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transportation, and delivery of freight, which are not to be disregarded by shippers or consignees without incurring liability to additional expense.

§ 576. Storage charges.

After transportation is at an end and the goods ready for delivery to the consignee the obligation of the common carrier ceases to a certain extent, and if the goods are left upon its hands for a time by the owners it would seem plain that having performed the services for which freight was paid it, it can make additional charges for storage of the goods with it. More than this, since to provide such storage is no part of the carrier's duty as such, it is not confined as it is in services during carriage to charge no more than the usual price for warehousing. This was pointed out to a complainant by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the quotation which follows: 57 "We cannot agree with the contention of the complainant in this case that the defendants had no right to charge for the storage of the freight in question more than the usual public warehouse charge in force at Macon, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina. A railroad freight depot and a public storage warehouse are buildings whose business and uses are wholly dissimilar. The former is planned and built to accommodate the current business of the railroad when expeditiously handled, and affords no facilities for storage during long periods of time. The storage warehouse is especially designed for storage purposes. The railway company imposes storage charges, not for gain especially, but in order that it may be enabled to clear its depots to the end that current business may not be blockaded." 58

57 Blackman v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 350.

58 The Commission now has power to pass upon such incidental charges and to require that whatever allowances are made shall be just and reasonable. Suffern Grain Co. v.

I. C. R. R., 22 I. C. C. 178; Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. B. & O. R. R., 20 I. C. C. 200; Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry., 18 I. C. C. 340; Brook-Rauch Mill & Elevator Co. v. M. P. Ry., 17 I. C. C. 158.

§ 577. Demurrage costs.

Again, since the use of the cars at the end of the route is no part of the carrier's public undertaking, a charge for demurrage of cars is a charge distinct from the charge for carriage, and it may therefore be made as a separate charge. Indeed, so entirely distinct is it from the charge for carriage that by the weight of authority no lien exists to enforce it, 59 unless of course there is an express contract permitting such a lien. The extent of the limitations under which railroads by public announcements may make charges for demurrage of cars is well discussed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the extract which follows: "Whether a charge of one dollar per day or fraction thereof, made for detention of cars and use of track on cars not unloaded within 48 hours after arrival, not including Sundays and legal holidays, and on empty cars not loaded within 48 hours after being placed, is a reasonable charge, and the time fixed for the loading and unloading, as required in the rule, is a reasonable time, are questions of fact, and on these issues the preponderance of the proof is clearly with the carriers. The rule must allow time enough to meet all cases likely to arise, and that such is the case here is abundantly shown by the testimony. That the rate of one dollar per day is also reasonable is conclusively shown. It may be somewhat more than the usual per cent on the first cost of a car, but this is not the

59 Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Jenkins, 103 Ill. 588; Cleveland, C., C. & S. L. Ry. v. Holden, 73 Ill. App. 582; Burlington & M. R. R. R. v. Chicago Lumber Co., 15 Neb. 390, 19 N. W. 451; Crommelin v. New York & H. R. R., 10 Bosw. (N. Y.) 77; East Tennessee V. & G. R. R. v. Hunt, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 261. Contra, Kansas Pac. Ry. v. McCann, 2 Wyo. 3; Kentucky Wagon Manufacturing Co. v. Ohio & M. Ry., 32 S. W. 595, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 726. See also

Brown v. Grand Trunk Ry., 54 N.
H. 535.

Where a carrier provides in its tariff for reconsignment, without any requirement for repayment of freight or guaranty of the same, it may not lawfully charge demurrage for time during which it holds the shipment while parleying with its connections as to advancement of its freight charges. Beekman Lumber Co. v. St. L. S. W. Ry., 14 I. C. C. 532.

proper criterion. A railroad company does not construct cars for the purpose of storing property in them, and their use for transportation involves the use of costly railway tracks, and other expenditures. It may be true, as contended, that the shipper was not consulted in framing these rules. We think, however, if the rules are reasonable, this fact does not vitiate them."

§ 578. Terminal facilities usually included.

The usual thing, therefore, is to assume that all use of terminal facilities in delivery of the property transported is included in the rate made for the carriage. This was squarely said by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case 60 where a railroad had entered into an arrangement by which consignees of cattle could not get them except at an established stockyard, the proprietors of which charged yardage for the service. Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the opinion of the court used the following language: "The carrier must at all times be in proper condition both to receive from the shipper and to deliver to the consignee, according to the nature of the property to be transported, as well as to the necessities of the respective localities in which it is received and delivered. A carrier of live stock has no more right to make a special charge for merely receiving or merely delivering such stock, in and through stockyards provided by itself, in order that it may properly receive and load, or unload and deliver, such stock, than a carrier of passengers may make a special charge for the use of its passenger depot by passengers when proceeding to or coming from its trains, or than a carrier may charge the shipper for the use of its general freight depot in merely delivering his goods for shipment, or the consignee of such goods for its use in merely receiving them there within a reasonable time after they are unloaded from the cars. If the carrier may not make such special charges in respect to stockyards which 60 Covington Stockyards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 11 Sup. Ct. 461.

itself owns, maintains, or controls, it cannot invest another corporation or company with authority to impose burdens of that kind upon shippers and consignees. The transportation of live stock begins with their delivery to the carrier to be loaded upon its cars, and ends only after the stock is unloaded and delivered, or offered to be delivered, to the consignee, if to be found, at such place as admits of their being safely taken into possession." 61

§ 579. Terminals regarded as connections.

But despite these general principles, a scheme has been worked out which has received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States whereby the railroad may treat stockyards which have their own railways as connecting carriers and add their rates for their services to the railroad's rate for its service. In deciding the validity of this, Mr. Justice White for the court said: 62 "As the right of the defendant carriers to divide their rates and thus to make a distinct charge from the point of shipment to Chicago and a separate terminal charge for delivery to the stockyards, a point beyond the lines of the respective carriers, was conceded by the Commission and was upheld by the Circuit Court of Appeals, no contention on this subject arises. If, despite this concurrence of opinion, controversy was presented on the subject, we see no reason to doubt, under the facts of this case, the correctness of the rule as to the right to divide the rate, admitted by the Commission and announced by the court below. This is especially the case in view of the sixth section of the act to regulate commerce, wherein it is provided that the schedules of rates to be filed by carriers shall 'state sepa

61 See accord Union Trust Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 64 Fed. 992; and Butchers' & D. S. Y. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 67 Fed. 35. But see Walker v. Keenan, 73 Fed. 758, 19 C. C. A. 668; and Central S. Y. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R.,

192 U. S. 568, 48 L. ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. 339.

62 Interstate Com. Comm. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 186 U. S. 320, 46 L. ed. 1182, 22 Sup. Ct. 824, affirming 103 Fed. 249, 43 C. C. A. 209, and 98 Fed. 173.

rately the terminal charges and any rules or regulations which could in anywise change, affect or determine any part of the aggregate of the aforesaid rates and fares and charges.' Whether the rule which we approve as applied to the facts in this case would be applicable to terminal services by a carrier on his own line which he was obliged to perform as a necessary incident of his contract to carry, and the performance of which was demanded of him by the shipper, is a question which does not arise on this record, and as to which we are, therefore, called upon to express no opinion." 63

Topic C. Bases of Distance Rates

§ 580. Mileage rate tends to decrease inversely.

It is a familiar rule in the transportation of freight by railroads and has become axiomatic that while the aggregate charge is continually increasing the further the freight is carried, yet the rate per ton per mile is constantly growing less all the time. In consequence of the existence of this rule the increase of the aggregate charge continues to be less in proportion every hundred miles after the first, arising out of the character and nature of the service performed and the cost of service; and thus it is that staple commodities and merchandise are enabled to bear the charges of transportation from and to the most distant portions of the country.64 The reason for this rule is that the cost of railway transportation is made up of the expense of the two terminals and the intermediate haul, and the terminal expenses are the same whether the haul be long or short. A few miles, or even a considerable number of miles, of additional haul may in some instances of long dis

63 The issues in this case had been repeatedly before the Interstate Commerce Commission. See, especially, Cattle R. A. of Texas v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 83; Same v. Same, 11 I. C. C. Rep. 277.

64 New Orleans Cotton Exch. v.

Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 289, 2 I. C. C. Rep. 375; Farrar v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 76, 1 I. C. C. 480; Board of Trade of Troy v. Alabama Midland Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 1.

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