2D SESS.]

Mr. BENTON asked the indulgence of the Senate to make an exposition of the circumstances under which the President had proposed the appointment of a lieutenant-general to command the army in Mexico, and with which appointment his name had become connected. It had been intimated, he said, on the floor of the Senate-hypothetically, to be sure, but not the less intelligibly and forcibly on that account that there might be an ulterior and covert design in the proposition: nothing less than a design on the part of the President to appoint his successor. The Senator from North Carolina, (Mr. BADGER,) in his speech on the lieutenant-general bill, had indulged in that hypothesis; and as no supposition could be more unfounded, or more injurious to the President or to the public service, or could descend from a higher source and as he (Mr. BENTON) happened to be in possession of all the facts necessary to the vindication of the President, he desired to make an exposition which would show the supposition to be unfounded, and | would save the President's character and the public service from the injury they would suffer if the intimation was allowed to go out uncontradicted from the floor of the Senate. He asked leave; for, as the bill for the lieutenantgeneral was laid upon the table, and as he would not have it taken up, (and would not speak to it if it was,) and as he did not choose to commit the irregularity of hanging a speech on some irrelevant bill, he must throw himself upon the indulgence of the Senate for leave to make the exposition of facts which the case required, and which the intimations of the Senator from North Carolina had rendered necessary.

Leave was given, and Mr. BENTON proceeded

I feel myself called upon by the remarks of the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. BADGER) to vindicate the President from the unconstitutional and dangerous design which the hypothetical observations of that Senator would attribute to him; and shall do so in the simplest form of narrative, repeating to the Senate all that has taken place between the President and myself in relation to this appointment, and

(JANUARY, 1847.

thereby enabling the Senate and the people to judge of the justice of the accusation.

It was at the beginning of the month of September last, and in the moment that I was about setting out to the West, that the President sent for me, and informed me that he had done so for the purpose of offering me a high appointment. He named it. It was the mission to France, then becoming vacant by the return of the gentleman (Mr. King, of Alabaina) so long an ornament to this Chamber. I declined the appointment, and for reasons which had induced me to decline high appointments from Presidents Jackson and Van Buren. Mr. Polk was kind enough to ask me to take time to consider; but I answered him that there was no need for time; that the answer would still be the same, after any length of consideration; and so, with thanks for the honor he had done me, the appointment to the French mission was definitively declined. This was the beginning of September last; so that, at that time, it is certain that the President could have had no such design as has been attributed to him by the Senator from North Carolina— no design to make me his successor, by virtue of military feats to be performed on the lowlands or the table land of the republic of Mexico. On the contrary, a fertile imagination-such as the Senator from North Carolina so happily possesses-might have seen, or thought it saw, in this proposed amendment, a sort of political deportation-something like an exiling and burying in a foreign Court-for a purpose the very reverse of what the Senator from North Carolina has supposed. I say an inventive imagination might have seen, or thought it saw, all this. Possessing no such imagination, I saw no such thing. And taking the offer in the sense in which it was made, as eminently honorable in itself and a signal evidence of the President's confidence in me, and goodwill for me, I made him my thanks for it privately, as I now do publicly; and the affair was dropped. This, I repeat, was at the beginning of September last-only three months before the meeting of Congress; so that, at that time, it is quite clear the President had no such momentous and fearful design as the Senator from North Carolina has attributed to him. Up to that time-up to the first day of September, in the year 1846-the republic was safe.

Immediately after refusing the mission to France I went off to the West, was gone until the month of November, and had no communication of any kind, direct or indirect, nor upon any subject whatever, during my absence, with President Polk. This makes all safe again for two months more. I returned to this city in November, where my family was, and where Congress was soon to meet. The day after my arrival I called upon the President; and here we approach the dangerous ground! For, in that first interview, he actually asked me my

2D SESS.]

[JANUARY, 1847.

Finally, and to conclude the vindication of the President in this particular, I can say that Mr. Polk is not the first President who proposed to give me the command of the army against Mexico-that General Jackson himself proposed it in 1836, when our affairs with that country looked warlike; and that then, as now, I agreed to take it.

And here, Mr. President, having fulfilled my task of vindicating the Chief Magistrate of the Union from the design, hypothetically imputed to him, of wishing to appoint his successor, in my person, and by means of this lieutenantgeneralship, I might close my remarks; but as my name has been coupled with this business, and as I have remained silent, and even left my seat while the measure was depending, I must now take leave, with the kind indulgence of the Senate, to proceed a step further, and to say a word on my own account; and to show that service, and not rank, was my inducement to agree to the offer of the President; and that there might have been cases in which I would not have accepted the office of lieutenant-general, even if it had been created. I have already said that I will not now show what my own plan was; but I can say of it that it was a plan which looked to a result, and promised an issue, and that briefly; and that I would have had nothing to do with any plan of any other kind -nothing to do with any plan that contemplated a long and moderate war, or a war of masterly inactivity, or of retreat upon the Rio Grande, or of defending a line; or of attack upon the idle and solitary castle of San Juan of Ulua-especially at the commencement of the season for the black vomit. In no one of these cases would I have been lieutenantgeneral, or captain-general, or major-general, or colonel-general, or any other sort of a general that ever was heard of. I know very well that the President had no idea of any one of these most amiable plans; but there is a way to give him an idea of them, and even to force them upon him; and that would be, by the simple process of denying him the means of doing any thing else.

I shall not state my plan; but I will say of it, that, besides intending a result, it proposed to carry on the war, while there was war, according to the usage of all nations in the case of invasive war-the invaders to be paid and subsisted by the invaded. Contributions regu

I can say, further, that my plan was not limited to a mere military view of the subject; that it comprehended a union of policy and of arms-the olive-branch to go with the sword, ministers to treat, as well as an army to fight. A diplomatic mission, nationally constituted both in a geographical and in a political sense, was to attend the head-quarters; and, while the ministers stood ready to negotiate at every step, the army was to make an organization and an attitude to give emphasis to negotiation. And this combination of arms and of policy was not mere guess work, the idle conception of fancy; but the result of a knowledge of the state of parties in Mexico-a peace party, for honorable peace; a war party, for endless war -as was so luminously shown by the Senator from New York (Mr. Dix) a few days ago. My plan was adapted to both of these parties-honorable peace for the one; the sword for the other. The military part of the plan has fallen to the ground: the diplomatic part falls with it: and now it devolves upon those who have frustrated the plan of the President to present him a better.

I counted much on the efficacy of the diplomatic part of this plan; for great errors prevail in Mexico with regard to our designs and feelings towards that country, and which nothing but an authentic mission can remove. The war party is incessant in its calumnies against us, artfully contrived to operate on every class of the people, and to render peace impossible. It has a falsehood for every class. To the religious orders the war is represented as a war of religion-the Protestant against the Catholic

and a war of sacrilege the spoliation of the churches. To the Creole Spaniards and the Indians of mixed blood they present it as a war of races-the Anglo-Saxon against the SpanishAmerican-and the subjugation of the latter intended. To the unmixed Indian race, (nearly the one-half of the whole population, and the sole resource of the army for its rank and file,) it is presented as a war of extinction, or of slavery-their race to be extirpated, like so many tribes in our North America; or to be carried into slavery to work the fields of their masters, like the slaves brought from Africa. And, to all, it is presented as a war of ambition and of conquest, in which there is no peace for Mexico but in the degradation of her citizens and the loss of her independence. A mission, such as I proposed, would authentically contradict all these calumnies, and show the deceived people of Mexico that just and honorable peace is all that we want; and that, far from wishing her degradation, both policy and interest unite in making us wish to see her prosperous, happy, and independent. She is a republic-our neighbor-who did us the honor to copy our form of government, and had a great commerce with

FEBRUARY, 1847.]

I counted much on the efficacy of the diplomatic part of the plan, and not less on the military part, if the other failed. Of this I can say nothing but that it was not framed in total ignorance of Mexican character, Mexican country, and Mexican resources. Forty years ago I studied Humboldt, and did not overlook his chapter on the military defences of the country, and especially his imposing development of the great elements of defence with which nature had endowed her; the dangers of the coast when the north wind was blowing, which blows from the autumnal to the vernal equinox-the black vomit when it was not-and the deep defiles of volcanic mountains. The plan may have been bad; but it was not conceived without some knowledge of the subject; and it promised a result-peace to the country, if it succeeded; and to the soldier that died, a death worthy of the soldier-the battle-storm his embrace, the field of honor his bed, the lofty summits of the Cordilleras his monument and his grave!

TUESDAY, February 2.

Three Million Loan.*

Mr. SEVIER moved that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the special order, being the bill making appropriations to bring the

This bill was no part of the ordinary support of the war

by providing for the army and navy. It was a special appropriation for a special purpose, as its terms imply, and sage. It looked to the acquisition of territory, and to the payment of money in advance of the ratification of the

as was made known by the President in a confidential mes

treaty of purchase. Santa Anna had returned, and expected this money, and was ready to treat on the assurance of receiving it. The clause in the bill by which the President was to cause an account of the expenditure, made under his direction, to be laid before Congress as soon as may be, sufficiently indicate it to be of the nature of secret service money. This being the character of the appropriation, and evidently intended for territorial acquisition, it became the main topic of the debate of the session-embracing the origin, the conduct, and the objects of the war,

and giving a full view both of the opposition and of the administration side of that question. It was to this bill that Mr. Wilmot proposed his proviso against the introduction of slavery in the territory which should be acquired, which created so much excitement for some time, and was finally rejected on showing that slavery was then extinct in the territory expected to be acquired.

[29TH CONG. existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion.

The motion having been agreed to, the bill was taken up for consideration as in Committee of the Whole. After having been read a second time, as follows:

"Be it enacted, &c., That a sum of money, not exceeding three millions of dollars, be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, for the purpose of defraying any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in order to bring the existing war with Mexico to a speedy and honorable conclusion, to be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be applied under the direction of the President of the United States, who shall cause an account of the expenditure thereof to be laid before Congress as soon as may be ”—

Mr. SEVIER remarked, that this bill had been introduced upon the recommendation of the President of the United States, and that the Committee on Foreign Relations, by whom it was reported, in preparing the bill, had resolved to follow the form in which other enactments of a similar character had been framed. One of those enactments to which he referred was passed in the year 1803, at the time of the acquisition of Louisiana, during the Administration of Mr. Jefferson; and another in 1806, when it was proposed to purchase Florida. A similar bill had also passed the Senate at the last session of Congress, the proposition having been first considered with closed doors, and afterwards reported in open session. The design of the committee was to follow those precedents, excluding all extraneous matter, and incorporating nothing that was calculated to excite sectional or party feeling, or to occasion debate. It was the opinion of the committee, and in this opinion he concurred, that all such matter would be ill-timed, and that its introduction could lead to no good result; and he intended, if it were moved from any quarter, to put any thing of that sort into the bill, to oppose it. In looking over the proceedings of the last session, he found that the Committee on Foreign Relations had reported two resolutions on the subject, the first of which declared that the course indicated by the President in his Message received the approbation of the Senate, and was in the following language:

"1. Resolved, That the Senate entertain a strong desire that the existing war with Mexico should be terminated by a treaty of peace, just and honorable to both nations; and that the President be advised to adopt all proper measures for the attainment of that object."

This resolution was discussed for several

days, and was at length voted on, and was sanctioned by every Senator, on both sides of the Senate, with the exception of two, the Senator from Texas, (Mr. RUSK,) and the Senator from Missouri, (Mr. ATCHISON.) The second resolution was as follows:

"2. Resolved further, That the Senate deem it

thereof."

This was agreed to, and the Committee on Foreign Relations were instructed to report to the Senate, in open session, a bill to that effect. Various propositions to amend the bill were made, and the discussion upon it consumed two days. The bill was ultimately passed by a vote of 33 to 19. This proposition having been thus discussed and deliberately voted on, he would consider it a waste of time to go at any length in the matter now, and in regard to the form of the measure. The same course had been adopted in 1803, in the acquisition of Louisiana; in 1806, in the acquisition of Florida; and, lastly, in that body at its last session, in 1846. Unless gentlemen had changed their opinions since that time, there could be no great variety of opinion in any part of this chamber. The object of this bill, as appears upon its face, was to make peace with Mexico; and, in urging its passage, he should abstain from the expression of any opinions regarding the origin of the Mexican war; for his object was to excite no party feelings upon any side on a question of this sort. He had his own opinion on the subject, but he should not introduce it into a discussion. He took it for granted they were all in favor of peace, if it could be obtained upon proper terms; and it was proper that he should say, that he did not see how peace could be brought about, unless one or other of the belligerent parties made an advance towards obtaining it. It was true, we had already made an advance towards that object, by sending a Minister to treat with the Government of Mexico, and had kept our army out of the country which was claimed by us for a considerable time before the commencement of this war, for the express purpose of securing peace, by showing a forbearance and a disposition to avoid a hostile collision.

In making peace, of course the United States would expect to receive indemnity, to some extent at least, for the expenses of the war, and they would expect also the payment of the claims held by our citizens against the republic of Mexico, and this indemnity was expected in the shape of territory. He was not authorized to state precisely what territory this Government would require, but he supposed that no Senator would think that they ought to get less than New Mexico and Upper California. He did not suppose that a treaty of peace with less than this would ever pass that body. However, they would be better prepared when a treaty was proposed to determine as to the quantity.

Having stated then, in as few words as practicable, the object of the bill and its form, the next question that arose was, Whether it was

[FEBRUARY, 1847.

likely that they could effect their purpose upon these terms? In regard to that he would say, that, in coming to the conclusion they had, the committee were governed, to a great extent, by the recommendation of the President; and he, after examining that correspondence, had come to the conclusion that peace could be made upon those terms with Mexico. He believed that Mexico, a large part of it, at all events a large majority of the people, would be glad to make peace on these terms.

Mr. MANGUM said there was no purpose of delay, of any unreasonable delay, on his part; but this was a very important question. They had been engaged during the last few weeks on very important measures, which had occupied their attention exclusively; and not knowing that this bill would be precipitated upon them, they were not prepared satisfactorily to deter mine those important questions which it involved. He hoped the question would not be pressed. If it were necessary they could go into special session.

Mr. SEVIER said if it was to be debated, that it might share the fate it did last year, he was not willing to have it passed over; but he should not object to reasonable debate. He was not willing, though, to have it spoken to death. They had the appropriation bills yet behind, but he was willing to yield a day or two.

Mr. MANGUM said the object of the President now seemed to be pretty clearly intimated to be the purchase of California and New Mexico. If this were so, he would only say, for one, that, under. this aspect, it presented a vastly momentous question. He was unwilling to see Mexico dismembered. He was unwilling to acquire, at the edge of the sword, or the point of the bayonet, a single square inch of territory, though he was disposed to acquire, if practicable, those water facilities which would be of immense advantage to this country. But as to a forcible spoliation of the territory of California, or any other, at the edge of the sword, it was distasteful to him. He was altogether averse to it. The change of phase which this matter had assumed rendered it incomparably of more importance than the proposition of last year; and he was indisposed, therefore, to give a vote which might foreclose him hereafter (the views of the Administration not having been clearly indicated until to-day) from taking such a course as his more mature judgment might dictate.

Mr. SEVIER moved to postpone the further consideration of the subject until to-morrow. He then briefly explained some matters in relation to this subject, from the history of the last session of Congress.

Mr. CALHOUN said Thursday was but day after to-morrow. By the postponement to that day they should gain time, as it would give Senators the opportunity for reflection; and they knew that debates which came on after due reflection were generally the most concise.