8 672. Fare demanded at any point on the journey.

If demand for payment is not made in advance, it is none the less essential that payment should be made at once upon demand. The passenger does not obtain the right to remain on board the carrier's conveyance by promising to pay his fare in a short time,2 or as soon as he decides how far he shall ride.3 "In my opinion the plaintiff refused to pay his fare within the meaning of that clause when he failed to pay it upon being civilly asked for it, and that more than once, by the proper officer, and contented himself with saying that he had not yet made up his mind where he was going to, and that he would tell him when he got to some place ahead. We see that when a railway trains stops at any station every passenger feels himself at liberty to leave it freely, without waiting for the permission of any officer, or stopping till he can be released by one. This is a most convenient arrangement, both for the passengers and for the railway company, for by that means the passengers can depart instantly and without hesitation, and the company's officers are left at liberty to attend to the movement of the train, without having their attention distracted by looking after passengers in order to collect their fare. But this convenient method of doing business can only be provided by insisting rigidly on the passengers showing their tickets or paying their fare at the proper time, which is when they are asked to do

It is of course not sufficient to tender less than the amount of the fare. So when a tender of fare for two persons was less than the amount of two fares, though more than a single fare, the refusal to carry both persons was justifiable.

2 Nye v. Marysville & Y. C. S. R. R., 97 Cal. 461, 32 Pac. 530 (1893).

3 Fulton v. Grand Trunk Ry., 17 Up. Can. Q. B. 428 (1858).

4 14 & 15 Vict. ch. 51, sec. 21, sub-sec. 6.

5 Robinson, C. J., in Fulton v. Grand Trunk Ry., supra.

6 Eddy v. Elliott, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 248, 15 S. W. 41 (1890).

§ 673. Ticket entitles passenger to carriage for a single jour

ney.

For the reason that the journey is an entirety, the ticket with which a passenger pays his fare is good only for the single journey on which the passenger is then engaged. It is good for any journey which is included within its terms, thus it is good from its starting point to any station short of its destination or from any station between its termini and the point of destination. If presented for use and accepted in payment of fare it is at once used, and cannot be used again. So where a ticket from Buffalo to New York expired on the 26th of September, and the bearer took the train for New York on the evening of that day and his ticket was called for and punched, he had paid his fare for the whole journey, although the train did not reach his destination until the next day.8

§ 674. Passenger cannot take two journeys for a single fare. A passenger cannot for a single fare travel part of the distance for which he has paid his fare upon one train and part on another; for that would be paying for a single journey and really taking two. A stop-over without the payment of an additional fare can be taken only by the express permission of the carrier.9

This law is summarized thus by Mr. Justice Deady in Roberts v. Koehler:10 "A ticket for transportation on a railway between certain termini, which is silent as to the time when or

7 Auerbach v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290 (1882).

8 Auerbach v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 89 N. Y. 281, 42 Am. Rep. 290 (1882).

9 Cheney v. B. & M. R. R., 11 Met. (Mass.) 121, 45 Am. Dec. 190 note (1846); State v. Overton, 24 N. J. Law, 435, 61 Am. Dec. 671 (1854); Cleveland, Col. & Cinn. R. R. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457 (1860); Vankirk v. Pennsylvania R. R., 76 Pa. 66, 18 Am. Rep. 404 (1874).

10 30 Fed. 94 (1887).

within which it may be used, does not authorize the holder to stop over at any point between such termini, and resume his journey thereon on the next or any following train. The contract involved in the sale and purchase of such a ticket is an entire one, and not divisible. It is a contract to carry the passenger through to the point of his destination as one continuous service, and not by piecemeal, to suit his convenience or pleas

§ 675. Passenger cannot pay two partial fares for a single journey.

For this reason a passenger has no right to split up a single journey into two by tendering fare from the point of departure to an intermediate station, and then, continuing on the train, tender fare from the intermediate station to his destination, even though he might thus secure a cheaper passage by taking advantage of cheaper rates between two of the stations. This point was fully considered in the case of the London & Northwestern Railway v. Hinchcliffe.12 The facts in the case were these: The defendant, intending to travel by a particular train from Huddersfield to Manchester on the plaintiff's railway, took a ticket to Stalybridge, an intermedite station, and after giving up this ticket on the arrival of the train at Stalybridge remained in the carriage and tendered to the plaintiffs' servants 7d., which was the amount of the fare from Staylbridge to Manchester, the difference between the fare from Huddersfield to Stalybridge and the through fare from Huddersfield to Manchester being 9d. The plaintiffs refused the amount tendered, but allowed the defendant, to travel on in the same train to Manchester, and sued him for the excess through fare; it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.

11 Citing 2 Ror. Rys. 971, § 10; 2 Wood, Ry. Law, § 347; Cleveland, &c., Ry. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; Drew v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 51 Cal. 425.

12 [1903] 2 K. B. 32.

On this principle it was held in an Australian case that a rule providing that no passenger should take a ticket at any intermediate station for the purpose of continuing his journey in the same train as that in which he arrived, except from some stopping place where booking clerks are not provided, was reasonable and valid. 13

Mr. Chief Justice Darley said: "It has been pointed out that this by-law prevents a double evil. First, it prevents pergetting an advantage

sons who live beyond a holiday district of cheap fares not intended for them. Secondly, it prevents dishonest persons from traveling without a ticket over portions of the journey. For instance, if this by-law were not in force, a person might, in coming from Goulburn to Sydney, take a ticket from Goulburn to the next station, and then travel on to Campbelltown, and take a ticket from there to Sydney; thus traveling over a considerable portion of the journey without a ticket. To obviate this, it would be necessary to look at the tickets at every station, which would lead to inconvenience and delay, not only to the railway department, but to the public. In the present case the respondent, by re-booking, obtained the advantage of the tourist rates between Moss Vale and Sydney, which were never intended for him. If he had remained in the train, and informed the guard that he wanted to go on to Sydney, he would have had to pay the full fare from Goulburn to Sydney."14

8 676. Part of journey completed before collection of fare. It not infrequently happens that a passenger has completed part of his journey before the fare is demanded and collected; and a passenger is sometimes found dishonest enough to attempt

13 Davies v. Williamson, 21 N. S. W. L. R. (Law) 124 (1899).

14 But see Horton v. Erie R. R., 83 N. Y. Supp. 733 (App. Div.), (1903). And compare Savannah B. of F. & T. v. Charleston & S. Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 601 (1898).

to ride to his destination upon payment of fare for the remaining distance. That this attempt is illegal has been made plain. The journey in which he is engaged is the whole journey from his place of departure to his destination; and the fare which is due, and which alone is due, is the fare for the whole distance.15 The same thing is true if for some reason he would have a legal right to leave the train at an intermediate station without paying fare, but instead of doing so chooses to remain on the train and complete his journey. This was the ground of the decision in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In that case the plaintiff, bound on a journey from A to B, could not get a seat until he reached X, an intermediate station; and he then refused to pay fare from A to B, but instead of doing so tendered fare from X to B only. He was ejected for non-payment of fare, and the court held that the ejection was justified; though he might lawfully have left the train at X, the first station, without paying fare, since he could get no seat. 16

§ 677. Resumption of journey by rejected passenger.

When because of the refusal of a passenger to pay his fare he is ejected from the train at a point between regular stations, he has no right to take the train again upon tendering fare, since the place is not one where any person has a right to demand that he be received as a passenger."

In O'Brien v. Boston and Worcester Railroad 18 Mr. Justice Bigelow said: "After being rightfully expelled from the train,

15 Manning v. Louisville & N. R. R., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So. 8, 36 Am. St. Rep. 225, 16 L. R. A. 55 (1891).

16 Davis v. Kansas City, S. J. & C. B. R. R., 53 Mo. 317, 14 Am. Rep. 457 (1873).

17 O'Brien v. Boston & W. R. R., 15 Gray (Mass.), 20, 77 Am. Dec. 347 (1860); Hibbard v. New York & E. R. R., 15 N. Y. 455 (1857); Pickens v. Richmond & D. R. R., 104 N. C. 312, 10 S. E. 556 (1889).

18 Supra.