information of such as are unacquainted with the 1809. subject it may be useful to add, that the bower April. anchor of the Caledonia, the largest ship in the british navy, weighs 4 tons, and that her bower cable measures in diameter, or did measure before iron ones were adopted, 25 inches. For any thing that appears in the accounts, the existence of this formidable boom was not known to the British until after the attack which we are about to relate had commenced.

The

ries of

d'Aix,

&c.

The strength of the batteries that protected the Batteanchorage has been variously stated at from 13 to Isle 50 guns. It is probable that the number of guns d'A did not exceed 30; but the greater part of these were long 36-pounders; and there were also several mortars of the largest description in use. island was garrisoned with 2000 troops; but they were all conscripts and not to be relied upon. Nor was Isle d'Aix strong in any other part than that which protected the fleet. On its north-east side, or the side which fronts the bay of Rochelle, there were only a few guns mounted, and those in bad condition and at a great distance apart. Exclusive of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, the isle of Oleron, distant three miles and a half to the west-southwest of the citadel of Aix, contained three or four gun and mortar batteries, one of which, named Saumonard, could throw its shot and shells nearly within the range of the former, Besides these artificial defences, the road of Isle d'Aix had a shoal at a short distance in its rear, and another, at a somewhat greater distance, stretching along its southern extremity. The latter was named Palles, and was in several parts hard and rocky. The former was a bank or bar of mud, thrown up at the mouth of the river Charente.

Other

range

The arrival of the 12 fire-ships, on the afternoon defenof the 10th, leaving no doubt in the mind of M. sive arAllemand, as to the nature of the attack in contem- ments plation, he directed the armed launches and boats of M. of the fleet, 73 in number, to be assembled in five mand.

Alle

April.

1809. divisions, in order to be ready, at the close of day, to take their stations near the boom, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fire-ships, and of engaging any british boats that might be sent down to assist the latter in their operations. Some very excellent regulations were drawn up for the guidance of these boats, as appears by a copy of them which afterwards fell into the hands of the British. The french admiral also ordered the ships of each line, to strike their topmasts and get their topgallantmasts on deck, and to unbend all useless sails: the advanced frigates, however, were to keep their topmasts an-end, and to be in readiness to get under way, the instant the signal to that effect should be made. The line-of-battle ships were also directed to be prepared to land the few troops they had on board, in case any attempt should be made by the British to possess themselves of Isle d'Aix.

British

to an

ad

an

chor

age, &c.

On the 11th, early in the afternoon, the british frigates remove admiral having completed his arrangements, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the vanced stations assigned them. The Impérieuse ran down towards the inner end of the Boyart, and came to, in nine fathoms, close to the shoal; having the north point of Isle d'Aix bearing east, the south point south-east by east, and the centre of the french fleet south-east by south; the latter at the distance of about two and a half miles. The bearing of the Impérieuse, as taken from the french frigate Indienne, was nearly north-west, distant about a gun-shot and a half from the boom. The Aigle, Unicorn, and Pallas anchored a short distance above or to the north-west of the Impérieuse; in order to receive the crews of the fire-ships on their return, to support the boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and to render assistance, if required, to the Impérieuse herself. The Whiting schooner, lieutenant Henry Wildey, and the King-George and Nimrod cutters, master's mates Thomas Mekeek and Edward Tapley, which had been fitted for throwing rockets, also took their stations near the Boyart shoal. The

April.

Etna, the only bomb-vessel present, although four 1809. others (Fury, Hound, Thunder, and Vesuvius) had w been promised, and eight would not have been one too many, placed herself to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, as near to the fort as possible in that direction, and was covered by the Indefatigable and Foxhound. The Emerald, Beagle, Doterel, Conflict, and Growler were stationed, to make a diversion, at the east end of the island; and the Redpole and Lyra, with lights hoisted, and properly screened from the enemy's view, were stationed, the one near the shoal to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, the other close to the Boyart shoal, in order to guide the fire-ships in their course to the attack. Each of these brigs was distant rather less than two miles from the extremity of the french line on her side.

tance

from

The 11 british line-of-battle ships, which lay at a Disdistance of from eight to nine miles from the french of brifleet, also unmoored, to be ready to cooperate, if tish necessary; but, having unavoidably anchored in a french strong tide-way, and the wind blowing hard from the fleet. north-west, the ships were again moored when the weather-tide made, in order to prevent them from falling on board of each other. Mr. Edward Fairfax, the master of the Caledonia, considered the distance of that ship and those around her from the enemy's anchorage to be only six miles; but, when the French telegraphed from the citadel on 1sle d'Aix, as they did every morning, they stated the distance at three leagues.

The wind, although in its direction as favourable as it could blow for the progress of the fire-ships, the whole of which had dropped to an anchorage about a mile nearer than the british fleet, was too violent to admit one part of the plan to be carried into effect, that of chaining the vessels together in divisions of four. Each fire-ship, therefore, was Fireleft to act an independent part; and at about 8 h. ships 30 m. P. M., the night uncommonly dark, the wind ceed.

pro

The explo

1809. even fresher than it had been, and the tide flowing April, at the rate of more than two knots an hour, the Mediator, and the other fire-ships that had anchored around her, cut their cables and made sail. Of the sion- three explosion-vessels, one was swept from the vessels. stern of the Impérieuse by one of the too early. abandoned fire-ships; and, although the crew of the explosion-vessel were on board ready to proceed, and did afterwards set fire to the fusee, the fusee appears to have failed. In the mean while the remaining two, one of which was conducted by lord Cochrane, assisted by lieutenant William Bissell and four seamen, proceeded towards the road of Isle d'Aix. These two explosion-vessels appear to have been ignited when within less than three quar ters of a mile from the french line: how near to it they exploded, and what effect the blast produced, the French themselves are the most competent to state. The effect that such machines were calculated to produce may be conceived from the manner in which they were prepared. Lord Cochrane's vessel alone contained about 1500 barrels of gunpowder, started into puncheons placed end-upward, fastened to each other by cables wound round them, and jammed together with wedges, having moistened sand ram med down between them, so as to render the whole, from stem to stern, quite solid, and thereby increase the resistance: besides which, on the top of this mass of gunpowder, lay between 300 and 400 shells charged with fusees, and nearly as many thousands of hand-grenades.

Medi

Several of the fire-ships were ignited and abandoned long before they got abreast of even the northernmost of the two vessels stationed as guides. Others, again, were admirably conducted; especially the Mediator, the largest and most efficient of all fire- of them. This ship, from her great weight, and the breaks strength of the wind and tide, which had by this time increased to nearly four knots, broke the boom, and thus afforded a clear passage to the remainder

ator

ship

the

boom.

Loss on

board

ships.

of the fire-ships. So resolved was the Mediator's 1809. gallant commander to see the service he had en- April. gaged in properly executed, that himself and the officers and men who had volunteered to accompany him nearly perished along with their vessel: one the officer, the gunner, (James Segges,) was killed, and firecaptain Wooldridge, lieutenants Nicholas Brent Clements and James Pearl, and one seaman, were blown out of the ship; the three latter slightly, but the captain very severely, scorched. The loss sustained on board the other fire-ships appears to have been, two seamen killed belonging to the Cæsar, by the bursting of an explosion-vessel near the fireship, and an acting lieutenant (William Flintoft) and one seaman, who died from fatigue in the boat; one master's mate (Richard Francis Jewers) of the Theseus, and another (John Conyers) of the Gibraltar, both scorched by powder.

mand

ers

ships

haved

The five or six officers in command of fire-ships, Comwho, besides captain Woollcombe, had the judgment sof and presence of mind to wait till the proper time firebefore they set fire to the trains of their vessels, who and among whom we can name captains Newcome ber of the Beaver, and Joyce of the Lyra, and lieutenant well. John Cookesley of the Gibraltar, were exposed to imminent danger in their endeavours to regain the advanced frigates. They had to pull against a strong tide and rough sea, which nearly swamped many of the boats; and they were also endangered by flights of rockets, many of the latter, from having been placed in the rigging of the fire-ships, taking a direction quite different from that intended.

of

sup

The boats of the fleet, under the direction of rear- Reason admiral Stopford, had been ordered to support the boats fire-ships, and were assembled accordingly alongside not of the Cæsar; but, judging from the boisterous porting state of the weather that their services would not the be required, the rear-admiral did not proceed with ships. them. He was so far correct that, although the fourth and fifth divisions of the french boats had

fire