(Monatsschrift für kath. Lehrerinnen, 1901, no. 7). In 1904 a high ecclesiastical dignitary, whose special competence no one will deny, expressed his contentment with the good work of such University Training Institutes. Past failures, he said, had in the beginning made him somewhat doubtful of the success of any attempt to improve in a scientific sense the training of female teachers. But in view of the happy outcome of the new movement, he felt bound to express his unconditional approval of these Institutes and his satisfaction with the good work accomplished in them for the improvement of practical instruction. We may add, in conclusion, that these judgments of experienced men square with the sentiments of the teacherstudents themselves and of their superiors. They are unanimous in the conviction that scientifically directed study offers the best guarantee for the improvement of instruction, both as to content and solidity, for an enlargement of mental outlook and for superior skill in the presentation of knowledge to the intelligence of the pupil.

WILHELM ENGELKEMPER.

AGNOSTICISM AS CONCILIATION.

To anyone who has followed the recent movements in philosophy, the condemnation of Agnosticism by the Encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis will cause no surprise. From time to time, indeed, various propositions agnostic in character have been singled out for censure and some of these with the judgment passed on them by the Vatican Council are cited in the Encyclical. But in the present instance the condemnation reaches the entire system of speculation which, by limiting knowledge to phenomena, would make the ultimate reality inconceivable, and in particular would proscribe any and every inquiry concerning the supreme reality which is God. In dealing with Agnosticism, therefore, one encounters not merely an error, however grave this might be, but rather a prolific source of errors, only a few of which have as yet been cast in definite form. Or perhaps one might say, no complete formulation is necessary, since in its principles and its method, but above all in the attitude which it assumes, Agnosticism sweeps away the most vital of truths. To say that it strikes at the foundation of Christian philosophy is to use a mild sort of metaphor; in point of fact, it leaves neither materials for building nor any ground in which these, if available, could possibly be set.

Regarded as a theory in epistemology and this is its primary import-Agnosticism, by its doctrine of relativity, makes knowledge a purely subjective affair. In its application to the world of external reality where, it asserts, cognition is limited to appearances, it coincides with Phenomenalism. And in the mental sphere, by denying that anything can be known of the substance of mind, it excludes from investigation all those problems the solution of which depends upon what is ascertained concerning the nature of the soul. It does not, in principle at least, deny that there is an objective something

back of phenomena; it contends that this something, however it may appear or manifest itself, is unknowable.

But the most serious consequences are those which the Encyclical points out. "Given these (agnostic) premises, every one will readily perceive what becomes of Natural Theology, of the motives of credibility, of external revelation." And in fact, if in the nature of things and of minds, the Ultimate Reality or whatever else may be offered as a substitute for God, is unknowable, it is obviously useless to talk about revelation and worse than useless to allege as the organ of revelation the inspired word of Scripture or the authority of the Church. For the agnostic "supernatural truth" is a meaningless term, not simply because he regards dogmas as idle statements at variance with the demands of intelligence and therefore unthinkable, but rather and chiefly because he sees in them a claim to knowledge about that which cannot be known. Since in his view a knowable God would be equivalent to a related Absolute, so a self-revealing God would be a downright absurdity.

In the emphasis which it lays upon the limitations of reason Agnosticism, of course, makes no pretension to originality. The history of philosophy shows that scepticism has at all times been quick to challenge the results of speculation and even to fix the bounds beyond which thought might not venture with any hope of success. As regards the knowledge of things divine, the medieval teachers themselves, notably St. Thomas, made it quite clear that the human mind is especially liable to err in seeking out the ways of God and in defining His attributes. But this only deepened their conviction as to the necessity of revelation. Among those more radical thinkers who in recent times have denied that reason could of itself attain any certainty about God, some made that very denial the basis of an argument in favor of revelation. The agnostic, on the contrary, while insisting that all knowledge is relative because of the conditions under which thought takes place, further insists that the impossibility of becoming known lies in the nature of the First Cause. Objectively,

therefore, no less than subjectively, revelation is out of the question.

One might, then, suppose that the agnostic was quite indifferent to the relation between religious truth and scientific truth, and that the various attempts to harmonize them left him entirely unconcerned. Arbitration, it would seem, implies at least two parties and some sort of communication between them. But since according to Agnosticism nothing can be known about the Being which is the object of religion, it ought to follow that there is nothing with which scientific truth can negotiate, and that antagonism and conciliation are equally impossible. If to the first question that Science might ask and to all the logically subordinate questions Religion could only reply with a confession of ignorance, the process of conciliation would end abruptly; nor could Science be blamed for closing the discussion.

As a matter of fact, however, no such strained relations are contemplated by the agnostic; or if such a possible issue has been suggested, a way out of the difficulty has been with commendable foresight proposed. The solution is clearly stated by Spencer in his "First Principles," five chapters of which, i. e., all of Part I, are devoted to the "Reconciliation." At the close of the chapter on ultimate religious ideas Spencer says: "If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest and most certain of all facts-that the Power which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." That is to say, the doctrine of the Unknowable which seemed to threaten the existence of Religion, now turns out to be its mainstay and the one hope of its survival in its conflict with Science. Agnosticism thus appears in a new and attractive role; it takes upon itself the function of pacification.

Somewhat more in detail the terms of conciliation are these: The ultimate religious truth, of the highest possible certainty, is the existence of a Reality the nature of which cannot be known. This is the "vital element in all religions"; it is the element which not only survives every change, but grows more distinct the more highly religion is developed." "This

most abstract belief which is common to all religions is also that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable or rather makes ever clearer. It has nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic, but on the contrary is a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more profoundly true than any religion supposes. . . And thus the mystery which all religions recognize turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect-not a relative, but an absolute mystery."

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Similarly, the ultimate ideas of Science represent ties that cannot be comprehended." Motion and rest, space and time, force and matter defy all efforts of the understanding. Consciousness itself, both in extent and substance, eludes our mental grasp. The "personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be truly known at all; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought." The man of science, whether he look outward upon the world or inward upon himself, is baffled. "Objective and subjective things he thus ascertains to be alike inscrutable in their substance and genesis. In all directions his investigations eventually bring him face to face with an insoluble enigma, and he ever more clearly perceives it to be an insoluble enigma."

Thus Science and Religion, differing as they do in their special teachings, are found to coincide in their recognition of an unknowable Reality. However antagonistic in their positive elements, they are as one in that Agnosticism which is essentially negative, or, as the Encyclical tersely puts it, solum est in ignoratione. Nor is the conciliation proposed by Agnosticism merely theoretical; it is meant to determine the attitude of the candid mind, to inculcate a tolerant spirit and to point the path of duty. "By continually seeking to know and being continually thrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Unknowable."