuch as Congress have a clear right to refuse the admission of a Territory into the Union, by the terms of the Constitution, they ought in the present case to exercise that absolute discretion in order to preserve the political rights of the several existing States, and prevent the great national disgrace and multiplied mischiefs, which must ensue from conceding it, as a matter of right, in the immense Territories yet to claim admission into the Union, beyond the Mississippi, that they may tolerate Slavery.
6. Resolved, (with the concurrence of Council,) That the Governor of this State be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to each of the Senators and Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States."
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, December 11th, 1819. A motion was made by Mr. Duane and Mr. Thackara, and read as follows:
"The Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while they cherish the right of the individual States to express their opinion upon all public measures proposed in the Congress of the Union, are aware that its usefulness must in a great degree depend upon the discretion with which it is exercised; they believe that the right ought not to be resorted to upon trivial subjects or unimportant occasions; but they are also persuaded that there are moments when the neglect to exercise it would be a dereliction of public duty.
"Such an occasion, as in their judgment demands the frank expression of the sentiments of Pennsylvania, is now presented. A measure was
ardently supported in the last Congress of the United States, and will probably be as earnestly urged during the existing session of that body, which has a palpable tendency to impair the political relations of the several States; which is calculated to mar the social happiness of the present and future generations; which, if adopted, would impede the march of humanity and Freedom through the world; and would transfer from a misguided ancestry an odious stain and fix it indelibly upon the present race-a measure, in brief, which proposes to spread the crimes and cruelties of Slavery from the banks of the Mississippi to the shores of the Pacific. When a measure of this character is seriously advocated in the republican Congress of America, in the nineteenth century, the several States are invoked by the duty which they owe to the Deity, by the veneration which they entertain for the memory of the founders of the Republic, and by a tender regard for posterity, to protest against its adoption, to refuse to covenant with crime, and to limit the range of an evil that already hangs in awful boding over so large a portion of the Union.
"Nor can such a protest be entered by any State with greater propriety than by Pennsylvania. This commonwealth has as sacredly respected the rights of other States as it has been careful of its own; it has been the invariable aim of the people of Pennsylvania to extend to the universe, by their example, the unadulterated blessings of civil and religious freedom; and it is their pride that they have been at all times the practical advocates of those improvements and charities among men which are so well calculated to enable them to answer the purposes of their Creator; and above all, they may boast that they were foremost in removing the pollution of Slavery from among
"If, indeed, the measure, against which Pennsylvania considers it her duty to raise her voice, were calculated to abridge any of the rights guaranteed to the several States; if, odious as Slavery is, it was proposed to hasten its extinction by means injurious to the States upon which it was unhappily entailed, Pennsylvania would be among the first to insist upon a sacred observance of the constitutional compact. But it cannot be pretended that the rights of any of the States are at all to be affected by refusing to extend the mischiefs of human bondage over the boundless regions of the West, a territory which formed no part of the Union at the adoption of the Constitution; which has been but lately purchased from a European Power by the people of the Union at large; which may or may not be admitted as a State into the Union at the discretion of Congress; which must establish a republican form of Government, and no other; and whose climate affords none of the pretexts urged for resorting to the labor of natives of the torrid zone; such a territory has no right, inherent or acquired, such as those States possessed which established the existing Constitution. When that Constitution was framed in September, 1787, the concession that three-fifths of the slaves in the States then existing should be represented in Congress, could not have been intended to embrace regions at that time held by a foreign power. On the contrary, so anxious were the Congress of that day to confine human bondage within its ancient home, that on the 13th of July, 1787, that body unanimously declared that Slavery or involuntary servitude should not exist in the extensive territories bounded by the Ohio, the Mississippi, Canada and the Lakes; and in the ninth article of the Constitution itself, the power of Congress to prohibit the emigration of servile persons after 1808, is expressly recognized; nor is there to be found in the statute-book a single instance of the admission of a Territory to the rank of a State in which Congress have not adhered to the right,
vested in them by the Constitution, to stipulate with the Territory upon the conditions of the boon. "The Senate and House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, therefore, cannot but deprecate any departure from the humane and enlightened policy pursued not only by the illustrious Congress which framed the Constitution, but by their successors without exception. They are persuaded that, to open the fertile regions of the West to a servile race, would tend to increase their numbers beyond all past example, would open a new and steady market for the fawless venders of human flesh, and would render all schemes for obliterating this most foul blot upon the American character useless and unavailing.
"Under these convictions, and in the full persuasion that upon this topic there is but one opinion in Pennsylvania
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, That the Senators of this State in the Congress of the United States be, and they are hereby instructed, and that the Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States be, and they are hereby requested, to vote against the admission of any Territory as a State into the Union, unless said Territory shall stipulate and agree that the further introduction of Slavery or involuntary servitude, except for the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall he prohibited; and that all children born within the said Territory, after its admission into the Union as a State, shall be free, but may be held to service until the age of twenty-five years.'
"Resolved, That the Governor be, and he is hereby requested to cause a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolution to be transmitted to such of the Senators and Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States. "Laid on the table."
"THURSDAY, December 16, 1819. "Agreeably to the order of the day, the House resumed the consideration of the resolutions postponed on the 14th inst., relative to preventing the introduction of Slavery into States hereafter to be admitted into the Union. And on the question, 'Will the House agree to the resolution?' the Yeas and Nays were required by Mr. Randall and Mr. Souder. and stood Yeas, 74-(54 Democrats, 20 Federalists); Nays, none. Among the Yeas were David R. Porter, late Governor, Josiah Randall of Philadelphia, now a Whig supporter of Buchanan, William Wilkins, late minister to Russia, now in the State Senate, Dr. Daniel Sturgeon, late U. S. Senator, etc., etc. William Duane, editor of The Aurora, then the Democratic Organ, also voted for the resolutions, as he had prominently advocated the principle they asserted.
"The Senate unanimously concurred, and the Resolves were signed by Gov. William Findlay."