Bribery en the King. There can be little doubt that the king himself was cognizant of the bribery which, at this period, was cour by systematically used to secure Parliamentary support. Nay, more, he personally advised and recommended it. Writing to Lord North, 16th October, 1779, he said: "If the Duke of Northumberland requires some gold pills for the election, it would be wrong not to satisfy him." "1 When the disgraceful traffic in boroughs was exposed in the House of Commons, before the general elecAttempts to restrain cor- tion of 1768, Alderman Beckford brought in a ruption. bill requiring an oath to be taken by every member, that he had not been concerned in any bribery. According to Horace Walpole, the country gentlemen were favorable to this bill, as a protection against "great lords, Nabobs, commissaries, and West Indians; "2 but the extreme stringency of the oath proposed, which, it was urged, would result in perjury, a jealousy lest, under some of the provisions of the bill, the privileges of the House should be submitted to the courts of law, - but above all, a disinclination to deal hardly with practices, which all had been concerned in, had profited by, or connived at, — ultimately secured its rejection. Again, in 1782 and 1783, Lord Mahon proposed bills to prevent bribery and expenses at elections; but on both occasions was unsuccessful. The same evil practices continued, unchecked by legislation, connived at by statesmen, and tolerated by public opinion. The system of purchasing seats in the House of ComSale of seats: mons, however indefensible in principle, was at its uses. least preferable to the general corruption of electors, and in some respects, to the more prevalent practice of nomination. To buy a seat in Parliament was often the only means, by which an independent member could gain 1 King's Letters to Lord North; Lord Brougham's Works, iii. 137, 138. 2 Walpole's Mem. iii. 153, 157, 159. admission to the House of Commons. If he accepted a seat from a patron, his independence was compromised; but if he acquired a seat by purchase, he was free to vote according to his own opinions and conscience. Thus, we find Sir Samuel Romilly, the most pure and virtuous of public men, who had declined one seat from the favor of the Prince of Wales,' justifying the purchase of another, for the sake of his own independence, and the public interests. Writing in September, 1805, he says: "As long as burgagetenure representatives are only of two descriptions, they who buy their seats, and they who discharge the most sacred of trusts at the pleasure, and almost as the servants of another, surely there can be no doubt in which class a man would choose to enroll himself; and one who should carry his notions of purity so far, that, thinking he possessed the means of rendering service to his country, he would yet rather seclude himself altogether from Parliament, than get into it by such a violation of the theory of the constitution, must be under the dominion of a species of moral superstition which must wholly disqualify him for the discharge of any public duties." 2 "2 The extent to which the sale of seats prevailed, and its influence over the composition of the House of Commons, may also be exemplified from the Diary of Sir Samuel Romilly, in 1807: "Tierney, who manages this business for the friends of the late administration, assures me that he can hear of no seats to be disposed of. After a Parliament which had lived little more than four months, one would naturally suppose that those seats which are regularly sold by the proprietors of them, would be very cheap they are, however, in fact, sold now at a higher price than was ever given for them before. Tierney tells me that he has offered 10,000l. for the two seats of Westbury, the property of the late Lord Abingdon, and which are to be made the most of 1 Romilly's Life, ii. 114–120. 2 Diary; Life, ii. 122. by trustees for creditors, and has met with a refusal. 6000 and 55007. have been given for seats, with no stipulation as to time, or against the event of a speedy dissolution by the king's death, or by any change of administration. The truth is, that the new ministers have bought up all the seats that were to be disposed of, and at any prices. Amongst others, Sir C. H the great dealer in boroughs, has sold all he had to ministers. With what money all this is done I know not, but it is supposed that the king, who has greatly at heart to preserve this new administration, the favorite objects of his choice, has advanced a very large sum out of his privy purse. "This buying of seats is detestable; and yet it is almost the only way in which one in my situation, who is resolved to be an independent man, can get into Parliament. To come in by a popular election, in the present state of the representation, is quite impossible; to be placed there by some great lord, and to vote as he shall direct, is to be in a state of complete dependence; and nothing hardly remains but to owe a seat to the sacrifice of a part of one's fortune. It is true, that many men who buy seats do it as a matter of pecuniary speculation, as a profitable way of employing their money: they carry on a political trade; they buy their seats and sell their votes." 1 He afterwards bought his seat for Horsham of the Duke of Norfolk, for 2000l. Annual rents for seats in So regular was the market for seats, that where it was inconvenient to candidates to pay down the purchasemoney, they were accommodated by its commutaParliament. tion into an annual rent. It was the sole redeeming quality of this traffic, that boroughs were generally disposed of to persons professing the same political opinions as the proprietors.2 The practice of selling and letting seats at last became so notorious, that it could no longer be openly tolerated by Parliament. In 1809, Mr. Curwen brought in a bill to pre 1 Life of Sir S. Romilly, ii. 200-201. 2 Ibid. 202. Act, 1809. vent the obtaining of seats in Parliament by corrupt practices, which after much discussion in both Houses, he Sale of seats succeeded in passing. It imposed heavy penal- restrained by ties upon corrupt agreements for the return of members, whether for money, office, or other consideration; and in the case of the person returned, added the forfeiture of his seat.1 But notwithstanding these penalties, the sale of seats,if no longer so open and avowed, — continued to This Act inbe carried on by private arrangement, so long as operative. nomination boroughs were suffered to exist, as one of the anomalies of our representative system. The representation of Hastings, being vested in a close corporation, was regularly sold, until the reform act had enlarged the franchise, for 60001.2 And until 1832, an extensive sale of similar boroughs continued to be negotiated by the Secretary to the Treasury, by the "whippers-in" of the Opposition, and by proprietors and close corporations. So long as any boroughs remained, which could be bought and sold, the market was well supplied both with buyers and sellers. larger bor Boroughs whose members were nominated, as to an office, and boroughs bought in the open market, or cor- Government rupted by lavish bribery, could not pretend to influence in popular election. The members for such places oughs. were independent of the people, whom they professed to represent. But there were populous places, thriving ports, and manufacturing towns, whence representatives, freely chosen, might have been expected to find their way into the House of Commons. But these very places were the favorite resort of the government candidates. The seven years' war had increased the national debt, and the taxation of the country. The number of officers employed in the collection of the revenue, was consequently augmented. Being the servants of the government, their 149 Geo. III. c. 118; Hansard's Deb. xiv. 354, 617, 837, 1032, &c. votes were secured for the ministerial candidates. It was quite understood to be a part of their duty, to vote for any candidate who hoisted the colors of the minister of the day. Wherever they were most needed by the government, their number was the greatest. The smaller boroughs were al ready secured by purchase, or overwhelming local interest, but the cities and ports had some pretensions to independ ence. Here, however, troops of petty officers of customs and excise were driven to the poll, and, — supported by venal freemen, overpowered the independent electors. In 1768, Mr. Dowdeswell had in vain endeavored to insert a clause in Alderman Beckford's bribery bill, for cers disfran- the disqualification of revenue officers. In 1770 he proposed a bill to disqualify these officers from voting at elections, and was supported by Mr. Grenville. It was urged, however, that they were already prohibited from interfering at elections, though not from voting; and that no further restraint could reasonably be required. But, in truth, the ministry of Lord North were little disposed to surrender so important a source of influence; and the bill was accordingly rejected.1 Revenue offi chised. The measure, however, was merely postponed for a time. The dangerous policy of the Court, under Lord North, and its struggle to rule by prerogative and influence, -convinced all liberal statesmen, of the necessity of protecting public liberty, by more effectual safeguards. Meanwhile the disastrous American war further aggravated the evils of taxes, and tax-collectors. In 1780, a bill to disqualify revenue officers was proposed by Mr. Crewe, and though rejected on the second reading, it met with much more support than Mr. Dowdeswell's previous measure. It was again brought forward in 1781, with less success than in the previous year. But the time was now 1 By a majority of 263 to 188; Parl. Hist. xvi. 834; Cavendish Deb. i. 442. 2 The numbers were 224 to 195; Parl. Hist. xxi. 403. 8 The numbers being 133 to 86; Parl. Hist. xxi. 1398. |