Jolliffe v. Hector.

THE plaintiff, a gentleman of landed property, had employed the defendant to act as his agent in the management of his estates. The bill prayed that an account might be taken of the sums which the defendant had received as such agent, and that the defendant might be decreed to deliver up, to the plaintiff, all deeds, documents, papers and writings, in his possession or power, which be longed to the plaintiff. The decree directed the accounts to be taken, and the Master to make, to the parties, all just allowances.

The defendant was a solicitor, and had been employed by the plaintiff in that capacity during the period that he had acted as the plaintiff's agent; and, several bills of costs having become due to him from the plaintiff, the Master, on the application of the plaintiff's solicitor, referred those bills to a clerk in court, for

taxation; and, in taking the accounts directed by the [*399] decree, he included the reduced amounts of the *bills amongst the just allowances to be made to the defendant. The plaintiff excepted to the report, because the Master had allowed the defendant the reduced amounts of his bills.

Mr. G. Richards and Mr. Parry, in support of the exceptions.

Mr. Bethell and Mr. Briggs, in support of the report, said that, if a client applied to have his solicitor's bills taxed, he undertook to pay them; and that the plaintiff could not get his deeds, &c., out of the hands of the defendant, until he had paid his bills.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, after referring to the pleadings and decree, said :-The bill states that the defendant did act as the plaintiff's solicitor; but I do not see, either in the bill or in the answer, any statement that any bills of costs were due from the plaintiff to the defendant. The bill is framed for an account of the rents and profits of the plaintiff's estates, and of the moneys produced by the sale of timber on those estates, which had been received by the defendant: and the defendant does not, by his answer, make any claim in respect of bills of costs; there is no passage in the answer to that effect. The decree directs the Mas

Ex parte Dering.

ter to take an account of the rents, profits, and timber-money received by the defendant: but it does not order the Master to tax any bills of costs. Therefore, under the direction to make the defendant just allowances, it was not competent to the Master to tax the defendant's bills, and to allow him the amounts.

Consequently, I cannot allow the report to stand.

*IN the matter of 3 & 4 Vict., c. 55, (to enable the own. [*400] ers of settled estates to defray the expense of drain

ing the same, by way of mortgage.)

Ex parte DERING.

Petition, service of-Stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 55.

1841: 19th Nov.

A petition presented under 3 & 4 Vict. c. 55, by a tenant for life of settled estates, for leave to drain the estates, ordered to be served on the trustees to preserve contingent remainders, the person beneficially entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance being an infant.

THE Act of Parliament above mentioned empowers any tenant for life or for a term determinable upon his or her life, under any will, settlement or other like disposition, entitled in possession, at law or in equity, to any lands in England or Ireland, or the guardian or guardians of any infant, on the behalf of such infant so entitled as aforesaid, to apply, by petition, to the Court of Chancery or Exchequer in England or Ireland, for leave to make any permanent improvements in the lands to which he or she shall be so entitled, by draining the same in a permanent manner; sect. 1: Provided that a copy of every such petition shall be served, 21 days at the least before the hearing thereof, upon the person or persons beneficially entitled, at law or in equity, to the first vested estate of freehold of inheritance in remainder after the estate of the tenant for life; but, if any such

Trulock v. Robey.

persons shall be of unsound mind or under the age of 21 years, or under any other legal disability, or beyond the limits of the United Kingdom, then a copy of such petition shall be served, on his, her or their behalf, upon such person or persons respectively as the Court of Chancery or Exchequer, to which the petition shall be preferred, shall appoint for that purpose; sect. 2: And when the improvements have been made and sanctioned by

the court, the Master may authorize the tenant for life, [*401] &c., to charge the estates *with the payment, to any person willing to advance the same, of the amount of the sums expended, together with interest at five per cent; sect. 4.

Sir Edward Dering, the tenant for life of certain settled estates, in which his eldest son, an infant, was entitled to the first vested estate of freehold of inheritance in remainder, having presented a petition under the Act;

Mr. Bloxam, on his behalf, applied to the court to appoint a person on whom the petition might be served on the infant's behalf.

The Vice-Chancellor directed the petition to be served on the trustees of the estates to preserve contingent remainders.

[*402] *HANNAH MARIA TRULOCK v. JOHN ROBEY.

Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27.—Acknowledgment.— Mortgagor and mortgagee.-Equity of redemption.-Agent.

1841: 19th Nov.

A mortgagee in possession of lands at Hendred, having received from the grandfather of the infant heir of the mortgagee, a letter, the contents of which did not appear, wrote in answer as follows: "Concerning the business at Hendred, which you know nearly as well as myself, as there has been nothing kept from you; which I am very willing to settle if your granddaughter is of age. I never told you any other ways; as I have been informed she is the heiress of what there is. The

Trulock v. Robey.

difference is not worth much. I shall hear from your grand-daughter about the business." Held, that the last-mentioned letter was an acknowledgment of the heir's right to redeem the mortgage, and that, when she came of age, she was entitled to consider her grandfather as having acted as her agent, and, consequently, that she was entitled to redeem the mortgage at any time within 20 years after the letter was written.

IN December, 1767, Richard Hutchins, the plaintiff's greatgrandfather, made a mortgage in fee of a copyhold estate, held of the manor of East Hendred in Berkshire. In October, 1774, the mortgage was transferred to John Robey, the elder; and, soon afterwards, he was admitted to and entered into possession of the mortgaged premises, and continued in possession of them until his death.

Hutchins, the mortgagor, died in 1776; and the equity of redemption of the mortgaged premises descended to his three daughters, Ellen, Hannah, and Mary. Ellen afterwards died intestate and without issue, leaving her sisters, Mary and Hannah, her customary co-heirs. In October, 1804, Hannah sold and surrendered her moiety of the equity of redemption to John Robey, the elder, in fee. Mary married John Trulock, the elder, and died in 1778, leaving her son, John Trulock, the younger, her customary heir. John Trulock, the younger, died in 1811, leaving the plaintiff, who was then about four years old, his only child and customary heir. In December, 1837, John Trulock, the elder, died.

*John Robey, the elder, died some time before the [*403] 31st of October, 1817; and, on or about that day, the defendant was admitted to the mortgaged premises either as the devisee or heir of his father; and he then entered into and had ever since continued in the possession of the mortgaged premises.

The bill was filed on the 9th of May, 1838, praying, amongst other things, that the plaintiff might be declared to be entitled to redeem one moiety of the mortgaged premises. It charged that the defendant, in a letter written by him to the plaintiff's grandfather, in or about the month of November, 1821, in reply to a

Trulock v. Robey.

letter from the plaintiff's grandfather, admitted the plaintiff's title to the equity of redemption in a moiety of the mortgaged premises, and stated that he was willing to settle accounts as to the mortgaged premises, when the plaintiff should attain her full age. The letter alluded to, in the above charge, as containing an admission of the plaintiff's title, was dated, "Hendred, 30th of November, 1821," and was as follows: "Sir, Having received a letter dated the 17th of November, after a week's turn round the country on expense, I think you might send letter with less expense. Concerning the business at Hendred, which you know nearly as well as myself, as there has been nothing kept from you; which I am very willing to settle if your granddaughter is of age. I never told you any otherways; as I have been informed she is the heiress of what there is. As for chancery, I think there is no good there. The difference is not worth much. I shall hear from your grand-daughter about the business. J. Robey."

The question, at the hearing of the cause, was whether that letter prevented the plaintiff's right to redeem from being [*404] *barred by the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 William 4, c. 27; that is, whether it was "an acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor or of his right of redemption, given to the agent of the mortgagor or some person claiming his estate, in writing, signed by the mortgagee or the person claiming through him;" sect. 28.

The direction and contents of the letter, and the signature to it, were proved to be in the hand-writing of the defendant: and J. Trulock's daughter deposed that she received it from the East Hendred carrier, for her father, who was then confined for debt in Reading jail.

Mr. Stuart and Mr. Koe, for the plaintiff, contended that the letter contained a sufficient acknowledgment of the plaintiff's