observed the direction of their commander-in-chief; had they thought only of guarding and fortifying themselves in the defile, and not of marching up to attack our troops. Thank God, Sir, the courage of some of the French generals got the better of their discretion, as well as of their military discipline. This made them attack, instead of waiting to be attacked, and then, by the bravery of the English foot, and the cowardice of their own, they met with a severe repulse, which put their whole army into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation across the Maine. Our army thus escaped the snare into which they had been led, and was enabled to pursue its retreat to Hanau.

66

This, Sir, was a signal advantage; but was it followed up? Did we press upon the enemy in their precipitate retreat across a great river, where many of them must have been lost had they been closely pursued? Did we endeavour to take the least advantage of the confusion into which their unexpected repulse had thrown them? No, Sir; the ardour of the British troops was restrained by the cowardice of the Hanoverians; and instead of pursuing the enemy, we ourselves ran away in the night with such haste that we left all our wounded to the mercy and care of the enemy, who had the honour of burying our dead as well as their own. This action may, therefore, on our side, be called a fortunate escape; I shall never give my consent to honour it with the name of victory.

"After this escape, Sir, our army was joined by a very large reinforcement. Did this revive our courage, or urge us on to give battle? Not in the least, Sir; though the French continued for some time upon the German side of the Rhine, we never offered to attack them, or to give them the least disturbance. At last, upon Prince Charles's approach with the Austrian army, the French not only repassed the Rhine, but retired quite out of Germany; and as the Austrian army and the allied army might then have joined, and might both have passed the Rhine without opposition at Mentz, or almost anywhere in the Palatinate, it was expected that both armies would have marched together into Lorraine, or in search of the French army, in order to force them to a battle. Instead of this, Sir, Prince Charles marched up the German side of the Rhine-to do what? To pass that great river, in the sight of a French army equal in number to his own, which, without some extraordinary neglect in the French, was impracticable; and so it was found by experience. Thus the whole campaign upon that side was consumed in often attempting what so often appeared to be impracticable.

"On the other side-I mean that of the allied army-was there anything of consequence performed? I know of nothing, Sir, but that of sending a party of hussars into Lorraine with a manifesto. The army, indeed, passed the Rhine at Mentz, and marched up to the French lines upon the frontier of Alsace, but never offered to pass those lines until the French had abandoned them, I believe with a design to draw our army into some snare ; for, upon the return of the French towards those lines, we retired with much

greater haste than we had advanced, though the Dutch auxiliaries were then come up, and pretended, at least, to be ready to join our army. I have heard, however, that they found a pretext for never coming into the line; and I doubt much if they would have marched with us to attack the French army in their own territories, or to invest any of their fortified places; for I must observe, that the French lines upon the Queich were not all of them within the territories of France. But suppose this Dutch detachment had been ready to march with us to attack the French in their own territories, or to invest some of their fortified places, I cannot join in any congratulation upon that event; for a small detachment of Dutch troops can never enable us to execute the vast scheme we have undertaken. The whole force of that republic would not be sufficient for the purpose, because we should have the majority of the empire against us; and, therefore, if the Dutch had joined totis viribus in our scheme, instead of congratulating, I should have bemoaned their running mad by our example, and at our instigation.

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Having now briefly examined our past conduct, from the few remarks I have made, I believe, Sir, it will appear that, supposing our scheme to be in itself possible and practicable, we have no reason to hope for success if it be not prosecuted with more vigour and with better conduct than it was during the last campaign. While we continue in the prosecution of this scheme, whoever may lose, the Hanoverians will be considerable gainers, because they will draw four or five hundred thousand pounds yearly from this nation over and above what they have annually drawn ever since they had the good fortune to be united under the same sovereign with ourselves. But we ought to consider-even the Hanoverians ought to consider that this nation is not now in a condition to carry on an expensive war for ten or twelve years, as it did in the reign of Queen Anne. We may fund it out for one, two, or three years, but the public debt is now so large, that, if we go on adding millions to it every year, our credit will at last (sooner, I fear, than some amongst us may imagine) certainly be undone; and if this misfortune should occur, neither Hanover nor any other foreign state would be able to draw another shilling from the country. A stop to our public credit would put an end to our paper currency. An universal bankruptcy would ensue, and all the little ready money left amongst us would be locked up in iron chests, or hid in byecorners by the happy possessors. It would then be impossible to raise our taxes, and consequently impossible to maintain either fleets or armies. Our troops abroad would be obliged to enter into the service of any prince that could maintain them, and our troops at home would be obliged to live upon free quarter. But this they could not do long; for the farmer would neither sow nor reap if he found his produce taken from him by the starving soldier. In these circumstances I must desire the real friends of our present happy establishment to consider what might be the consequence of the Pretender's landing among us at the head of a French army. Would he not be looked upon by most men as a saviour? Would not the majority of the people join with him, in order to rescue the nation from those that had brought it

VOL. I.

E

into such confusion? This danger, Sir, is, I hope, imaginary, but I am sure it is far from being so imaginary as that which has been held out in this debate, the danger of all the powers of the continent of Europe being brought under such a slavish dependence upon France, as to join with her in conquering this island, or in bringing it under the same slavish dependence with themselves.

"I had almost forgotten, Sir, (I wish future nations may forget,) to mention the Treaty of Worms.* I wish that treaty could be erased from our annals and our records, so as never to be mentioned hereafter: for that treaty, with its appendix, the convention that followed, is one of the most destructive, unjust, and absurd that was ever concluded. By that treaty we have taken upon ourselves a burthen which I think it impossible for us to support; we have engaged in such an act of injustice towards Genoa as must alarm all Europe, and give to the French a most signal advantage. From this, Sir, all the princes of Europe will see what regard we have to justice when we think that the power is on our side; most of them, therefore, will probably join with France in curtailing our power, or, at least, in preventing its increase.

"The alliance of Sardinia and its assistance may, I admit, be of great use to us in defeating the designs of the Spaniards in Italy; but gold itself may be bought too dear; and I fear we shall find the purchase we have made to be but precarious, especially if Sardinia should be attacked by France as well as by Spain, the almost certain consequence of our present scheme of politics. For these reasons, Sir, I hope there is not any gentleman, nor even any Minister, who expects that I should declare my satisfaction that this treaty has been concluded.

The Treaty of Worms was an offensive and defensive alliance, concluded on the 2nd of September, 1743, between England, Austria, and Sardinia. By it the Queen of Hungary agreed to transfer to the King of Sardinia the city and part of the duchy of Placentia, the Vigevanesco, part of the duchy of Pavia, and the county of Anghiera, as well as her claims to the marquisate of Finale, which had been ceded to the Genoese by the late Emperor Charles VI., for the sum of 400,000 golden crowns, for which it had been previously mortgaged. The Queen of Hungary also engaged to maintain 30,000 men in Italy, to be commanded by the King of Sardinia. Great Britain agreed to pay the sum of £300,000 for the cession of Finale, and to furnish an annual subsidy of £200,000, on the condition that the King of Sardinia should employ 45,000 men. In addition to supplying these sums, Great Britain agreed to send a strong squadron into the Mediterranean, to act in concert with the allied forces. By a separate and secret convention, agreed to at the same time and place as the treaty, but which was never ratified nor publicly avowed, it was stipulated that Great Britain should pay to the Queen of Hungary an annual subsidy of £300,000, not merely during the war, but so long "as the necessity of her affairs should require." The terms of the Treaty of Worms relative to the cession of the marquisate of Finale to Sardinia were particularly unjust to the Genoese, since that territory had been guaranteed to them by the fourth article of the Quadruple Alliance, concluded on the 2nd of August, 1718, between Great Britain, France, Austria, and Holland. Coxe's Austria, chap. civ. Lord Mahon's Ilist, of England, vol. iii. p. 231. Belsham's Hist. of England, vol. iv. p. 82,

et seq.

"It is very surprising, Sir, to hear gentlemen talk of the great advantages of unanimity in our proceedings, when, at the time, they are doing all they can to prevent unanimity. If the honourable gentleman had intended that what he proposed should be unanimously agreed to, he would have returned to the ancient custom of Parliament which some of his new friends have, on former occasions, so often recommended. It is a new doctrine to pretend that we ought in our address to return some sort of answer to everything mentioned in his Majesty's speech. It is a doctrine that has prevailed only since our Parliaments began to look more like French than English Parliaments; and now we pretend to be such enemies of France, I supposed we should have laid aside a doctrine which the very method of proceeding in Parliament must show to be false. His Majesty's speech is not now so much as under our consideration, but upon a previous order for that purpose; therefore we cannot now properly take notice of its contents, any further than to determine whether we ought to return thanks for it or not; even this we may refuse, without being guilty of any breach of duty to our Sovereign; but of this, I believe, no gentleman would have thought, had the honourable gentleman who made this motion not attached to it a long and fulsome panegyric upon the conduct of our Ministers. I am convinced no gentleman would have objected to our expressing our duty to our Sovereign, and our zeal for his service, in the strongest and most affectionate terms: nor would any gentleman have refused to congratulate his Majesty upon any fortunate event happening to the royal family. The honourable gentleman would have desired no more than this, had he intended that his motion should be unanimously agreed to; but Ministers are generally the authors and drawers up of the motion, and they always have a greater regard for themselves than for the service of their Sovereign; that is the true reason why such motions seldom meet with unanimous approbation.

"As to the danger, Sir, of our returning or not returning, to our national custom upon this occasion, I think it lies wholly upon the side of our not returning. I have shown that the measures we are now pursuing are fundamentally wrong, and that the longer we pursue them, the heavier our misfortunes will prove. Unless some signal providence interpose, experience, I am convinced, will confirm what I say. By the immediate intervention of Providence, we may, it is true, succeed in the most improbable schemes; but Providence seems to be against us. The sooner, therefore, we repent and amend, the better it will be for us; and unless repentance begins in this House, I shall no where expect it until dire experience has convinced us of our errors.

For these reasons, Sir, I wish, I hope, that we may now begin to put a stop to the further prosecution of these disastrous measures, by refusing them our approbation. If we put a negative .upon this question, it may awaken our Ministers from their deceitful dreams. If we agree to it, they will dream on till they have dreamed Europe, their country, and themselves

into utter perdition. If they stop now, the nation may recover; but if by such a flattering address we encourage them to go on, it may soon become impossible for them to retreat. For the sake of Europe, therefore, for the sake of my country, I most heartily join in putting a negative upon the question."

After a long debate, the address was carried by a majority of 278 to 149.

THE AUGMENTATION OF THE ARMY. INVASION.

APPREHENSION OF A FRENCH

1755. December. England was at this time thrown into a state of great alarm by the apprehension of a French invasion. Warlike preparations, on a most extensive scale, were carrying on throughout France. The fortifications of Dunkirk were put under repair; an order was issued, requiring all British subjects to quit the French territories; and many English vessels were seized in the different ports of France, and their crews sent to prison. The French subjects were invited to equip privateers; great numbers of artificers and seamen were employed in fitting out a formidable squadron at Brest; large bodies of troops were marched down to the coasts, and a considerable number of transports were being put into a state of preparation.

On the 5th December, the Secretary at War* made a motion in the House of Commons for an army of thirty-four thousand two hundred and sixtythree men, which was an augmentation of fifteen thousand men to the force already subsisting. The motion was seconded by Mr. Pitt; and it will be seen from the following animated speech, how warmly he could support the Ministry when he deemed their plans conducive to the public. welfare.

Mr. Pitt observed, "That last year he had pronounced eighteen thousand men not sufficient. Our whole force was necessary at this dangerous and critical conjuncture. Other efforts were requisite, than sending two miserable battalions as victims to America. Every step since had tended to provoke a war, not to make it- and at last the Crown itself was to be fought for, by an army so ineffective, and so raw! He hoped, by alarming the nation, to make the danger reach the ears of his Majesty, who was likely, after so gracious a reign, to be attacked in his venerable age! to see such a country exposed by the neglect of his Ministers! He could not avoid turning from the venerable age of the King, to his amiable posterity, born among us, yet given up by some unskilful Minister or Ministers! He meaned no invectives; he made no accusation; he spoke from his feeling. He then drew a striking and masterly picture of a French invasion, reaching London, and of the horrors ensuing,

• Viscount Barrington.