were bound in the pursuit of that object, not to use language, which might, by exciting in Spain the hopes of assistance from this country, induce her to refuse such concessions, as were at once compatible with her interests and her honour, and would take away from France the very shadow of a pretext for the violation of her independence. In his conscience he was persuaded, that his majesty's government had intended fairly and honestly; and, though they might have erred, through their too great anxiety for the interests of the country, in not preserving that firm tone, which with perfect consistency they might have held, still he could not concur in the motion of censure which had been proposed.

In the second evening, the chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Peel took a share in the discussion. If it could be shown, said Mr. Robinson that the entering upon a war, abstractedly speaking, was a mere matter of indifference to this country, or, that we could gain by such a step, then was blame to be attributed to his majesty's ministers. But, if it was once admitted, that peace was our policy, the next inquiry was, whether, in the late negotiations, his majesty's ministers had taken the course best calculated-first, to prevent any war; and, their efforts to that effect being unavailing, whether they had used their best endeavours to prevent our participation in it? His majesty's ministers were called to account upon this occasion, not for having unnecessarily plunged the country in war; not because they had not taken the necessary steps to preserve the peace of this country; but because they had not taken

what were considered the necessary steps to prevent a war between two powers-between whom there existed causes of irritation, which had a strong tendency to involve them in hostilities.

One complaint was, that, during the late negotiations, his majesty's ministers had not assumed that high tone of remonstrance which became the government of this country. Now, it appeared to him, that there was some difficulty in clearly defining and understanding what was meant by a "high tone of remonstrance." Some members might imagine it was to be found in the angry and vehement declamation of the noble member for New Sarum (lord Folkestone): others, that it ought to be couched in the violent invective and bitter sarcasm of the member for Winchelsea (Mr. Brougham); while a third would, perhaps, be of opinion, that it was to be discovered in the refined and epigrammatic satire of the mover of the original address. But, under such conflicting opinions, how were they to come to a decision? It was true, that nothing was more easy than to deal out the harshest terms, the grossest invectives against foreign powers; but, would any hon. member assert, that it would be right to pursue a similar course in diplomatic negotiations? While he maintained that our language to our allies should be that of persuasion rather than of menace, did he admit that this country had made no remonstrance against the aggressions of France? Did he admit that ministers had not forcibly pointed out to those allied powers the dangerous consequences likely to result from such a course of proceeding, and had not decidedly opposed themselves to the projects of those

powers? No. The conduct of his majesty's ministers had been of a nature diametrically opposite; in proof of which, he referred the House to the two last paragraphs of the confidential minute of lord Castlereagh on the affairs of Spain, addressed to the courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, in May, 1820.

Another complaint, said the chancellor of the exchequer, was, that we committed a very great mistake in not having, at the termination of the Congress at Verona, said to the allied powers, "Well, as we cannot induce you to give up your views on this question, we have nothing more to say to you." Why this, I think, is a matter very doubtful, Was it better for us to say to them, "We will have nothing more to say to you in the present state of things;" or to say, "Shall we make a last attempt to bring about a reconciliation?" I cannot undertake to say (for I am not quite so prophetic as the author of the address, who has undertaken to say so), what the future event of all these proceedings may be; but this I say, that, if any chance of averting that war by the continuation of our good offices and mediation should offer, it was our duty to avail ourselves of it. It was our duty to do so, with a view to the happiness and interest both of Spain, and of France. To the charge, further, that England had advised Spain to modify her institutions, Mr. Robinson replied, that, if Spain had not desired the interference of Great Britain, and called for her advice, it might not have been right, under the circumstances, for England to have tendered her suggestions. But, England was called upon to act, and called upon by

Spain; and the question was, whether the advice she gave was, under the circumstances, deserving approbation or censure? England stood, as it were, between two persons, strongly opposed to each other, both of whom had applied to her. England, as the third party, saw, from the nature of the dispute, and from the temper of the parties, that there was no chance of reconciliation, unless some concession was made. Concession she clearly saw was the price to be paid for reconciliation. England advised nothing disparaging to Spainnothing that could sink her character or encroach upon her independence. England advised Spain not to yield to any threat of France, nor to depart from the high tone of independence which it was necessary for her honour and security to maintain; but it was one thing not to yield to any demand of France, and another thing to listen to the amicable and friendly suggestions of Great Britain. Spain, however, rejected the proposition as inadmissible, and the negotiation terminated. England during that negotiation never advised Spain to do any thing that in the remotest degree would compromise her independence; and, least of all, did we advise her to yield to the monstrous principle contained in the speech of the king of France, which went to represent all free governments as mere waste paper, unless they proceeded from the mouth of kings. It has been said," added Mr. Robinson," that we have been grossly deceived by the French government. Undoubtedly it cannot be denied, that the conduct of France has been such as to excite_very great surprise on our part. But it is going a little too far to charge our government with having suf

fered itself to be deceived, when the party, with whom we were treating, was changing its mind from day to day. The French government was very little prepared on one day for the change which its opinions might undergo on the next. We are not to be blamed, because we could not anticipate such unexpected changes." Sir James Mackintosh expatiated chiefly on two points; first, that the internal dissentions of Spain afforded no sufficient reason, why we should abstain from assisting her; and secondly, that the occupation of Spain by France endangered the balance of power in Europe, and was an adequate cause of war. He illustrated those topics with his usual eloquence and historical lore: but it is not easy to see how they bore upon the substance of the question that was before the House, when they were insisted on by one who declined to contend that we ought to have plunged into hostilities. Not more than five minutes, said Mr. R. Peel in reply to him, did the hon. and learned gentleman employ in showing that the country ought to have assumed a more dignified tone in the late negotiations; and the arguments, which he had subsequently addressed to the passions, the reason, and the judgment of the House, all went to show, that the country ought to have made a declaration of war. He had referred much and often to the balance of power; and for what purpose?-to convince the House that it was now in such jeopardy, that we were bound to interfere for its preservation, even at the expense and hazard of being involved in war. The real question, however, was, did the honour of the country, and, if the honour, did the interests

of the country, render it necessary that we should become a party to the war? Did, then, the honour of the country require of us war? No. Did its interests? No. Did the faith of treaties? No. Did the voice of the people of England? Again he boldly answered, No. Did the government of Spain? Again and again he boldly answered, No. Since, then, neither Spain, nor the voice of the people of England, nor the faith of treaties, nor the interest, nor the honour of the country, required of us war, was there any reason for criminating the government, because it had not resorted to such a course? With respect to that part of the argument on the other side, which was intended to prove that a dignified tone had not been maintained by us in the late negotiations; Mr. Peel alleged, that a very artful attempt had been made to confound the different periods of the negotiations, and that the instructions, given by Mr. Canning in the first page of the correspondence, had been quoted to prove, that, when France first declared her intention of attacking Spain, our language had not been so strong and vigorous as it ought to have been. The words of his right hon. friend, "to such interference, come what may, his majesty will not be a party," used at the very outset of the negotiations, had been applied to events which had occurred three months afterwards, and had been quoted as the only remonstrance which we made to the French on their crossing the Bidassoa. The papers themselves furnished proof that this was not the case; and he therefore could not help complaining, that such an assertion had ever been allowed to go forth to

the public. It appeared to him, that these negotiations were divided into three distinct periods: the first, the period between the assembling and the close of the Congress; the second, the period between the return of the duke of Wellington to Paris, and the publication of the speech of the king of France; and the third, all the period that had since elapsed. Any man, who read the despatches for the purpose of criticising them, ought to keep these three periods perfectly distinct from each other in his mind, and to apply the language used during each of them to things as they then existed. He ought also to recollect, that at present we were rendered wise by the result, and should not forget that the writer of them had to enter into calculations of probabilities, with which at present we had nothing whatever to do. The object of the British government, during the first of these periods, was, to prevent a declaration from being made against Spain by the allied powers. Now had such a declaration been made or not? If it had not, how could it be justly said that the English negotiator had been duped? Indeed, what was the language used by France regarding these negotiations? Why, M. Montmorency said, that the measures, which the French government had contemplated for the amelioration of Spain, would have succeeded but for the conduct of England. That was at least an admission, on the part of France, that she did not consider her interests to have been forwarded by the part which we played at the late Congress. What was the opinion of Spain on the same point? Though she had complamed of our conduct when she VOL. LXV.

was unacquainted with it, as soon as she was informed of its effects, her minister, San Miguel, said to sir W. A'Court, on the 24th of December.-"We are sure of England, and are satisfied with her position." Did San Miguel say, that he expected that we should go to war? No such thing: but he pointed out the course, which, he thought would be most conducive to Spanish interests. He said, "There is nothing to induce us to ask for your mediation at present, but we are at sea, surrounded by dangers and menaced by storms, and it is impossible to say that we may not yet require a friendly hand." On a still later occasion the language of Spain, whom we were accused of not having favoured, was couched in the following terms:

"To England, who has taken, in the conferences at Verona, so moderate and pacific a line, it now belongs to crown her work." To crown her work! He wished the House to attend to the expression

did they think that the Spanish minister would have made use of it, had he been dissatisfied with our conduct?

Mr. Peel then vindicated the mission of lord Fitzroy Somerset, to Madrid, against the censures which had been cast upon it; and contended, that the advice which the duke of Wellington had offered, through him, to the members of the Spanish government, was well calculated to promote its best interests. His grace did not propose to them to make any modifications in the Spanish constitution that were not clearly for its benefit and improvement. Was there any thing in the nature of those modifications to prevent their acceptance by Spain; or any thing in the menace of a third power, [D]

which made it imperative upon her to reject them? What would have been the result, if she had accepted them? The withdrawal of the Army of Observation from the Pyrenees, to the presence of which they attributed so much of her calamities. As, at that moment, the king of France's speech had not been made public, Spain might certainly have consented without any loss of honour; and by such consent she would have united her people, and ameliorated their condition, more than she could do by any subsequent measure. He admitted, however, that after the French king's speech, even such a modification could not have been submitted to Spain with propriety. But, was it not too much that England should be made responsible for an entire change in the policy of the French government?

Sir Francis Burdett followed Mr. Peel, and met the question much more fairly and distinctly than any other of the opponents of ministers. He insisted, that the discussion had nothing to do with the question of peace or war; but simply, whether we had so conducted ourselves, as to convey to the minds of the French and other foreign ministers, the sense entertained by this country of the injustice meditated and done by France to Spain? Now, with respect to what had taken place at Verona, he thought there was, on the face of those transactions, more than sufficient to call down on the head of any English minister the censure contemplated by the original address. The French minister, at the outset, asked the noble duke who was our plenipotentiary, if England would concur with France in their aggression on Spain; and he had had the inso

lence, to go on and inquire, what effectual support this country would give to France, in case of her making this attack. Now, without using violent language, or menaces leading to war, there was a dignified expression of virtuous feeling, which would have brought to the minds of the makers of such propositions a knowledge of the sentiments which this country must entertain with regard to its atrocity. If we had said, that we were astonished and shocked at such conduct, and that far from having our support, we should feel it necessary to throw the whole weight of our moral authority into the other scale, such language would not have been without effect. There were a variety of modes of proceeding besides war, which might have been adopted, and which would have kept us out of the situation in which we were now placed a situation, which even those persons, who were anxious to preserve peace at all events, must acknowledge was a most ambiguous one. Suppose we had said"Your conduct is a violation of every principle of justice. only will we not be an accomplice in the transaction, but we must follow the severe line of our duty, and withdraw from your court our ambassador." This would have been an answer to the question, more consonant to the dignity of England and to the character which she had hitherto supported, but which she now seemed inclined to relinquish. Such an answer would have been more likely to deter France from her vile and detestable project, than telling her that she was undertaking an unnecessary responsibility. "It had been argued, that no member ought to vote for the address, who did not

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