the nominees of peers and great landowners; or were mainly returned through the political interest of those magnates. Many were the nominees of the Crown; or owed their seats to government influence. Rich adventurers, — having purchased their seats of the proprietors, or acquired them by bribery, supported the ministry of the day, for the sake of honors, patronage, or court favor. The county members were generally identified with the territorial aristocracy. The adherence of a further class was secured by places and pensions by shares in loans, lotteries, and contracts; and even by pecuniary bribes.

Defects of the representative system.

The extent to which these various influences prevailed, and their effect upon the constitution of the legislature, are among the most instructive inquiries of the historian. The representative system had never aimed at theoretical perfection; but its general design was to assemble representatives from the places best able to contribute aids and subsidies, for the service of the Crown. This design would naturally have allotted members to counties, cities, and boroughs, in proportion to their population, wealth, and prosperity; and though rudely carried into effect, it formed the basis of representation, in early times. But there were few large towns:- - the population was widely scattered: industry was struggling with unequal success in different places; and oppressed burgesses,

so far from pressing their fair claims to representation, were reluctant to augment their burdens, by returning memhers to Parliament. Places were capriciously selected for that honor by the Crown, and sometimes even by the sheriff, and were, from time to time, omitted from the writs. Some small towns failed to keep pace with the growing prosperity of the country, and some fell into decay; and in the mean time, unrepresented villages grew into places of importance. Hence inequalities in the representation were continually increasing. They might have been redressed by 1 Glanville's Reports, Pref. v.

a wise exercise of the ancient prerogative of creating and disfranchising boroughs; but the greater part of those created between the reigns of Henry VIII. and Charles II. were inconsiderable places, which afterwards became notorious as nomination boroughs. From the reign of Charles II.,when this prerogative was superseded, the growing inequalities in the representation were left wholly without cor rection.

From these causes, an electoral system had become estab lished, wholly inconsistent with any rational theory of representation. Its defects, Its defects, originally great, and aggra vated by time and change, had attained monstrous propor tions in the middle of the last century.

boroughs.

2

The first and most flagrant anomaly was that of nomina tion boroughs. Some of these boroughs had been, Nomination from their first creation, too inconsiderable to aspire to independence; and being without any importance of their own, looked up for patronage and protection to the Crown, and to their territorial neighbors. The influence of the great nobles over such places as these was acknowledged, and exerted so far back as the fifteenth century. It was freely discussed, in the reign of Elizabeth; when the House of Commons was warned, with a wise foresight, lest "Lords' letters shall from henceforth bear all the sway." As the system of parliamentary government developed itself, such interest became more and more important to the nobles and great landowners, who accordingly spared no pains to extend it; and the insignificance of many of the boroughs, and a limited and capricious franchise, gave them too easy a conquest. Places like Old Sarum, with fewer inhabitants than an ordinary hamlet, avowedly returned the nominees of their

998

1 One hundred and eighty members were added to the House of Commons, by royal charter, between the reigns of Henry VIII. and Charles II. Glanville's Reports, cii.

2 Paston Letters, ii. 103.

8 Debate on the Bill for the validity of burgesses not resiant, 19th Apri. 1571; D'Ewes Jour 168-171.

proprietors. In other boroughs of more pretensions in respect of population and property, the number of inhabitants enjoying the franchise was so limited, as to bring the representation under the patronage of one or more persons of local or inunicipal influence.

Various and

of election.

Not only were the electors few in number; but partial and uncertain rights of election prevailed in differlimited rights ent boroughs. The common-law right of election was in the inhabitant householders resident within the borough; but, in a large proportion of the boroughs, peculiar customs prevailed, by which this liberal franchise was restrained. In some, indeed, popular rights were enjoyed by custom; and all inhabitants paying "scot and lot,"

2

or parish rates, or all "potwallers," being persons furnishing their own diet, whether householders or lodgers, - were entitled to vote. In others, none but those holding lands by burgage-tenure had the right of voting; in several, none but those enjoying corporate rights by royal charter. In many, these different rights were combined, or qualified by exceptional conditions.

tion deter

Rights of election, so uncertain and confused, were founded Rights of elec- upon the last determinations of the House of Commons, which, however capricious, and devoid of settled principles, had a general tendency to restrict the ancient franchise, and to vest it in a

mined by the House of Commons.

In some of the corporate towns the inhabitants paying scot and lot, and freemen, were admitted to vote; in some, the freemen only; and in many, none but the governing body of the corporation. At Buckingham, and at Bewdley, the right of election was confined to the bailiff and twelve burgesses:

1 Parl. Return, Sess. 1831-32, No. 92.

2 Com. Dig. iv. 288. Glanville's Reports.

8 Glanville's Reports; Determinations of the House of Commons concerning Elections, 8vo., 1780; Introduction to Merewether and Stephens History of Boroughs; Male's Election Law, 289, 317; Luders' Election Reports, &c.

at Bath, to the mayor, ten aldermen, and twenty-four common-councilmen at Salisbury, to the mayor and corpora tion, consisting of fifty-six persons. And where more popular rights of election were acknowledged, there were often very few inhabitants to exercise them. Gatton enjoyed a liberal franchise. All freeholders and inhabitants paying scot and lot were entitled to vote, but they only amounted to seven. At Tavistock, all freeholders rejoiced in the franchise, but there were only ten. At St. Michael, all inhabitants paying scot and lot were electors, but there were only seven.1

In 1793, the Society of the friends of the people were prepared to prove that in England and Wales seventy Number of

oughs.

members were returned by thirty-five places, in small borwhich there were scarcely any electors at all; that ninety members were returned by forty-six places with less than fifty electors; and thirty-seven members by nineteen places, having not more than one hundred electors.2 Such places were returning members, while Leeds, Birmingham, and Manchester were unrepresented; and the members whom they sent to Parliament, were the nominees of peers and other wealthy patrons. No abuse was more flagrant than the direct control of peers, over the constitution of the Lower House. The Duke of Norfolk was represented by eleven members; Lord Lonsdale by nine; Lord Darlington by seven; the Duke of Rutland, the Marquess of Buckinghain, and Lord Carrington, each by six. Seats were held, in both Houses alike, by hereditary right.

8

elections.

Where the number of electors in a borough was sufficient to insure their independence, in the exercise of the Bribery at franchise, they were soon taught that their votes would command a price; and thus, where nomination ceased, the influence of bribery commenced.

Bribery at elections has long been acknowledged as one

1 Parl. Return, Sess. 1831-32, No. 92.

2 Parl. Hist. xxx. 789.

8 Oldfield's Representative Hist. vi. 286.

of the most shameful evils of our constitutional government. Though not wholly unknown in earlier times, it appears, like too many other forms of corruption, to have first become a systematic abuse in the reign of Charles II.1 The Revolution, by increasing the power of the House of Commons, served to enlarge the field of bribery at elections. As an example of the extent to which this practice prevailed, it was alleged that at the Westminster election, in 1695, Si Walter Clarges, an unsuccessful candidate, expended 2000%. in bribery in the course of a few hours.2

The Bribery

liam III.

These notorious scandals led to the passing of the Act 7 William III. c. 4. Bribery had already been recAct of Wil- ognized as an offence, by the common law;3 and had been condemned by resolutions of the House of Commons; but this was the first statute to restrain and punish it. This necessary measure, however, was designed rather to discourage the intrusion of rich strangers into the political preserves of the landowners, than for the general repression of bribery. It seems to have had little effect; for Davenant, writing soon afterwards, spoke of "utter strangers making a progress through England, endeavoring by very large sums of money to get themselves elected. It is said there are known brokers who have tried to stock-job elections upon the Exchange; and that for many boroughs there was a stated price." 5 An act of Parliament was not likely to touch the causes of such corruption. The increasing com merce of the country had brought forward new classes of men, who supplied their want of local connections, by the unscrupulous use of riches. Poi ical mora ity may be elevated

1 Macaulay's Hist. i. 184.

2 Ibid. iv. 491.

8 Burr. iii. 1235, 1388; Dougl. iv. 294; Male's Election Law, 339–345. 4 Com. Journ. ix. 411, 517.

Essay on the Balance of Power; Davenant's Works, iii. 326, 328. See also Pamphlets, "Freeholder's Plea against Stock-jobbing Elections of Parliament Men; ""Considerations upon Corrupt Elections of Members tc serve in Parliament," 1701.