through the use or the abuse of corporate machinery. We have it from Mr. Roosevelt that this feeling is played upon by unscrupulous legislators, who introduce measures attacking corporation interests, not with the intention of having them passed, but of using them to force blackmail from the proposed victims. That the corporations in turn are equally unscrupulous must, we fear, be admitted, and their resources, of course, are It is by no means an unheard-of thing that in a State where public feeling runs high against corporations, the members of the Legislature somehow contrive in the end to subserve the interests of the corporations in many important respects. The feud between the corporations and the public, which tells thus disadvantageously on the character of State legislation, demonstrates the importance of those Federal restrictions on State powers which we shall advert to in the next chapter.

enormous.

The importance of the State Legislature depends less on the character of its members or the part they play in public life than on the magnitude of the interests committed to their charge. Great and real as are the restrictions upon State sovereignty, they still leave by far the largest portion of affairs under the regulation of State-made laws. The ordinary law between man and man is State-made law. Property and contracts, personal relations and political privileges, are subject to the regulation and control of the State. On all these subjects the Legislature is the mouthpiece

of the State, and the greatness of its functions makes great even the indifferently constituted assemblies of the smaller States.

It is probably a sound proposition in politics that laws involving the widest human interests are best left to Legislatures based on the largest area of representation. The subject of divorce, for example, would probably be more effectively and justly handled by an Imperial than by a Home Rule Parliament. On subjects of such far-reaching importance, the mere want of uniformity between State and State is itself an evil of great magnitude. But apart from that, it might be maintained that in matters of this class the larger assembly would, as a rule, produce wiser and juster legislation. Narrow views and contracted sympathies are more likely to mark the Parliament of a small State than the Congress of the nation, in which the mere variety of interests represented must force discussion up to a higher plane. As great despots are more likely than smaller tyrants to deal justly with general interests, so larger ideas of public justice may be expected to prevail in the larger Parliament. It would be surprising if the local Legislatures of America did not yield a large supply of unwise legislation, and if their legislation did not tend constantly to widen the region of State interference. Both directly by statute and indirectly through powers granted to local authorities, the State Parliaments have pressed hardly in many cases on the rights of indi viduals. Their legislation, as distinguished from that

of Congress or the British Parliament, may be described as the work of amateurs, that is, of men who are called together for short terms only, without any special preparation for the work of law-making, and without the discipline which comes from continuous occupation. The mischief of irresponsible and sentimental legislation is, however, corrected by another— the general habit of disregarding unworkable or meddlesome laws. The severity of the code is mitigated by laxity of practice. The Americans claim to be a law-abiding people, and, as far as submission to the ascertained voice of constituted authorities is concerned, the claim is just. But it is compatible with the existence of a disposition to wink at the evasion of statutes of an oppressive or merely vexatious character. It is a frequent saying that the law in the United States "is just as strong or as weak as public opinion makes it;" and public opinion is robust enough to tolerate the practical nullification of enactments the enforcement of which would do more evil than good. The maxim that the law must be enforced at any cost, no matter what kind of law it may be, would not appeal very powerfully to the average American citizen.

The State Legislature in general is far from being endowed with the extensive powers which we have noted above as inherent in the State itself, as distinguished from the Federal Government. In every case the people has refused to intrust its representatives with unlimited authority. In every State there is a

special Constitution, enacted directly by the people, by which the boundaries of legislative and all other governmental authorities are fixed. The conditions under which local statutory Parliaments exist cannot possibly be apprehended unless we keep in mind the fact, that they are bounded not only by the Federal Constitution, but by the special Constitution of the State. And the latter is generally a much more detailed and elaborate scheme than the former. The general scope of these limitations will be considered hereafter. At present we may note that they commonly contain provisions for the regulation of the procedure of the Legislature. The following may be given as a sample :—

Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may meet, adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members. A quorum being in attendance, if either House fail to effect an organisation within the first five days thereafter, the members of the House so failing shall be entitled to no compensation from the end of the said five days until an organisation shall have been effected.

Each House when assembled shall choose its own officers, judge of the election qualification and return of its own members, determine its own rules of proceeding, and sit upon its own adjournments; but neither House shall without the concurrence of the other adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which it may be sitting.

Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings. The yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of any two members, be entered, together with the

names of the members demanding the same, on the journals; provided that, on a motion to adjourn, it shall require one-tenth of the members present to order the yeas and nays.

Either House may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause [nor for any cause known to his constituents antecedent to his election].

Each House shall have all the powers necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free and independent State.

Bills may originate in either House, but may be amended or rejected in the other, except that bills for raising the revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.

Every bill shall be read by sections on three several days in each House, unless, in case of emergency, twothirds of the House where such bill may be depending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, deem it expedient to dispense with this rule; but the reading of a bill by sections on its final passage shall in no case be dispensed with, and the vote on the passage of every bill or joint - resolution shall be taken by yeas and nays.* Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expresssd in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall be expressed in the title.

A majority of all the members elected to each House shall be necessary to pass every bill or joint-resolution; and all bills or joint-resolutions so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective Houses.

* In the vote by yeas and nays each member is called upon by name, and states whether he votes yea or nay on the question.