The claims of persons other than owners are scheduled as follows:

No claims are made in behalf of any other person. In schedule 1 to 60 in the cases of Morris Moss, "owner" of the Lily; of Byrnes, owner of the Triumph, and of Bucknam, as owner of the Ariel, and in those cases only, claims are set up in general for the crew and hunters, but only for their share in the estimated future catch, which, in the details of each of those claims, made by the owner, is included in the claim of the owner, and so stated.

Not only are there no other persons named as claimants, but there are no other claims of persons mentioned, described, or suggested in the schedule of claims referred to this Commission, or in any paper referred to or connected with either the treaty, the award, the findings of fact, or the Convention. Hence, there is no jurisdiction of such claims, which are presented for the first time, in the whole history of the subject, in the British argument.

A "lump sum" for persons in general not named or suggested in the schedule-for crews and others whose names are not mentioned anywhere-will not do under this convention, and the new position of Great Britain advanced at page 56 of the argument can not be maintained.

This brings us to the following proposition:

There are two classes of "persons" among these claimants, who, by the settled and adjudicated principles of international law, are not "persons in whose behalf Great Britain is entitled to claim compensation from the United States."

These are:

(1) Original subjects of Great Britain still owing that nation a qualified allegiance (in respect of sovereignty and certain exterritorial laws), but who by domicile in the United States, without naturalization, owe allegiance to the sovereign claims of the United States and obedience to their municipal laws.

(2) Citizens of the United States, alleged to have been domiciled in Great Britain, who had not become naturalized in Great Britain, but who owed allegiance to the United States, obedience to the jurisdiction. asserted by the authorities of its sovereignty-execu tive, legislative, and judicial—and obedience to their exterritorial laws.

And of these in their order.

(ONE.)

CLAIMANTS WHO WERE ORIGINAL BRITISH SUBJECTS, BUT DOMICILED IN THE UNITED STATES.

In respect of some of the schooners, there are two owners in this class, as to one of whom there may be

doubt, but in respect of all claims presented in behalf of Thomas H. Cooper, as owner, the fact of his domicile in the United States is conclusive against them.

The British argument assumes (p. 38-39), and especially from the letter of Secretary Gresham, which is there imported into this case for the first time, that the omission of the words "British subjects," in Article I of the Convention, as defining those for whom Great Britain might present claims under the Convention, was a means of enlargement of jurisdiction rather than of limitation. As a matter of fact, that description was eliminated, for the reason that its use, and the similar use of terms importing the original citizenship of a claimant, had in all prior Conventions been productive of much embarrassment to the Commissioners.

Running through the proceedings of the Mixed Commissions of 1853 and 1871 it will be seen that claims were constantly presented in behalf of persons who were technically British subjects, because never naturalized in this country, and yet who had established legal domiciles in the United States.

The same difficulty had arisen under all the other Mixed Commissions which have been before referred to. In such cases it was insisted on the one side that such a description of persons could not be eliminated from the convention, although at the same time it would be admitted that a person legally domiciled in a country at the time his claim arose, though not naturalized, could not recover against the country of his domicile, before such commissions, or against any other country, by virtue of his original citizenship of the country of his original allegiance

Under the Mixed Commission of 1853 the term "British subject" was in such case eliminated from the convention, by construction, by the British umpire, Bates, in the Laurant's case; the umpire holding that

the term "British subject," although correctly describing the political status of the claimant, was not intended by the convention of 1853 to mean that a British subject domiciled, though not naturalized, in Mexico, and who had thus become civilly subject to the laws and the sovereignty of that country in its foreign relations with countries other than Great Britain, could urge his political status, of original allegiance to Great Britain, as a claimant against the United States for injuries suffered at their hands in Mexico.

Under the Mixed Commission established by the treaty of Washington of 1871, and which finished its labors in 1874, the question came up on demurrer of the United States in the Barclay case, and it was there held on the broad conferment on the Commissioners of jurisdiction by the treaty of Washington (it appearing by his statement of claim that he was a resident of the United States, and therefore domiciled there) that the demurrer must be overruled on the ground that Barclay was a "British subject" within the language of the Convention; but in that case it clearly appeared, as strongly urged by the British counsel, in point III of his brief, that the claimant Barclay had, while domiciled in the United States, been as "faithful to the United States as any loyal citizen," the principle being that he had been loyal to the sovereignty of his domicile and obeyed its municipal laws.*

In consideration of these difficulties under prior commissions, therefore, the framers of the present 'Convention provided, in effect, that the claims to be presented would only be those that Great Britain would be entitled to present under the rules of inter

* See report by Her Majesty's agent, of the Mixed Commission, presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1874, and published in Parliamentary Papers under the title "North America, No. 2” (1874), page 297.