Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social ResponsibilitiesUniversity of Chicago Press, 1985 - 235 էջ Our narrower obligations often blind us to larger social responsibilities. The moral claims arising out of special relationships—family, friends, colleagues, and so on—always seem to take priority. Strangers ordinarily get, and ordinarily are thought to deserve, only what is left over. Robert E. Goodin argues that this is morally mistaken. In Protecting the Vulnerable, he presents a comprehensive theory of responsibility based on the concept of vulnerability. Since the range of people vulnerable to our actions or choices extends beyond those to whom we have made specific commitments (promises, vows, contracts), we must recognize a much more extensive network of obligations and moral claims. State welfare services, for example, are morally on a par with the services we render to family and friends. The same principle widens our international, intergenerational, and interpersonal responsibilities as well as our duties toward animals and natural environments. This book, written with keen intelligence and unfailing common sense, opens up new perspectives on issues central to public policy and of critical concern to philosophers and social scientists as well as to politicians, lawyers and social workers. |
Բովանդակություն
1 Which Brothers Keeper? | 1 |
2 A Hierarchy of Moral Duties | 16 |
3 Grounds of Special Responsibilities | 28 |
4 The Standard Cases Reanalyzed | 42 |
5 Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities | 109 |
6 The Extended Implications of Vulnerability | 145 |
7 Invulnerability as an Alternative | 189 |
8 Conclusion | 205 |
References | 209 |
| 229 | |
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Protecting the Vulnerable: A Re-Analysis of Our Social Responsibilities Robert E. Goodin Դիտել հնարավոր չէ - 1985 |
Common terms and phrases
actions and choices American Law Institute animals argue argument Barry benefactor beneficiaries benefits caveat emptor ceteris paribus chap child claims clients consequences consequentialistic contract course crucial dependent discharge ethics example exploit fact Feinberg Fried friends friendship give Goodin harm Hart Harvard Law Review Hence human individual interests intergenerational justice justice last clear chance less London marriage merely model of self-assumed moral duties moral responsibilities natural negative duties nerability nonconsequentialistic notion ordinarily parents Parfit particular party person philosophers political positive duties Press professional promises protecting the vulnerable Pufendorf 1672 quasi-contracts Rawls reason reciprocal relationship reliance role self-assumed obligations Shue sibilities Sidgwick similarly simply social society someone sort special obligations special responsibilities stronger Suppose surely theory things tion U.S. Supreme Court Univ Utilitarianism voluntarily voluntaristic voluntary vulnerability model welfare wrong Yale Law Journal