to Lady Day; and as to the remaining three and three-quarter years, for the difference between 100l., the rent reserved under the lease, and 751., the trustee's estimate of the present letting value, and a sum for repairs. That is inadequate.

Reed, Q.C., and Muir Mackenzie, for the trustee :

The trustee can only do his best to assess the diminished letting value. The claimant has a full quarter to put in repair and relet, and he is allowed loss of rent to the end of the term on the basis of a reduction of 25 per cent. Ex parte Blake, In re McEwan (1), gives the true measure of damages in such a case.

Blake, In re Here the proof

VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J.: In Ex parte McEwan (1), the proof was by the lessor. is not by the lessor, but by an assignee of the lease whom the bankrupt has covenanted to indemnify. If Carruthers had not become bankrupt, Tobit, his assignor, would have had nothing to pay. But Carruthers has become bankrupt and his assignor has to pay. If the house is not let he will have to pay four years' rental; but he is not entitled to prove for the whole of that. He can relet, and the question is, How long will it take to repair and relet? The right measure of damages in my opinion is that the claimant should have another quarter to repair and relet, and that the loss in the letting value of the house should be taken at 30l. a year, not 251. The claimant will, therefore, be allowed to prove for two quarters' rent-from December, 1894, to 25 June, 1895-and for loss of rent, on the basis of a 301. reduction, for the remaining three and a half years of the term. He is also entitled to prove for dilapidations in respect of which a sum has, I understand, been agreed. The applicant may add his costs to his proof.

Solicitors: Saxelby & Faulkner, for the Creditor.

Phelps, Sidgwick & Biddle, for the Trustee.

(1) 11 Ch. D. 572; 40 L. T. 859; 27 W. R. 901.

E. M.

IN RE OTWAY, EX PARTE OTWAY.

1895, March 15. LORD ESHER, M.R., LOPES AND RIGBY, L.JJ. Bankruptcy-Petition-Grounds for Dismissal-Presentation for purpose of Extortion-Forfeiture of Assets on Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 8. 7, subs. 3.

It is a sufficient cause for dismissing a bankruptcy petition that the real object of the creditor in presenting it was not to obtain an adjudication, but to extort money from the debtor.

It is also a sufficient cause for dismissing a petition that an adjudication would destroy the only available asset.

APPEAL from a receiving order.

The petitioning creditor had obtained judgment against the debtor for 1287. 78. 6d., and the act of bankruptcy upon which the petition was founded was non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice to pay that sum.

Before the day fixed for the hearing of the petition, the petitioning creditor offered to consent to an adjournment, if the debtor would give him 25l. The debtor refused to do so.

It appeared that the debtor's only asset was a life interest, amounting to about 1,500l. a year, under a will, which provided that it should be forfeited upon his becoming bankrupt.

On the hearing of the petition, the Registrar made a receiving order.

The debtor appealed.

M. Muir Mackenzie, for the appellant.

F. Cooper Willis, for the petitioning creditor.

Lord ESHER, M.R.: It seems to me that both the points that have been taken are made out, and that this petition should have been dismissed. It is clear that the object of the petitioning creditor was to be bought off. He went to the debtor and said that he would consent to an adjournment, if the debtor would give him 251. The distinction taken by the counsel for the petitioning creditor between a successful and an unsuccessful attempt to

extort money does not appear to me to exist for this purpose. The creditor did all he could to extort the money in this case, and failed. The case of Ex parte Atkinson, In re Atkinson (1) decides that, when the Court sees that a bankruptcy petition has been made use of for an inequitable purpose or for the purpose of extorting money, the Court ought not to make a receiving order. An attempt, such as this, to extort money from the debtor is a fraud on the other creditors, and a fraud on the Court of Bankruptcy. On that ground alone, therefore, I should have been of opinion that these proceedings ought not to be allowed to go on. As to the other point in the case of Ex parte Robinson, In re Robinson (2), it was said that where, owing to the absence of assets, an adjudication would be altogether a vain thing, there ought not to be one. It seems to me that to allow this petition to go on would be a vain thing, and, if so, it ought not to go on. If this life interest is the only asset, it would be destroyed by an adjudication in bankruptcy, and there would, therefore, be an entire absence of assets. If there is nothing to distribute among the creditors, an adjudication would be altogether vain. The fact that the petitioning creditor is insisting upon an adjudication under such circumstances still further shows what is the object of this petition. He is willing to do what looks like cutting his own throat, by taking proceedings which would result in destroying the only available asset, because he thinks that he will thereby squeeze some money out of somebody.

LOPES, L.J.: I am of the same opinion. I think that no receiving order ought to have been made in this case. The moment that the Court sees that a bankruptcy petition is for the object of extorting money, the Court ought not to allow it to proceed. I am clearly of opinion that this petition is for the purpose of extorting money. I asked the counsel for the petitioning creditor several times during the argument what advantage could possibly accrue to his client if the receiving order were to stand. It appears to me that no possible advantage could accrue to him. Coupling that with the fact that he has attempted to extort

money from the debtor, I have not the slightest doubt that this petition is not a bonâ fide one. The case of Ex parte Atkinson (1) decides that, whenever that is the case, the Court ought not to make a receiving order.

I also think that, upon the other ground, no receiving order ought to have been made. It is clear that, as the Master of the Rolls has said, to make a receiving order in this case would be a vain thing, there being no assets available for distribution in bankruptcy.

RIGBY, L.J.: I am of the same opinion. I think that the petitioning creditor's attempt to extort money from the debtor as the price of consenting to an adjournment was a fraud upon the other creditors. I conceive that, upon that ground alone, it would be quite right to refuse a receiving order. It ought also to be refused on the other ground, that it is clear that the only asset is one that would be forfeited upon an adjudication in bankruptcy.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors: Michael Abrahams, Sons & Co., for the Appellant.
A. J. Benjamin, for the Respondent.

A. H. B.

IN RE BASSETT, EX PARTE LEWIS.

1895, April 4. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS AND KENNEDY, JJ. Bankruptcy-Petition by Liquidator-Form-Misfeasance Moneys-“ Final Judgment"-Bankruptcy Notice-Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 63), s. 10—Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 58), 8. 1-Joining Claims in Petition—Amendment.

A bankruptcy petition presented by a liquidator in respect of a debt due to the company should be in the name of the company and should be headed "Ex parte The company," and a bankruptcy notice likewise. Where on a misfeasance summons by the liquidator of a company, an order had been made on a person to pay moneys under section 10 of the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890, and the liquidator afterwards served a bankruptcy notice in his own name "as liquidator" of the company, based on such order as constituting a "final judgment" under section 1 of the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1893, and also presented a petition in the same form, the Court held that the petition had rightly been dismissed as irregular and refused leave to appeal.

To join with such a claim for misfeasance moneys a claim for the costs of an appeal from the order made on the misfeasance summons will render the petition bad.

In re Low, Ex parte Central Argentine Gold Fields (1), followed.

THIS was an appeal from the refusal of the registrar of the County Court of Birmingham to make a receiving order against the above debtor Bassett. Bassett had been managing director of a company called "Bassett's Plaster Company, Limited," and in that capacity had received a sum of 1897. 13s. 11d. for which he was accountable to the company. The company on 20 October, 1892, resolved on a winding-up-afterwards continued under supervision—and the liquidator, one Lewis, applied by motion to the County Court at Birmingham for an order under section 10 of the Winding-up Act, 1890, on Bassett to repay the said sum of 1891. 13s. 11d. The order was made (in the usual form) directing that Bassett "do pay to the said Joseph Lewis, the liquidator of Bassett's Plaster Company, the sum of 1897. 138. 11d." Bassett appealed, but his appeal was dismissed, and the order not having been complied with, the liquidator, on 1 August, 1894, made a request for a bankruptcy notice to issue on the order of the County Court as constituting a "final judgment" by virtue of

(1) 7 Morr. 302; [1891] 1 Q. B. 147; 60 L. J. Q. B. 265; 63 L. T. 694.