Federal judiciary is appointed to judge the acts and measures of the Federal as well as the State authorities, it is itself peculiarly under the influence of the President and Congress. The tribunals could hardly help taking a political colour from the political parties which from time to time control the appointments, particularly when political controversy turns, as it does in America, so largely on the legal interpretation of constitutional instruments.

"The constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court," says Mr. Wilson, "have changed slowly but none the less surely with the altered relations of power between the national parties. The Federalists were backed by a Federal judiciary; the period of Democratic supremacy witnessed the triumph of Democratic principles in the courts; and Republican predominance has driven from the highest tribunal all but one representative of Democratic doctrines. It has been only during comparatively short periods of transition, when public opinion was passing over from one political creed to another, that the decisions of the Federal judiciary have been distinctly opposed to the principles of the ruling political party." We have already noticed the dependence of the subordinate courts on congressional legislation, and their consequent liability to alteration or extinction at the caprice of Congress. Not less significant is the power of Congress to dilute the Supreme Court itself by creating new judges. "In December 1869 the Supreme Court decided against the constitutionality of Congress's pet Legal Tender Acts; and on the following March a vacancy on the bench opportunely occurring, and a new justiceship having been created to meet the emergency, the Senate gave the President to understand that no nomination unfavourable to the debated Acts

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would be confirmed.

Two justices of the predominant party's way of thinking were appointed; the hostile majority of the court was outvoted, and the obnoxious decision reversed."

The State courts, as a rule, want many of the elements which go to constitute the strength of the Federal judiciary. There is some variety in the practice of the States, both as to the mode of appointing the judges and as to the duration of their term of office; but it will be seen from the following statement that the tendency, on the whole, is to short tenures and popular elections. The matter is wholly within the power of the people themselves, and is, to a large extent, regulated by provisions in the State Constitution. Four Constitutions require all judges to be elected by the people in their respective districts; one gives the election to the Legislature; one to the Governor, and three to the Governor and Council. Taking the two highest orders of courts— those classified by Mr. Stimson as supreme courts and superior courts respectively-we find that the judges of the former are, in a large number of cases, elected by the people of the State; in others, by the electors in their respective judicial districts; in four, by the two Houses of the Legislature in joint committee, while in a few others they are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature or the Senate. The judges of the superior courts, which occupy much the same position as the High Court of Justice in England, are, in a large majority of States,

elected by the people of the State in their respective judicial districts, circuits, or counties; in several by the Legislature; in two or three they are appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate. Supreme Court judges in Vermont hold office for two years only; in a considerable number of States for six years; in one for five years, and in others for terms of seven, eight, nine, ten, twelve, fourteen, and in three States during life or good behaviour. There is a like variety of terms in the superior courts, one of the most common being the term of four years. Justices of the peace, who exercise a limited jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases of minor importance, are in all but a few States elected directly by the people of the districts in which they act, and their term of office in the majority of States is limited to two or four years, although three, five, six, seven, and even fifteen years' terms are fixed in some cases.

Popular elections and limited tenures are not, for obvious reasons, generally regarded as conducive to the excellence of a judicial system; and in most of the State courts the salaries paid to the judges are below what we should consider to be essential in similar cases. The inferiority of the State courts in general to the Federal courts is not to be denied. They do not offer the same inducements to able men, nor do the judges speak with the same consciousness of assured position. The ablest lawyers in a country where legal practice often produces enormous emolu

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ments are not likely to be attracted by the very modest advantages of a seat on the judicial bench. In many States it would doubtless be found that the bench is often regarded as a stepping-stone to the bar: a young judge elected through a party vote may hope by an efficient discharge of his duties to recommend himself to clients when he returns to private practice. A popular election generally, though not necessarily, means a party vote, and judges thus elected must be expected to be more avowedly subservient to party than those who are nominated by Legislatures and appointed by executives, although these in turn depend on party elections. But while the popular election of judicial officers may be open to all these and many other objections, it commends itself to the people by the hold which it gives them over their own courts. Scientific justice may fare badly under such a system, but public opinion, in any case which calls for its intervention, is likely to have a powerful influence on the bench. Accordingly, the constitutional movement throughout the States has in recent times been steadily in the direction of popular elections. In 1830 in one half of the States the judges were appointed by the Governor; in the other half they were either appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the Legislature, or elected by the Legislature itself.* In half a century, therefore, the constitutional practice of the States on this important head has been revolutionised.

* Ford's "Citizen's Manual," p. 136.

It is evident from this review of the relations of the National to the State Governments that the field of action denoted by the phrase-so familiar in our own controversies-"law and order" is for the most part reserved to the latter. The National courts can only deal with crimes which are declared to be such by competent legislation in Congress. The State courts have an inherent jurisdiction to punish crimes which are such by the principles of the common law, unless where the State Constitution has imposed restrictions. But there is no common law of the United States.* In the matter of suppressing public disorder, the National Government, it is said, has no right of its own to interfere except in two cases-where the property of the National Government itself is in danger, or where riotous resistance is offered to an Act of Congress with a penalty attached.† And while Congress may provide

* So declared by the Supreme Court in the case of the United States v. Corlesp, Wherlon, 415.

Mr. FitzJohn Porter in the North American Review, vol. cxli. p. 353. Mr. Porter gives the following illustration of the limited functions of the National Government. "During the late Rebellion a draft became necessary to fill up the army of the Union. The President, in pursuance of an Act of Congress, had ordered it, but the draft could not be made under the immediate direction of the general Government: it must be made under the supervision of the State authorities. The draft. ... was resisted, and from one step to another the resistance culminated in a riot, one of the most disgraceful ever known in this country. Houses were pillaged, orphan asylums were burned, innocent men were hung to lamp-posts, and for days in this great city scenes of anarchy and bloodshed were enacted, at the mention of which to-day every citizen of this great metropolis should