the goods. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 567, 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 102 (1889), appeal dismissed 149 U. S. 777, 37 L. Ed. 964, 13 Sup. Ct. 1048 (1892). See, however, Interstate S. Y. Co. v. Indianapolis U. Ry., 99 Fed. 472 (1900). § 903. Local carrier taking part in through carriage. Where, however, a local carrier takes part in the carriage of goods through to destination in another State, though his share of the carriage is entirely within the State, he is engaged in interstate commerce. Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. Ed. 394, 10 Sup. Ct. 958, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 178 (1890); Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 867, 1 Int. Com. Rep. 28 (1887); Augusta So. R. R. v. Wrightsville & T. R. R., 74 Fed. 522 (1896); In re Annapolis, W. & B. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 315, 1 I. C. C. 315 (1887); Mattingly v. Pennsylvania Co., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 806, 3 I. C C. 598 (1890); James v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 682, 4 I. C. C. 744 (1891); State v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 542 (1898). This is often shown to be the case by a through billing and rating of the goods, assented to by the carrier in question. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 391 (1896). In Texas it has been held that through billing is not enough, and a State carrier is not engaged in interstate commerce unless it takes part in a through rating. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Nelson, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 23 S. W. 732 (1893); Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Williams (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. 556 (1895); Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Davis, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 24, 31 S. W. 308 (1895). But it is certain that the rating need not be a joint one; the State carrier is none the less an interstate carrier because his share of the total rate is equal to his entire local rate, if he takes part in or permits through billing. United States v. Seaboard Ry., 82 Fed. 563 (1897); Independent Refiners' Assoc. v. Western N. Y. & P. R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 378 (1895). And it would seem to be unnecessary for the establishment of a through carriage, to prove that a technical through rate has been named. CHAPTER XXVIII. REASONABLE CHARGES AND FACILITIES. § 911. Provisions of the statute. 912. Amendments of 1906. TOPIC A-THE SCHEDULE AS A WHOLE. § 913. Elements considered in establishing a general tariff of rates. 914. Bearing of tariff as a whole on reasonable rates. 915. Schedule as a whole may throw light on reasonableness of particular rate. 916. Schedule as a whole important where rate is fixed by public authority. TOPIC B-THE PARTICULAR RATE. § 917. Customary rate presumably reasonable. 918. General principles. 919. Comparison with other rates. 920. Special service. 921. Incidental charges. 922. Conditions. 923. Route. 924. Cost of service. 925. Value of service to shipper. 926. Value of goods. 927. Amount. 928. Distance. 929. Through rates. TOPIC C-CLASSIFICATION. § 930. General principles of classification. 931. Instances. TOPIC D-UNREASONABLE RATING. § 932. General principles. 933. Passenger rates. 934. Freight rates; instances, TOPIC E-REASONABLE FACILITIES. § 935. Not required by original act. 936. Switching privileges. § 911. Provisions of the statute. Reasonable charges.-All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, shall be just and reasonable; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 1, as amended by Act of June 29, 1906, section 1.] Switch connections.-Any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act, upon application of any lateral, branch line of railroad, or of any shipper tendering interstate traffic for transportation, shall construct, maintain, and operate upon reasonable terms a switch connection with any such lateral, branch line of railroad, or private sidetrack which may be constructed to connect with its railroad, where such connection is reasonably practicable and can be put in with safety, and will furnish sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the same; and shall furnish cars for the movement of such traffic to the best of its ability without discrimination in favor of or against any such shipper. [Act of June 29, 1906, section 1.] § 912. Amendments of 1906. The changes made by the act of 1906 are as follows: 1. From the original section are omitted, as unnecessary and covered by other parts of the act, the words "or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property." 2. The entire provision as to connection with lateral branches and switches is new. TOPIC A-THE SCHEDULE AS A WHOLE. [See generally on this topic Chapters XI-XV.] § 913. Elements considered in establishing a general tariff of rates. The elements to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an entire system of rates are widely different from those involved in the question of the reasonableness of the rate upon a single commodity. Central Yellow Pine Asso. v. Illinois C. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505 (1905). What those elements are has been fully examined in the earlier portion of this treatise (ante, Chapters XI-XV). That railroad investments may be as secure as other property, the reasonable rates should be liberal until earnings are sufficiently large for a fair return on actual expenditure. Newland v. Northern P. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 474, 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131 (1894). § 914. Bearing of tariff as a whole on reasonable rates. Under the power given in the Interstate Commerce Act to pass on the question of reasonable rates, the Commission seldom had to consider the schedule as a whole, since each case presented to the Commission is that of a particular rate, and the considerations which determine the reasonableness of a particular rate are seldom those which determine the reasonableness of the entire schedule of rates. The capital account of a railroad does not necessarily furnish a criterion by which the reasonableness of its freight rates is to be determined; and in order that the capitalization should be considered in cases involving the readjustment of rates, it must be accompanied by a history of the capital account. Grain Shippers' Asso. v. Illinois C. R. R., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 158 (1899). The mere fact of the need of additional revenue to meet additional expenses without diminishing net income does not justify an advance in a particular rate. Tift v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep: 548 (1905); Central Yellow Pine Assoc. v. Illinois Central R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505 (1905). The financial necessities and conditions of a carrier are not controlling to the extent that, independent of other circumstances, any rates are reasonable until the earnings are sufficient to operate the road and meet all the obligations of the carrier. Jerome Hill Cotton Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 601 (1896). § 915. Schedule as a whole may throw light on reasonableness of particular rate. The gross income from the schedule as a whole may, however, be considered under some circumstances in determining the reasonableness of the particular rate. Jerome Hill Cotton Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 601 (1896). That railroad investments may be as secure as other property, the reasonable rates should be liberal until earnings are sufficiently large for a fair return on actual expenditure. Newland v. Northern P. R. R., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 474, 6 I. C. C. Rep. 131 (1894). In fixing reasonable rates the requirements of operating expenses, bonded debt, fixed charges, and dividend on capital stock from the total traffic, are all to be considered; but the claim that any particular rate is to be measured by these as a fixed standard, below which the rate may not lawfully be reduced, is one rightly subject to some qualifications, one of which is that the obligations must be actual and in good faith. Re Rates and Charges on Food Products, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 93, 4 I. C. C. 116 (1890). See, also, Board of Railroad & Warehouse Comrs. v. Eureka Springs Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 69 (1897); Brewer & Hanleiter v. Louisville & N. R. R., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 224 (1897); Cary v. Eureka Springs Ry., 7 I. C. C. Rep. 286 (1897); Brockway v. Ulster & D. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 21 (1898). § 916. Schedule as a whole important where rate is fixed by public authority. Where the rate is fixed by the legislature or by a commission the most common inquiry is whether the schedule as a whole will bring in a fair income, and it is in such cases that this inquiry is mose frequently made. Ante, § 351 ff.; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. Ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898); Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 325 (1888); Pensacola & A. R. R. v. State, 27 Fla. 403, 9 So. 89, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 522 (1889). Under the power to regulate rates the Interstate Commerce Commission will probably have more frequent occasion to pass upon the reasonableness of the schedule as a whole. TOPIC B-THE PARTICULAR RATES. [See, on this topic generally, Chapters XVI-XX.] § 917. Customary rate presumably reasonable. A railroad company by putting in force and continuing in force a rate of charges, furnishes evidence that the rate is profitable, and if it increases a long-established rate, the new rate will be presumed to be unreasonably high. Re Rates and Charges on Food Products, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 93, 4 I. C. C. 48 (1890); Coxe v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 460, 4 I. C. C. 535 (1891); Railroad Commission v. Savannah, F. & W. Ry., 3 Int. Com. Rep. 688, 5 I. C. C. 13 (1891); National Hay Assoc. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 9 I. C. C. Rep. 264 (1902); Central Yellow Pine Assoc. v. Illinois Central R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 505 (1905); Tift v. Southern Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 548 (1905). So where a certain rate had been long established for delivery in New York, and the railroad company changed its practice and made delivery in Jersey City, but charged the same rate, this rate, being for less service, was held prima facie unreasonable. Truck Farmers' Assoc. v. Northeastern R. R., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 295 (1895). But a former special rate is not a fair test of the reasonableness of present rates, the act having abolished special and preferred rates. Myers v. Pennsylvania Co., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 403, 2 I. C. C. 573 (1889). Similarly, there is a presumption that rates fixed by a State commission |