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and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Provided, that nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.

The common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 20, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, section 7.]

Through carriage.-Sec. 7. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to enter into any combination, contract, or agreement, expressed or implied, to prevent, by change of time schedule, carriage in different cars, or by other means or devices, the carriage of freights from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place of destination; and no break of bulk, stoppage, or interruption made by such common carrier shall prevent the carriage of freights from being and being treated as one continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of destination, unless such break, stoppage or interruption was made in good faith for some necessary purpose, and without any intent to avoid or unnecessarily interrupt such continuous carriage or to evade any of the provisions of this Act.

Pooling. It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act to enter into a contract, agree

ment, or combination with any other common carrier or carriers for the pooling of freights of different and competing railroads, or to divide between them the aggregate or net proceeds of the earnings of such railroads, or any portion thereof;

And in any case of an agreement for the pooling of freights as aforesaid, each day of its continuance shall be deemed a separate offence. [Interstate Commerce Act, section 5.]

992. Amendments of 1906.

The provisions for compulsory through routing, rating and billing are The anti-pooling section of the original act is unchanged by the new

new.

act.

TOPIC AREASONABLE FACILITIES FOR INTERCHANGE.

[These matters are discussed in Chapter XXV.]

8993. Extent of application of the provision.

What are reasonable facilities for an interchange of business between connecting railroad companies, within the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act, depends upon the state of the traffic and the business; and the question is to be determined by what is considered reasonable by the public, and what is required to conveniently transact the business. Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. v. Northern P. R. R., 51 Fed. 465, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 205 (1892). Facilities may be denied in any manner, as by an unreasonable arrangement of time schedules. New York & N. Ry. v. New York & N. E. R. R., 50 Fed. 867, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 116 (1892).

The provisions of the section apply not merely to the carriers themselves, but with equal force to their officers and employees. Therefore the act is violated by employees who by concerted action strike in order to avoid receiving cars from a connecting carrier. Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 746, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 545 (1891), appeal dismissed, Ex parte Lemon, 150 U. S. 393, 37 L. Ed. 1120, 14 Sup. Ct. 123 (1893). The intervention between two railroads of a terminal system owned by an independent company will not prevent the roads from being connecting lines, within the meaning of the section. Oregon Short Line v. Northern Pac. R. R., 51 Fed. 465, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 205 (1892).

994. Carriage through in same car.

Whether a railroad is compelled by its duty to afford reasonable facilities for interchange of traffic to receive a carload of freight from a connecting road and carry it through without breaking bulk is not altogether

clear on the authorities. In Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry., 34 Fed. 481 (1888), it was held that a boycotted road could compel a connecting road to do so, in spite of a threatened strike of its employees. In Oregon Short Line v. Northern Pacific R. R., 51 Fed. 465, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 205, and on appeal 61 Fed. 158, 9 C. C. A. 409, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 718 (1894), on the other hand it was held that this could not be done. Judge Thayer in Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 63 Fed. 775, 11 C. C. A. 417, B. & W. 277 (1894), the qualification stated by Mr. Justice Field in the Oregon Short Line case was emphasized. "The third section of the Interstate Commerce Act does not require an interstate carrier to receive freight in the cars in which it is tendered by a connecting carrier, and to transport it in such cars, paying a mileage rate thereon, when it has cars of its own that are available for the service, and the freight will not be injured by transfer." This moderate statement represents the condition of the authorities. The question is settled by the amendment of 1906 by which through routing is required.

995. Continuous carriage.

Contracts by a railroad company with other companies for the establishment of through routes and through rates for the continuous carriage of interstate traffic do not violate section 7 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, prohibiting a combination to prevent the carriage of freight from being continuous. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 571, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 351, 2 L. R. A. 289 (1888). Nor is it prevented by a refusal of the connecting carrier to take the goods at the valuation agreed on by the first carrier. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. Ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. 132 (1903).

§ 996. Discrimination between connecting lines.

Though not expressly contained in this clause of the act it is nevertheless to be understood that discrimination is not forbidden unless it is undue or unreasonable. Thus in making contracts for through transportation of passengers, the initial carrier may lawfully prefer a road going through to the point of destination to one going only part of the way, an arrangement with which would necessitate further arrangements to reach the desired point. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. R., 47 Fed. 771, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 261 (1891). A combination of independent carriers by which one is to prefer the other to another connecting line outside of the combination does not justify discrimination between the connecting lines. New York & N. Ry. v. New York & N. E. R. R., 50 Fed. 867, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 116 (1892); Freight Bureau v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry., 4 Int. Com. Rep. 592, 6 I. C. C. 195 (1894). But a railroad may prefer itself to a rival, even a connecting rival. So a railroad company op

erating steamers in connection with its railroad as a single line is not guilty of a discrimination against another carrier, within the prohibition of the interstate commerce act, by refusing to allow a rival steamboat company to land its boats at a wharf used by it solely for connecting its railroad and boats, where there is no regular public station at such wharf, but the general station is at a little distance and ample facilities there exist. Ilwaco R. & Nav. Co. v. Oregon S. L. & U. N. Ry., 57 Fed. 673, 6 C. C. A. 495, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 627, B. & W. 275 (1893).

So a railroad does not violate the act by making and carrying out an exclusive contract with a stock yards company for the exclusive delivery to that company of live stock in the city of Louisville, although in carrying out such contract it refuses to deliver to another railroad company, for delivery to a competing stock yards, live stock consigned to such competing stock yards; for, as Mr. Justice Holmes remarked, the favored stock yards " are the defendant's depot. They are its depot none the less that they are so by contract, and not by virtue of a title in fee. Unless a preference of its own depot to that of another road is forbidden, the defendant is not within the act of Congress. Suppose that the Southern Railway station and the Louisville & Nashville station were side by side, and that their tracks were connected within or just outside the limits of the station grounds. It could not be said that the defendant was giving an undue or unreasonable preference to itself or subjecting its neighbor to an unque or unreasonable disadvantage if it insisted on delivering live stock which it had carried to the end of the transit at its own yard." Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 192 U. S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. 339 (1904); Railroad Commission of Kentucky v. Louisville & N. R. R., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 173 (1904).

Under this provision a car company is not a connecting carrier, and is not entitled to protection. Burton Stock Car Co. v. Chicago & A. R. R., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 329 (1887); Worcester Excursion Car Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 2 Int. Com. Rep. 792, 3 I. C. C. 577 (1890). Neither is a bridge company. Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 571, 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 102 (1888).

§ 997. Discrimination in furnishing optional facilities.

Certain facilities are entirely optional with the carrier; either by express provision of the statute, such as terminal facilities, or by their nature. So a carrier may furnish to one connecting road and not to another trackage and terminal facilities. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 59 Fed. 400 (1894). So it may accept goods from one carrier without prepayment of charges, while it requires prepayment of charges from another. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 59 Fed. 400 (1894); Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 63 Fed. 775, 11 C. C. A. 417, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 854, B. & W. 277 (1894). So

it may make through billing and routing arrangements with one connecting line while declining to do so with another. Little Rock & M. R. R. v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. R., 47 Fed. 771, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 261 (1891); Oregon Short Line v. Northern Pac. R. R., 51 Fed. 465, 3 Int. Com. Rep. 205 (1891), affirmed 61 Fed. 158, 9 C. C. A. 409, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 718 (1894); Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 59 Fed. 400 (1894); Little Rock & M. R. R. v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 63 Fed. 775, 11 C. C. A. 417, 4 Int. Com. Rep. 854, B. & W. 277 (1894); St. Louis Drayage Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 65 Fed. 39, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 137 (1894); Prescott & A. C. R. R. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 73 Fed. 438 (explaining New York & N. Ry. v. New York & N. E. R. R., 50 Fed. 867), appeal dismissed 84 Fed. 213, 28 C. C. A. 481 (1897); Gulf C. & S. F. R. R. v. Miama S. S. Co., 86 Fed. 407, 30 C. C. A. 142, 52 U. S. App. 732 (1898).

§ 998. Use of tracks or terminal facilities.

This provision modifies the requirement for reasonable facilities for interchange of traffic. It imposes upon a carrier no duty either to form new connections or to establish new stations, yards, or depots, or to pay any part of the expense of providing such new facilities, either for the convenience of the public or of other carriers; and a carrier cannot be compelled to receive or deliver traffic at a point where another company has made a new connection with its roads, but has not provided proper facilities. Kentucky & I. B. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 37 Fed. 571, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 102, 2 L. R. A. 289 (1888).

The provision is merely negative. It does not affect either a contract or a State statute giving another carrier the right to use tracks and terminal facilities. Iowa v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 33 Fed. 391 (1887), appeal dismissed, Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Iowa, 145 U. S. 631, 36 L. Ed. 857, 12 Sup. Ct. 978 (1892).

“Terminal facilities" refers to facilities for interchanging traffic between connecting lines. Chicago F. P. C. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 8 I. C. C. Rep. 316 (1899).

TOPIC B-THROUGH ROUTING AND RATING.
[See Chapter XIX.]

$999. Carriers not compelled to route, bill or rate through. Under the original act no power was given to the Commission to compel through billing, routing or rating by connecting lines. This can be done only by contract or arrangement between the carriers, and the act does not compel connecting carriers to make mutual contracts. Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 192 U. S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. 339 (1904); Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., 2 L. R. A. 289, 2 Int. Com. Rep. 351, 37 Fed. 567, 629, 630 (1888); Little Rock

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