I did, sir, suppose this to be your meaning. But you had been stating that "a whole denomination of Christians may be united in their distinguishing tenets." You then proceeded to tell how this might be, notwithstanding the diversity in their knowledge, namely: "So far as they all know the same scheme of sentiment, they all agree; and so far as some feel their deficiency in knowledge they do not pretend to judge, and of consequence do not presume to differ." In this way, according to your account, a whole denomination may be united in their distinguishing tenets. Suppose the distinguishing tenets of a denomination to be ten. Some of the denomination judge respecting every article. A second class so far feel their deficiency as to judge only with respect to five; a third class judge only with respect to one; and a fourth class, having a still greater sense of their deficiency, forbear to judge of any of the articles. Still the whole denomination are united in their distinguishing tenets! Does not this imply that they are united with regard to those articles, on which some presume to judge, and others pretend not to judge? Now, sir, I would ask, whether, according to your views of unity of sentiment, the whole human family might not be "perfectly joined together in the same mind and the same judgement," respecting all religious subjects, should they all so far feel their deficiency as in no case to judge, and of course have no religious opinions? And if the requirement in your text may be satis

fied by so feeling our deficiency as not to pretend to judge: And if it be, as you suppose, that blame is in all cases attached to error in judgement respecting religious subjects, is there not some inducement for all, but the selfsufficient, to suspend forming any religious sentiment, until they can do it without danger of error?

LETTER IV.

The reply to the second objection examined.

FOR a second objection you observe, that "The wide difference in the education and instruction of Christians is often supposed to be an insuperable bar in the way of their becom ing sentimentally united, in their present imperfect state."

It has sometimes appeared to me that this objection was naturally implied in the first; that the difference of education and instruction is included either in the difference of intellectual powers, or in the difference of external circumstances. But as you have made it a distinct objection I shall state your answer.

"There is no doubt but Christians are extremely prone to imbibe and retain the peculiar doctrines, in which they have been early and uniformly instructed. But since they have the word of God in their hands, it is completely in their power, to bring their own opinions, and the opinions of their instructers to an infallible standard, and to decide for themselves what they ought to believe, or to disbe lieve. Neither their private nor public teachers can lay them under a natural necessity

of thinking, or reasoning, or be lieving wrong; but only throw difficulties in their way of think ing, or reasoning, or believing right. And it is their indispensable duty if they meet with such difficulties to surmount them, and form their religious sentiments according to the holy scriptures, which will necessarily unite them in the truth."

The extensive powers which you have attributed to Christians, in this passage, would almost tempt one to suspect, that you had in view an order of beings but little known in our world. But, supposing that by Christians you must mean some of our fellow creatures, I would ask of what age or of what degree of knowledge a person must be to be a Christian. It seems to me that he must be considerably advanced in years, and possessed of a very learned education before it will be "completely in his power," by the help of the bible to correct all the mistakes he may have imbibed by education, or to decide with certainty, in every case, "what he ought to believe, or to disbelieve."

For myself, I am free to own my incompetency for such a task. And as I am confident that your observations are inap plicable to myself, I cannot but entertain a suspicion that they are so to many others.

Notwithstanding all you have said to make it appear that the rule of faith is plain and intelligible to every capacity, I cannot but suspect that your own practice is in direct contradiction to your theory. Do you not explain the scriptures to Vol. V.-No. 10.

your children, to your people, and to your students in divinity? On what ground do you attempt this? Is it on the ground that the scriptures are not "sufficiently plain and intelligible to every capacity ?" Or, is this done to make the rule of faith more than sufficiently plain and intelligible? Do you mean by this conduct practically to "impeach the wisdom and goodness of God!"

If the scriptures are sufficiently plain and intelligible to every capacity, or if it be " completely in the power of all to bring their own opinions and the opinions of their instructers to an infallible standard, and decide for themselves what they ought to believe or to disbelieve;" I think your good sense must allow, that it is no part of a minister's duty to explain the scriptures, and that to attempt it is preposterous.

The third objection, which you have brought into view, is founded in "the right of private judgement."

I shall remark only on the first sentence of your reply:

"It is readily granted" you say, "that every Christian has a right to think, to read, and to converse upon any religious sentiment, in order to collect evidence of its truth or falsehood, and after that, to judge according to the evidence he has collected."

I would here inquire, whether a person may not think, read and converse in order to collect evidence of the truth or falsehood of a religious sentiment, and yet, in judging honestly, according to the evidence he may have collected, form an errone

ous opinion? After all his labour he may have obtained but a part of the evidence which in fact exists; and that part may have escaped his notice, which was most essential to a correct decision. And if he has a right to judge according to the evidence he has collected, why may he not be said to have a right to form an erroneous opinion? But I should prefer saying, that a person may, in some cases, be under a necessity of forming an erroneous opinion, or of neglecting to form any opinion at all. A magistrate, in certain cases, may judge correctly, according to the evidence which he has been able to collect, and yet acquit a man who is really guilty, or condemn one who is innocent.

LETTER V.

Remarks on the reply to the

fourth objection.

You observe There is but one other objection which appears to be worthy of notice; and this is drawn from the fourteenth chapter of Romans, in which the Apostle is supposed to allow Christians to differ in their religious sentiments, and only exhorts them to view their different opinions with a candid and charitable eye."

As it is quite as important for us to consider what God approves, as what the Apostle allows, I would beg leave to vary the form of the objection, and state it thus :

"From what Paul wrote to the Corinthians, at Rome, in the fourteenth chapter of his Episle, it appears, that there are cases, in which real Christians may differ in sentiment and

practice, and yet each may aim at the glory of God, and each obtain his approbation !" ·

In reply to the objection, as you stated it, you first observe, This is rather an objection against the Apostle himself, than against the leading senti. ment of this discourse; for it supposes, that in writing to the Romans he contradicts what he had written five or six years before to the Corinthians."

But perhaps, sir, the objection is not against the Apostle, but only against your views of his meaning.

To obviate the objection you say, respecting the Apostle, "He was then treating of the ceremonial law, which was abrogated by the gospel. He allows, that real Christians might entertain different opinions concerning Mosaic rites and ceremonies, which were things in their own nature indifferent, and which might be observed, or neglected, under a sense of duty. Accordingly, he forbids them to censure one another on account of such nonessential points of difference, and exhorts them to exercise mutual affection and esteem."

Here I would ask, in what sense were the Mosaic rites things indifferent? I know you have said "in their own nature indifferent," but this does not give the necessary information.

Will you, sir, pretend, that from the days of Moses to the coming of Christ, the Mosaic rites were things so indifferent that it was of no consequence whether they were regarded by the Israelites, or disregarded? I presume you will not.

I will ask again-Are those

striking features in his character in childhood and through life. The effect of religion upon his mind was, to make him cheerful, considerate, benevolent, intrepid, humble and happy. He loved the whole human race; he bore a particular love to Christians; and he wished all parties to exercise Christian charity towards each other.

He was almost constantly occupied in discharging the duties of his office, in performing acts of kindness, or in planning works of literature for the benefit of mankind; and there is great reason to believe that had his life been prolonged he would have been eminently useful in the world. But it pleased God to take him to himself in the morning of life. When he saw death approaching he met it with his usual calmness and resignation. When he was thought to be just about to expire he sweetly said, "How pleasant a medicine is Christianity!"

"One day," says his father, "when I was sitting by him, he began to speak in affectionate terms, as he often had done, of what he called my goodness to him. I begged him to drop that subject; and was proceed ing to tell him that I had never done any thing for him but what duty required and inclination prompted; and that for the little I had done, his filial piety, and other virtues, were to me more than a sufficient recompense, when he interrupted me which he was not apt to do and, starting up, with inexpressible fervour and solemnity, implored the blessing of

God upon me. His look at that moment, though I shall never forget it, I can describe in no other way than by saying, that it seemed to have in it something more than human, and what I may, not very improperly, perhaps, call angelie. Seeing me agitated he expressed concern for what he had done; and said. whatever might be in his mind, he would not any more put my feelings to so severe a trial.

Sometimes, however, warm sentiments of gratitude would break from him and those were the only occasions on which during the whole course of his illness he was observed to shed tears, till the day before his death, when he desired to see his brother, gave him his blessing, wept over him, and bid him farewell."

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At the conclusion of the memoirs of this excellent young man, written by his father, the bereaved parent says "I have lost the pleasantest, and, for the last four or five years of his short life, one of the most instructive companions, that ever man was delighted with. But the Lord gave; the Lord hath taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord. I adore the Author of all Good, who gave him grace to lead such a life, and die such a death, as makes it impossible for a Christian to doubt of his having entered upon the inheritance of a happy immortality."

Here let our young readers pause, ponder, reflect and resolve. Is it possible for you not to admire the character of James Hay Beattie? If not, let it be your care to live and die like him.