the profit motive tend to weaken; situations constantly arise when the truth might do manifold economic harm and the lie does direct economic good. This pressure toward the lie in business might be neutralized and undoubtedly is resisted, when the parties to business are thoroughly noble or when there are personal relations between them. But the mass and method in modern business tend to depersonalize it. Customer and merchant are strangers. The manufacturer produces not for individuals but for the "market; " the salesman deals with the customer not with a friend.

The thought may be illustrated for instance in the visit of an unknown lady of poor taste but marked pretensions to a salesman in search of a hat. The salesman's income and position depend on his sales. The lady must be suited. She demands it and the salesman's interests require it. The customer dictates combinations in color which will excite only ridicule, and selects a form which is quite unsuited to her. If the salesman tells the truth, he angers his customer, displeases his employer, affects his own income. Rather than do this, he will risk a lie and trust to the hundreds who too will lie kindly to the lady when they see the hat. Williams tells in his studies on Brahmanism that he planted some pipal trees near a market in order to ingratiate himself with the natives. The tree is sacred to them and planting it is an act of religion. But the natives begged him to desist, saying, that since they were compelled to deceive in doing business, the presence of the sacred trees would be a source of worry. A little book entitled "Who Lies" appeared some time ago. In it the story is told of ten men in professions who agreed not to lie for a year. All, it is said, ruined their business. While the impression of the story as a whole is improbable, every incident mentioned is within the range of the probable in every day professional life. So much so that it does not seem extravagant to say that the lie has become a business institution. Not all business is affected but the lie appears to have a well defined place which is quickly discovered by the entirely truthful who attempt to do business. Advertising, recommendations of goods, statements concern

ing "marked down" bargains, comparisons between competitors and such features of business life touch on the lie constantly. The salesman who insists on being truthful and accurate in these matters finds life a weary struggle.

VI.

It may be concluded from the foregoing that truthfulness is no easy virtue. Necessary as it is, and primary in its character, an extremely complex and even distressing situation awaits him who would be faithful.

Honesty of feeling is not a safe guide, purity of motive is no security against mistake, truth is not its own apology. That a statement is true gives no warrant that it may be made. If the truth in question is pleasant, it may be stated to one's friend, but possibly it would be an error of judgment to state it to an antagonist. If a statement of unpleasant truth ought to be made, it is easy to make it against an adversary but difficult to make it to a friend. Sometimes one must say the truth and incur penalty when a lie would win prompt reward. Sometimes social situations call for pleasant speech when only pleasant lies are at one's command. Morality on a given occasion says "tell the truth." Culture "do not." Kindness says "lie." The speaker must find a resultant from the component forces playing on him and only too often the resultant moves in the direction of the lie. And yet one agrees with Henry James in believing that falsehood is "the most contemptible, the least heroic of vices."

says

It is easy enough to teach the nobility of truthfulness and the degradation of the lie; it is not so easy to teach the telling of the truth concretely. Possibly some progress might be made were we to study the problem from a more personal standpoint. If the individual were to hold himself responsible for all of the lies told to him, on account of his sensitiveness and dislike of unpleasant truth, or on account of his impudence and curiosity, or of his craving for praise and flattery, he might gradually make it possible for those who deal with him to be more truthful.

The whole social situation resolves itself into a question of habit of mind. Most of us believe in truthtelling and hate lies. We have no doubt about the facts of social life which invite lies but we seem to have much doubt about the doctrine on truthtelling which is to guide us. Disagreement is found on all sides. Some give us one definition of a lie, some give us another; some find moderate lying necessary and consequently right; some find lying wrong, but they call necessary lying by another name. Some reach no conclusion, leaving situations to themselves and then, without debate, lie as may be necessary. Strong teaching and touching appeal for truthfulness are not lacking in society. What is lacking is practical understanding of the social processes back of much lying and practical sympathy for those who lie because forced to it by the world about them.

As medical science promises to put an end to yellow fever and malaria by exterminating mosquitoes, so the moralist might exterminate lies by suppressing in those to whom the lies are told their resentment against truth, their impudence and curiosity, their demand that others lie. When truthtelling is made practicable it will flourish. Corneille has pictured for us in his interesting Dorante the methods of the constitutional liar, and Molière has shown us in the career of Alceste the fate of the truthteller. In our own day, Henry James has sketched in his short story "The Liar," the "liar platonic." He is "disinterested, he does n't operate with a hope of gain or with a desire to injure. It is art for art and he is prompted by the love of beauty." Literature has not failed to take note of this great feature of life yet it is difficult to see that we make much headway against the forces that perpetuate the standard forms of untruthfulness. Extended comment on the sociological lessons in these works might be a real contribution to the discussion of our problem. The social setting of the lie, its fundamental relation to social processes, is well brought out in the following from Spencer's Principles of Sociology, Vol. II, Part IV, Ch. XII.

"War of necessity cultivates deception; ambush, manœuvering, feints and the like, involve acted lies; and skillful lying

by actions is regarded as a trait of military genius. The slavery which successful war establishes implies daily practice in duplicity. Against the anger of his cruel master, a successful falsehood is the slave's defense. Under tyrants unscrupulous in their exactions, skillful lying is a means of salvation and a source of pride. And all the ceremonies which accompany the régime of compulsory coöperation are pervaded by insincerity; the fulsome laudations are not believed by the utterer; he feels none of that love for his superior which he professes; nor is he anxious for his welfare as his words assert. But in proportion as compulsory coöperation is replaced by voluntary coöperation, the temptations to deceive that penalties may be escaped, become less strong and perpetual, and simultaneously truthfulness is fostered, since voluntary coöperation can increase only as fast as mutual trust increases. Though throughout the activities of industry there yet survives much of the militant untruthfulness; yet, on remembering that only by daily fulfillment of contracts can these activities go on, we see that in the main, the things promised are performed. And along with the spreading truthfulness thus implied, there goes on an increasing dislike of the more extreme untruthfulness implied in the forms of propitiation. Neither in word nor in act do the professed feelings so greatly exceed the real feelings.' The relations of language and lying will be treated in a concluding article.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

DIDACTIC MATERIALISM AND THE TEACHING OF RELIGION.

Wherever and whenever Christian truth was taught, regard was had also to the right form of teaching. Not the doctrine alone, but also the teaching of the Divine Saviour was held to be the model," declared Dr. Otto Willmann in the opening address at the Catechetical Congress of Munich, 1905. The Encyclical Eterni Patris' called our attention to the 'perennis philosophia.' Now parallel with this perennis philosophia must be placed the perennis pædagogica.'1 The same well-known Catholic pedagogue, arguing against Dilthey of Berlin, follows the same line of thought in the words: "Christian pedagogical wisdom contains the leading lines of scientific pedagogy True science wears not the garb of its time, it searches for that which holds for all time, wisely instructed it springs forth from the eternal." 2

...

Guided by this truth, we well may adopt the pedagogical language and experience of our time, still keeping in mind the dictum of St. Vincent of Lerins: Dicas nove, non dicas nova. Speaking, therefore, in broad terms the Catholic Church recognizes no new education.' We shall not allow ourselves to be misled by that American educator, who in an unguarded moment declared that all there is to the science of education could be learned in an hour and a half. On the other hand, as we are striving for a Catholic education, we may not reject even the most insignificant kernels of pedagogical truth, though they may be found in books and deeds of non-Catholic educators. We may safely affirm that to these minds also we shall give in return a hundredfold more than we received. The writer heartily endorses Dr. Shields' contention in the March number of the CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, "No earnest student. . . can fail to notice the wide chasm which separates

'Der Muenchener Katechetische Kurs, 1905. p. 23.

* Aus Hoersaal und Schulstube, 1904. p. 40.