The State, in some portions of the world, provides roads itself; in others, assigns the duty of constructing them to others.

Massachusetts delegates to associations the trust and duty of providing railroads. Let us inquire what is the compact between them.

They ask the State to transfer to them its right of eminent domain-its power to appropriate the property of individuals. They apprise the State of the progress of art, suggest that the public good requires railroad facilities; that they will reduce the cost and increase the speed of locomotion, and develop latent resources; and, with great propriety, they urge that they can construct the work and conduct the traffic with more economy and safety than the State. Upon these representations, the acts of incorporation are granted, and reciprocal obligations are assumed by the parties. Trusts are created for the benefit of the public, and tolls are granted for the remuneration of the trustees. The State delegates to societies the office of catering for the public, and, in its contract, aims to make such terms as shall tempt the capitalist to embark his funds, and, at the same time, secure to the public all facilities compatible with a fair remuneration. It confers important powers, accompanied with corresponding duties; for the companies it creates are to lend wings to commerce, and to the social intercourse of the State.

Is not this the true basis of our railroad system? and could it rest on a better or safer foundation? Were the companies chartered to forget the cardinal principles to which we have adverted; were they to pursue a narrow and self-defeating policy, by infrequent trains, high charges, and inferior cars, engines, and track, to incommode and depress the district they traverse, of which they hold a virtual monopoly; were they to misapply the revenue by needless expenses, or high salaries to favorites or dependents, could they expect countenance of the legislature, or success in contests with rivals who offer the very advantages they withhold? Should they, on the contrary, pursue a more judicious and generous policy; adopt the im. provements of the day which tend to increase speed, safety, and comfort; reduce the cost of transit, and, by branches, give access to quarries and waterfalls, and restore the fading prosperity of villages which have suffered by a diversion of their traffic, or facilities given to rivals, reliance may well be placed upon legislative protection.

THE STATE WILL NOT CHARGE THE PUBLIC WITH THE COST OF MAINTAINING TWO LINES, WHEN ONE NOT ONLY CAN, BUT DOES, ACCOMMODATE THE PUBLIC.

Massachusetts permits her railroad companies to earn a revenue of 10 per cent. England and France have been more liberal than Massachusetts. In regions where money is worth less than in America, they have authorized a nett return of 10 per cent to the projectors. They have reserved, also, a reversionary interest, but have made the terms more liberal than our own. These advantages enable their successful lines (and nearly all are successful,) to carry the stock to a premium of 50 to 100 per cent, and thus enrich those who have benefited the country. And it is but just that they who have adventured their capital in this new field of enterprise, to accomplish great public results; who have applied talent, energy, and skill, to construct and conduct great public works in a judicious and frugal manner, should receive, in all countries, a liberal return; and such return has been, and, doubtless, will be, sanctioned here by an enlightened public opinion.

Massachusetts has not at the outset restricted the rate of tolls. She has referred the rate to the discretion of the parties incorporated, reserving merely a right to reduce the charge when the revenue shall exceed a maximum of 10 per cent upon the outlay. More than ten years have elapsed since the first lines were opened in Massachusetts. At that early period, the directors, although intelligent and trustworthy, had little or no experience in the movement of passengers and freight. Alarmed by the almost uniform excess of cost over estimates, without statistics to guide them, they did not stop to theorize or experiment, but were satisfied to adopt such rates as should put down the stage and wagon, their immediate competitors. Having set their cars in motion, they found much to alter, renew and enlarge. Busied with the extension of their tracks and depots, with requests for branches, with experiments in engines and cars, they left the chances of the future to determine how the rates thus estab lished would coincide with philosophy, the public good, and their pecuniary interest. With a piece of mechanism on their hands, competent to carry both men and goods at less than one-eighth the cost of horse-power on common roads, they took that cost as a standard for their guidance, marking only one shade below it, just low enough to incline the scale in their favor, and secure a preference.

In 1835, when the lines of Massachusetts were opened, the average charge by railroad for passengers, was four cents each, per mile, and the average charge for freight, not far from nine cents per ton, a mile; rates which would be considered almost prohibitory, at the present day. The precedent, thus established, was copied under subsequent charters, as a matter of course, and the light since thrown upon the subject has been principally gleaned from the experience of other lands, or from concessions made in struggles to improve a losing business, to meet competition, or to reduce a revenue exceeding the limits prescribed by the charters. Under this light, however, the charge for passengers has, since 1837, fallen nearly one-half, viz. to a nominal average of 2,6 66 first-class passengers, and 1 second-class; but, with due allowance for deductions made to stage and steamboat travellers, by season tickets, and special trains, to 21 cents per mile, on first-class, and 14 cents on second-class passengers. Freight has fallen in nearly the same ratio, and the question naturally arises, what causes have led to this reduction of charge? How far has it been judicious, and will it be progressive? It is our purpose, in this essay, to discuss the topics thus presented.

100

The first section of the Western Railroad, the great enterprise of Massachusetts, leading from Worcester to Springfield, a distance of fifty-five

AVERAGE RATES of railroads out of Boston, for first-class PASSENGERS, JULY, 1846.

miles, was finished in the summer of 1839, and opened for travel in the October following.

By this line, and the Boston and Worcester, a continuous railroad of one hundred miles united the port of Boston with the valley of the Connecticut, at a point in Massachusetts twenty-six miles above tide water, and sloop navigation at Hartford. At this period, Hartford and New York were the great marts of the valley. Small steamers run between Springfield and Hartford, and lines of steamers and packets between Hartford and New York. The average charge between New York and Springfield was less than three dollars per ton, and three dollars per passage.

Instead of conforming to these rates, the directors of the Western Railroad rigidly adhered to precedents, and resolving to adopt the average rates of Massachusetts, fixed the rate of passage by first-class cars, at $3 75 from Boston to Springfield, the local fare at 4 cents per passenger a mile, and the charge for freight at an average rate of six dollars per ton between Boston and Springfield, or six cents per ton, a mile.

This decision, in which the Boston and Worcester Railroad concurred, attracted public attention, gave rise to the first public discussion of the rates of fare; and such was the solicitude in Boston respecting the Western Railroad, in which both the public credit of the State, the growth of the city, and the fortunes of many citizens were embarked, that deep interest was taken in the question. It was the fortune of the writer to commence this discussion, in a series of essays, published in the Boston Atlas, in August, 1839, with a view to change the decision of the directors of the Western Railroad Company. Their enterprise originally aimed at the trade of the West, and the expansion of the business of the State. Eloquent appeals on these points, had been made to Boston. Her citizens had responded by large subscriptions to the stock. Measures tending to crush her commerce in the bud, were to be averted; and the writer, participating in the feelings of the stockholders, his associates from the outset, entered with warmth into the discussion. He had been engaged for years previous, in directing a line of steamers on the coast of Maine, under rates varying with competition; had drawn deductions favorable to moderate charges from experiments tried under his own eye, and could see nothing so amphibious in the habits of our citizens as to prevent the success of a policy on land which had triumphed on the water.

66

Under such impulses he entered the field, taking the ground that the average rates of fare and freight in Massachusetts were too high, both for the interests of the public and the stockholders; that the directors of her roads, instead of adopting the liberal and enlightened policy of Belgium, seemed, in most instances, to have aimed at extracting as much as possible from each passenger; to have supposed they had done all that was politic or advisable, if they had put down the competition of the stage and the baggage-wagon; to have gone on the assumption that they accomplished everything if they secured the existing travel, and the gain incident to increased speed; without taking at all into account the vast business they might call into existence by a reduced rate of fare, and the attendant benefits they might confer on Boston and the State."

These views were sustained by contrasting the power of the locomotive with that of the horse, by reference to the success of the system of Belgium, to the tendency of the age to cheap amusement and locomotion, to the experience of the steamers on the coast and on the Hudson, to the

easy communication between Springfield and New York, and the reasonable expectations of the stockholders. The essays urged a reduction on the Boston and Providence Railroad, of the passenger charge, from $2 to $1 25, or from 43 to 3 cents per mile, and a reduction on freight, from $5 to $2 50 per ton, the rate of the present day, as necessary to give the trade of Providence to Boston, and advocated the adoption of a charge on the Western Railroad of $1 50 per passage, and $2 per ton, between Worcester and Springfield. They also urged the directors, on the completion of the line to Albany, to consider the policy of a $3 fare.

These essays, while they attracted public attention, produced no immediate effect. Nathan Hale, Esq., the president of the Boston and Worcester Railroad, replied to them, through the columns of the Daily Advertiser, in general terms, suggesting that the rates proposed were too low, that they would give the Western Railroad little or no profit, that they were sanctioned by no experience worthy of reliance, that Belgium was actually advancing her rates 40 per cent, and the directors were the best judges upon the subject.

Thus countenanced, the directors of the Western Railroad adopted the high scale of prices originally proposed, and the line was opened at an average rate of four cents per mile for passengers, and six cents per ton a mile, for freight, on the first of October, 1839. At the close of the first six months, viz., on the first of April, 1840, the aggregate of tons carried in that period, was found less than three thousand, the passengers less than fifteen thousand, and the entire income but $35,798 72, being actually less than the cost of transit and the deterioration of the line.

This result was more disastrous than any one anticipated. It led to the appointment of a committee of investigation, of which the writer was a member. In April, 1840, the committee unanimously recommended, in an elaborate report, the rates proposed in the essays, and, on the first of April, these rates were adopted. Upon their adoption, the writer became a member of the board. Commerce was greatly depressed in 1840 and '41, but the revenue of the line rapidly increased under the new system. For six months, ending March 31st, 1840, the revenue was.........

$35,798 72

53,149 18

$17,350 46

The increase in the number of passengers, and tons of freight, was much larger, without a corresponding increase of expenses; and, at the close of 1840, it became apparent that the section of this unfinished line from Boston to Springfield, would become a productive property, while the rapid growth of business gave a stimulus to the payment of assessments, and the progress of the work.

The result of this reduction would have been still more beneficial if the Boston and Worcester Railroad had co-operated in the measure. The revenue was derived, principally, from passengers and freight passing over both lines; but the principal burthen of the reduction, particularly on passengers, was thrown upon the Western, while the Boston and Worcester

participated in the attendant benefits. Indeed, it was seriously urged by the president of that company, that it could not afford to transact business at a lower rate, such was the actual cost of conveying passengers and freight on the line; and, in the negotiations between the companies, it was made a sine qua non, that forty cents per ton should, in all cases, be allowed to the Boston and Worcester Railroad, for each process of loading and unloading, a charge more than three-fold the present average cost of conducting that process. At this period, the friends of moderate rates formed an association, and held frequent meetings to influence public opinion, and procure a reduction of charges. Foreign journals and reports were examined. All facts bearing upon the policy were made public through the leading journals of Boston. A pamphlet condensing much information on the subject, was published by P. P. F. Degrand, an active member of the association, and one of the most ardent promoters of railroad improvement. It was determined, also, to investigate and improve, if possible, the condition of the Boston and Worcester Railroad, and, with this view, a committee of investigation was appointed at the annual meeting of that company, in June, 1840, of which the writer was a member.

The committee found the line susceptible of improvement; the sleepers, light sills of juniper and white cedar, decayed; the rail, thirty-nine pounds to the yard, insufficient for a heavy traffic, the depot inadequate, the cars and engines deficient in power, quality, numbers and model, accidents often occurring, even while the committee were in session. They made a full and elaborate report of fifty pages, pointing out the difficulties of the case, recommending a heavier rail, and double track; new depots, larger engines and cars, the abandonment of the four-wheel engines, and the light and defective machines, then in the infirmary; suggesting the policy of lower charges, and predicting, with confidence, that these measures would greatly reduce the cost of transportation, insure to the enterprise a permanent prosperity, and be, in the highest degree, beneficial to the public.*

The report was received by a full meeting, was discussed with warmth, was referred to the directors, and subsequently reviewed by the president of the company, in a spirited reply, apparently based upon the idea that the Boston and Worcester, averaging thirty tons, and but fifty passengers, to her trains, with engines costing ten cents per mile, for repairs, could not materially reduce the cost of transit. But the measures recommended, were gradually adopted; new depots, double cars, more powerful engines, of six and eight wheels, provided; the inferior machines, with few exceptions, sold or discarded; a new rail, of sixty pounds to the yard, laid down for a double track; and last, not least, large reductions made in charges. The predictions of the committee have been realized, by a diminution of more than 50 per cent on the cost of transit, a reduction of charges, and an increase of nearly 100 per cent in the revenue, accompanied by improved dividends for the stockholders.

In December, 1841, the Western Railroad was opened through the mountain pass, fourteen hundred feet above the sea, and a communication effected with Albany, by means of the Hudson and Berkshire Railroad.

The report predicted that when the proposed measures should be adopted, freight should be carried from Boston to Worcester, forty-five miles, at a cost of seventy-seven cents a ton, in trains averaging eighty-three tons; the average being then less than thirty tons, and the cost nearly $2.