erally encouraged by the smallness of the electoral body,— they yielded to the corrupt influences by which their political virtue has been assailed. In numerous cases these constituencies, when their offence was not sufficiently grave to justify a permanent disfranchisement, were punished in a less degree, by the suspension of the writs.1 the prevention of bribery. Bribery Act, Meanwhile, Parliament was devising means for the more Measures for general exposure and correction of such disgraceful practices. It was not enough that writs had been suspended, and the worst constituencies disfranchised: it was necessary for the credit of the House of Commons, and of the new electoral system, that gross abuses of the franchise should be more effectually restrained. The first measure introduced with this object, was that of Lord John Russell in 1841. Many members who had won their seats by bribery, escaped detection, under cover of the rules of evidence, then followed by election committees. These committees had, -not unnaturally, -required a preliminary proof that persons alleged to have committed bribery, were agents of the sitting member or candidate. Until such agency had been established, they declined to investigate general charges of bribery, which unless committed by authorized agents would not affect the election. When this evidence was wanting, as it often was, all 1841. the charges of bribery at once fell to the ground; the member retained his seat, and the corrupt electors escaped exposure. To obviate this cause of failure, the act of 1841,2inverting the order of proceeding, - required committees to receive evidence generally upon the charges of bribery, without prior investigation of agency; and thus proofs or implications of agency have since been elicited from the general evidence. And even where agency has not been established, every act of bribery, by whomsoever committed, has been disclosed by witnesses, and reported to the House. 1 Warwick, Carrickfergus, Hertford, Stafford, Ipswich, &c. While this measure has facilitated the exposure of bribery, it has often pressed with undue severity upon the sitting member. Inferences rather than proofs of agency having been accepted, members have forfeited their seats for the acts of unauthorized agents, without any evidence of their own knowledge or consent. In the administration of this committees,- so far from desiring to screen delinquents, -have erred rather on the side of severity. The investigation of corrupt practices has also been, incidentally, facilitated by the amendment of the law of evidence, which permits the personal examination of sitting members and candidates.1 law, 1852. The act of 1841 was followed by another, in the next year, which provides for the prosecution of in- Bribery Acts, vestigations into bribery, after an election com- 1842 and mittee has closed its inquiries, or where charges of bribery have been withdrawn. But this measure not having proved effectual; another act was passed in 1852, providing for the most searching inquiries into corrupt practices, by commissioners appointed by the Crown, on the address of the two Houses of Parliament. In the exposure of bribery, - and the punishment of its own members when concerned in it, Parliament has shown no want of earnestness; but in the repression of the offence itself, and the punishment of corrupt electors, its measures have been less felicitous. The disclosures of commissions have been barren of results. At Canterbury one hundred and fifty-five electors had been bribed at one election, and seventy-nine at another: at Maldon, seventy-six electors had received bribes: at Barnstaple, two hundred and fifty-five; at Cambridge, one hundred and eleven; and at Kingston-upon-Hull no less than eight hundred and forty-seven. At the latter place, 26,6067. had been spent in three elections. In 1854, bills were brought in for the prevention of bribery in those places, and the disfranchise 1 Lord Denman's Act; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99. 25 & 6 Vict. c. 102. 8 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57. ment of the electors who had been proved to be corrupt.' But under the act which authorized these inquiries, voters giving evidence were entitled to claim an indemnity; and it was now successfully contended that they were protected from disfranchisement, as one of the penalties of their offence. These bills were accordingly withdrawn.2 Again in 1858, a commission having reported that one hundred and eightythree freemen of Galway had received bribes, a bill was introduced for the disfranchisement of the freemen of tha borough; but for the same reasons, it also miscarried. In 1860 there were strange disclosures affecting the anGloucester cient city of Gloucester. This place had been election, 1859. long familiar with corruption. In 1816 a single candidate had spent 27,500l. at an election; in 1818 another candidate had spent 16,000l.; and now it appeared that at the last election in 1859, two hundred and fifty electors had been bribed, and eighty-one persons had been guilty of corrupting them. Up to this time, the places which had been distinguished Wakefield by such mal-practices, had returned members to election, 1859. Parliament prior to 1832; but in 1860 the perplexing discovery was made, that bribery had also extensively prevailed in the populous and thriving borough of Wakefield, the creation of the reform act. Eighty-six electors had been bribed; and such was the zeal of the canvassers, that no less than ninety-eight persons had been concerned in bribing them." The writs for Gloucester and Wakefield were suspended, as a modified punishment of these corrupt places; but the House of Commons was as much at fault as ever, in providing any permanent correction of the evils which had been discovered. In 1854, a more general and comprehensive measure was 1 Hans. Deb., 3d Ser., cxxxi. 1018. 2 Ibid. cxxxiii. 1064. 8 lbid. cxlix. 378. &c. 4 Report of Commissioners. 1860 5 Ibid. Corrupt prac 1854. devised, for the prevention of corrupt practices at elections.' It restrained candidates from paying any election expenses, except through their authorized agents, tices Act. and the election auditor; and provided for the publication of accounts of all such expenses. It was hoped that these securities would encourage, and perhaps enforce, a more legal expenditure; but they have since received little credit for advancing the cause of purity. of 1858. This temporary act has since been continued from time to time, and in 1858 was amended. The legality of Bribery Act travelling expenses to voters had long been a mat- Travelling exter of doubt, having received discordant con- penses. structions from different committees. The payment of such expenses might be a covert form of bribery; or it might be a reasonable accommodation to voters, in the proper exercise of their franchise. This doubt had not been settled by the act of 1854; but it had been adjudged in a court of law,2 that the payment of travelling expenses was not bribery, if paid bona fide to indemnify a voter for the expenses he had incurred in travelling to the poll, and not as a corrupt inducement to vote. The act of 1858, following the principle of this judgment, but adding a further security for its obpermitted the candidate, or his agent appointed in writing, to provide conveyance for voters to the poll; but prohibited the payment of any money to voters themselves, for that purpose. But it was objected at the time, the same objection has since been repeated, that the legalizing of travelling expenses, even in this guarded manner, tends to increase the expenses of elections; and this debatable question will probably receive further consideration from the legislature. servance, 8 and It is the policy of these recent acts to define clearly the expenses which a candidate may lawfully incur, and to in 1 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102. 2 Cooper v. Slade; 6 E. and B. 447; Rogers on Elections, 334 islation con cerning bri bery. sure publicity to his accounts. So far their provisions are a Policy of leg- security to the candidate who is resolved to resist the payment of illegal expenses; and an embarrassment, at least, to those who are prepared to violate the law. That they have not been effectual in the restraint of bribery, the recent disclosures of election committees, and commissions sufficiently attest. Though large constituencies have, in some instances, proved themselves accessible to corruption, bribery has prevailed most extensively in the smaller boroughs. Hence some remedy may be sought in the enlargement of electoral bodies, and the extension of the area of voting. To repress so grave an evil, more effectual measures will doubtless be devised; but they may still be expected to fail, until bribery shall be unmistak ably condemned by public opinion. The law had treated duelling as murder, yet the penalty of death was unable to repress it; but when society discountenanced that time-honored custom, it was suddenly abandoned. Voters may always be found to receive bribes, if offered; but candidates belong to a class whom the influence of society may restrain from committing an offence, condemned alike by the law, and by public opinion. Other questions affecting the constitution of Parliament, and the exercise of the elective franchise, have been discussed at various times, as well before as since the reform act, and here demand a passing notice. Duration of The Septen To shorten the duration of Parliaments, has been one of the changes most frequently urged. Prior to Parliaments. 1694, a Parliament once elected, unless dissolved by the Crown, continued in being until the demise of the reigning king. One of the Parliaments of Charles nial Act. II. had sat for eighteen years. By the Triennial Act1 every Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, came to a natural end in three years. On the accession of George I. this period was extended to seven years, by the well known 16 Will. and Mary, c. 2. |