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and after such order, it shall be the duty of the commission to furnish a statement of the facts, together with a copy of its order, to the grand jury of any county, the Circuit Court of which has jurisdiction, in order that the railroad company or carrier may be indicted for the offense; and the commission shall use propert efforts to see that such company or carrier is indicted and prosecuted. [General Laws (1894), sec. 820.]

In Illinois C. Ry. v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 544, 63 S. W. 448 (1901), it was held that (1) Const., § 218, and Ky. St., § 820, prohibiting a common carrier charging more for a short haul than for a long haul, where the shorter distance is included in the longer distance, are not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress; that (2) the Railroad Commissioners may consider the application of a railroad company, and determine that for the present and future it shall be relieved of the operation of those provisions of the Constitution and statutes in the transportation of a particular commodity between certain points; that (3) the action of the Railroad Commissioners, in exonerating a common carrier from the operation of those sections of the Constitution and statutes, is not retrospective, and does not relieve the carrier of punishment for past offenses; and that (4) a railroad company may be indicted for charging more for a short haul than for a long haul, in violation of Constitution, § 218, and Ky. St., § 820, without recommendation by the Railroad Commission.

But it was held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Walker, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 453, 63 S. W. 20 (1901), that Const., § 218, did not apply unless the shorter was included within the longer distance, and that a carrier did not violate the law where the long haul is altogether on its main line, while the short haul originates on a branch road, as the shipment is an entirety, and cannot be split into parts to bring it within the law.

Again, a joint traffic arrangement, by which connecting carriers haul from a point on one road to a point on the other road for less than the first carrier charges from the same point on its road to its terminus, between the points, is not in violation of St., § 820, making it an of fense for a carrier to charge more for hauling for a shorter than for a longer distance "over the same line" in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance, as is held in Com. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 115 Ky. 57, 72 S. W. 361 (1903). Nor does Const., § 215, providing that all railway companies shall transport freight of the same class for all persons from and to the same points and upon the same conditions, in the same manner, and for the same charges, prohibit a railway company from charging a through rate which is less than the sum of

the local rates between the two points, as the recent case of Southern Ry. in Ky. v. Com., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1078, 77 S. W. 207 (1903), decides.

On the other hand it is established by Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012 (1899), and by Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1380, 46 S. W. 707, 47 S. W. 210, 598 (1898), that competition does not justify a carrier in charging more for a shorter than for a longer distance, as the words "substantially similar circumstances and conditions" relate to the actual cost of transportation. By a parity of reasoning, however, it is held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1099, 48 S. W. 416 (1898), and in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com. (Ky. App.), 46 S. W. 702 (1898), that if there is dissimiliarity of conditions of shipment, so that the longer shipment is really the cheaper to handle, none of these clauses apply.

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As to respective powers under these sections it was held in Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1380, 47 S. W. 598 (1898), that under Const., § 218, prohibiting common carriers from charging more for a short than for a long haul, but providing that the Railroad Commission may in "special cases grant relief from the operation of the section, the action of the Commission in refusing such relief cannot be reviewed by the courts. And in Illinois C. Ry. v. Com., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1159, 64 S. W. 975, it was held that, as no indictment could be returned by the grand jury for a violation of the statute until the Railroad Commission had refused to exonerate the carrier, such statute is not violative of Const., § 218, prohibiting any common carrier from charging more for transporting passengers or property for a shorter than for a longer distance, and providing that the Railroad Commission may prescribe the extent to which a carrier may be relieved from the operation of the section since the question as to what penalty shall be imposed, or when, is left to the discretion of the Legislature.

See also as to remedies under these sections Louisville & N. Ry. v. Com., 00 Ky. 000, 46 S. W. 702 (1898); Hutcheson v. Louisville & N. R. R., 00 Ky. 000, 63 S. W. 33 (1901); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Com., 00 Ky. 000, 71 S. W. 910 (1903); and McChord v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. R., 183 U. S. 483, 46 L. Ed. 289, 22 Sup. Ct. 165 (1901).

§ 1220. Louisiana.

The power and authority is hereby vested in the Commission, and it is hereby made its duty to prevent such companies from charging any greater compensation in the aggregate for the like kind of property or passengers, or messages, for a shorter than a longer distance, over the same line, unless authorized by the Commission to do so in special cases. [Constitution (1898), Art. 284.]

§ 1221. Massachusetts.

No railroad corporation shall charge or receive for the transportation of freight to any station on its road a greater amount than is at the time charged or received for the transportation of the like class and quantity of freight from the same original point of departure to a station at a greater distance on its road in the same direction. Two or more railroad corporations. whose roads connect shall not charge or receive for the transportation of freight to any station on the road of either of them a greater amount than is at the time charged or received for the transportation of the like class and quantity of freight from the same original point of departure to a station at a greater distance on the road of either of them in the same direction. In the construction of this section, the amount charged or received for the transportation of freight shall include all terminal charges; and the road of a corporation shall include all the road in use by it, whether owned or operated under a contract or lease. [Revised Laws (1902), ch. 111, sec. 243.]

In Com. v. Worcester & N. R. R., 124 Mass. 561 (1878), it was held that this section applied only to the transportation of freight by such a corporation as a common carrier over its own road, and not over other railroads, for which it charged and received nothing except as collecting agent of the corporations owning such other railroads.

§ 1222. Michigan.

That it shall be unlawful for any railroad company doing business in this State, operating the shortest competing line of railroad, to charge a greater amount of toll or compensation for the transportation of freight from any noncompeting point on its line of railroad than it shall charge at the nearest railroad competing point on its line of road in opposite direction, to that from which such freight is to be moved, when of the same class, in like quantity, and for the same destination in this State. It is also hereby further provided that whenever freight is taken from any point on the

longer competing line or lines, that where the distance from such shipping point to the place of destination does not exceed the entire length of the shortest competing line, then the same rule shall apply as is provided in this section for the shortest competing line as to rates of freight. [Compiled Laws (1897), sec. 5247.]

1223. Minnesota.

No carrier shall charge or receive greater compensation for the transportation of passengers or of like kind or class and quantity of property, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be so construed as authorizing any carrier to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance; but upon application to the Commission such carrier, in special cases, after investigation by the commission, may be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances, for the transportation of passengers or property; and the Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated carriers may be relieved from the operation of this section. No carrier shall charge or receive any greater compensation per ton per mile for contemporaneous transportation of the same class of freight for a longer than for a shorter distance over the same line in the same general direction, or from the same original point of departure, or to the same point of arrival; but this shall not be construed so as to authorize any carrier to charge as high a rate per ton, per mile, for a longer as for a shorter distance. [Revised Laws (1905), section 2017.]

In State ex rel. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60, 89 Am. St. Rep. 514 (1900), it was shown that the tariff rate on coal from D. to N. was $2.50 and from D. to twenty-one stations along the same lines, the most southerly being B., 112 miles beyond N., the rate was the same. The court inclined to support this schedule upon the commercial necessities of the situation, citing Steenerson v. (it. Northern Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713 (1897).

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§ 1224. Mississippi.

Or if any railroad shall, for its advantage, or for the advantage of a connecting line, or for that of any person, locality or corporation, make any discrimination in transportation against any person, locality or corporation, unless authorized by the Commission, or if any railroad company shall charge more for a short haul than for a long one, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, without the sanction of the Commission, such person or corporation, in either case, shall be guilty of extortion, and may be punished therefor criminally, besides being liable civilly. [Annotated Code (1892), section 4287.]

See Alabama & V. Ry. v. Railroad Commissioners, 38 So. 356 (1905).

1225. Missouri.

Discrimination between persons or localities prohibited.—It shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company or firm, corporation or locality, in the transportation of goods, wares and merchandise of any character, or to subject any particular person, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to such transportation; and all such common carriers shall afford equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines and for receiving, forwarding and switching cars and delivering property to and from their lines, and to and from other lines and places connected therewith, and shall not discriminate in their accommodation, rates or charges between such connecting lines and places. But this provision shall not be construed as requiring such common carriers to give the use of their tracks or terminal facilities to other common carriers engaged in a similar business. [Revised Statutes (1899), section 1133.]

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