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[FEBRUARY, 1847.

by evidence drawn from himself-from his public official acts-leaving all the evidence derived from other sources, from private and unofficial acts, for future production, if deemed necessary.

himself to be the author of it, and will give a part of my reasons for believing so. In saying this, I do not consider the march to the Rio Grande to have been the cause of the war, any more than I consider the British march upon Concord and Lexington to have been the cause The Senator from South Carolina, in his of the American Revolution, or the crossing efforts to throw the blame of the war upon the of the Rubicon by Cæsar to have been the President, goes no further back in his search cause of the civil war in Rome. In all these for causes than to this march upon the Rio cases, I consider the causes of war as pre-exist- Grande: upon the same principle, if he wrote ing, and the marches as only the effect of these a history of the American Revolution, he causes. I consider the march upon the Rio would begin at the march upon Lexington and Grande as being unfortunate, and certainly Concord, leaving out of view the ten years should have advised against it if I had been work of Lord North's Administration. No, consulted, and that without the least fear of the march upon the Rio Grande was not the diminishing my influence in the settlement of cause of the war: had it not been for pre-existthe Oregon question-a fear which the Senator ing causes, the arrival of the American army from South Carolina says prevented him from on the Mexican frontier would have been salutinterposing to prevent the war which he foresaw.ed with military courtesy, according to the My opinion of Mr. Polk-and experience in usage of all civilized nations, and with none so that very Oregon case has confirmed it-did not much as with the Spaniards. Complimentary authorize me to conjecture that any one would visits, dinners, and fandangos, balls—not canlose influence with him by giving him honest non balls-would have been the salutation. opinions; so I would have advised against the The causes of the war are long anterior; and march to the Rio Grande if I had been con- I begin with the beginning, and show the Senasulted. Nor do I see how any opinion adverse tor from South Carolina an actor from the first. to the President's was to have the effect of In doing this, I am acting in defence of the lessening his influence in the settlement of the country, for the President represents the counOregon question. That question was settled try. The Senator from South Carolina charges by us, not by the President. Half the Demo- the war upon the President: the whole oppocratic Senators went contrary to the President's sition follow him: the bill under dicussion is opinion, and none of them lost influence with forgotten; crimination of the President is now him on that account; and so I can see no possi- the object; and in that crimination, the counble connection between the facts of the case and try is injured by being made to appear the the Senator's reason for not interfering to save aggressor in the war. This is my justification his country from the war which, he says, he for defending the President, and showing the saw. His reason to me is unintelligible, in- truth that the Senator, in his manner of comprehensible, unconnectible with the facts acquiring Texas, is the true cause of the war. of the case. But the march on the Rio Grande was not the cause of the war; but the causes of this event, like the causes of our own revolutionary war, were in progress long before hostilities broke out. The causes of this Mexican war were long anterior to this march; and, in fact, every circumstance of war then existed, except the actual collision of arms. Diplomatic intercourse had ceased; commerce was destroyed; fleets and armies confronted each other; treaties were declared to be broken: the contingency had occurred in which Mexico had denounced the existence of war; the incorporation of Texas, with a Mexican war on her hands, had produced, in legal contemplation, the status belli between the two countries: and all this had occurred before the march upon the Rio Grande, and before the commencement of this Administration, and had produced a state of things which it was impossible to continue, and which could only receive their solution from arms or negotiation. The march to the Rio Grande brought on the collision of arms; but, so far from being the cause of the war, it was itself the effect of these causes. The Senator from South Carolina is the author of those causes, and therefore the author of the war; and this I propose to show, at present,

The cession of Texas to Spain in 1819, is the beginning point in the chain of causes which have led to this war; for unless the country had been ceded away, there could have been no quarrel with any power in getting it back. For a long time the negotiator of that treaty of cession (Mr. J. Q. Adams) bore all the blame of the loss of Texas; and his motives for giving it away were set down to hostility to the South and West, and a desire to clip the wings of the slaveholding States. At last the truth of history has vindicated itself, and has shown who was the true author of that mischief to the South and West. Mr. Adams has made a public declaration, which no one controverts, that that cession was made in conformity to the decision of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, a majority of which was slaveholding, and among them the present Senator from South Carolina, and now the only survivor of that majority. He does not contradict the statement of Mr. Adams: he, therefore, stands admitted the coauthor of that mischief to the South and West with the cession of Texas involved, and to escape from which it became necessary, in the opinion of the Senator from South Carolina, to get back Texas at the expense of war with Mexico. This conduct of the Senator in giving

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The Three Million Bill.

[29TH CONG. Jacinto. The Congress of the United States was then in session: the Senator from South Carolina was then a member of this body; and, without even waiting for the official confirmation of that great event, he proposed at once the immediate recognition of the independence of Texas, and her immediate admission into this Union. He put the two propositions together-recognition and admission: and allowed us no further time for the double vote than the few days which were to intervene before the official intelligence of the victory should arrive. Here are some extracts from his speech on that occasion, and which verify what I say, and show that he was then ready to plunge the country into the Texan war with Mexico, without the slightest regard to its treaties, its commerce, its duties, or its character:

away Texas when we had her, and then making | war to get her back, is an enigma which he has never yet condescended to explain, and which, until explained, leaves him in a state of self-contradiction, which, whether it impairs his own confidence in himself or not, must have the effect of destroying the confidence of others in him, and wholly disqualifies him for the office of champion of the slaveholding States. It was the heaviest blow they had ever received, and put an end, in conjunction with the Missouri compromise, and the permanent location of the Indians west of the Mississippi, to their future growth or extension as slave States beyond the Mississippi. The compromise, which was then in full progress, and established at the next session of Congress, cut off the slave States from all territory north and west of Missouri, and south of thirty-six and a half degrees of north latitude: the treaty of 1819 ceded nearly all south of that degree, comprehending not only all Texas, but a large part of the valley of the Mississippi on the Red River and the Arkansas, to a foreign power, and brought a non-slaveholding empire to the confines of Louisiana and Arkansas: the permanent appropriation of the rest of the territory for the abode of civilized Indians, swept the little slaveholding territory west of Arkansas and lying between the compromise line and the cession line; and left the slave States without one inch of ground for their future growth. Nothing was left. Even the then Territory of Arkansas was encroached upon. A breadth of forty miles wide, and three hundred long, was cut off from her, and given to the Cherokees; and there was not as much slave territory left west of the Mississippi as a dove could have rested the sole of her foot upon. It was not merely a curtailment, but a total extinction of slaveholding territory; and done at a time when the Missouri controversy was raging, and every effort made by northern abolitionists to stop the growth of slave States. The Senator from South Carolina, in his support of the cession of Texas, and ceding a part of the valley of the Mississippi, was then the most Here, then, is the proof of the fact that, ten efficient ally of the restrictionists at that time, years ago, and without a word of explanation and deprives him of the right of setting up as with Mexico, or any request from Texas-withthe champion of the slave States now. I out the least notice to the American people, or denounced the sacrifice of Texas then, believ- time for deliberation among ourselves, or any ing Mr. Adams to have been the author of it: regard to existing commerce-he was for plungI denounce it now, knowing the Senator from ing us into instant war with Mexico. I say, South Carolina to be its author: and for this-instant war; for Mexico and Texas were then his flagrant recreancy to the slave interest in their hour of utmost peril-I hold him disqualified for the office of champion of the fourteen slave States, and shall certainly require him to keep out of Missouri, and to confine himself to his own bailiwick, when he comes to discuss his string of resolutions.

"Mr. Calhoun was of opinion that it would add more strength to the cause of Texas to wait for a few days until they received official confirmation of the victory and capture of Santa Anna, in order to obtain a more unanimous vote in favor of the recognition of Texas. *He had made up

I come now to the direct proofs of the Senator's authorship of the war: and begin with the year 1836, and with the month of May of that year, and with the 27th day of that month, and with the first rumors of the victory of San

his mind not only to recognize the independence of Texas, but for her admission into this Union; and if the Texans managed their affairs prudently, they would soon be called upon to decide that question. There were powerful reasons why Texas should be a part of this Union. The southern States, owning a slave population, were deeply interested in preventing that country from having the power facturing interests of the north and east were to annoy them; and the navigating and manuequally interested in making it a part of this Union. He thought they would soon be called on to decide these questions; and when they did act on it, he was for acting on both together-for recognizing the independence of Texas, and for admitting her into the Union. * * * * If events should go on as they had done, he could not but hope that before the close of the present session of Congress, they would not only acknowledge the independence of Texas, but admit her into the Union. He hoped there would be no unnecessary delay-for in such cases delays were dangerous-but that they would act with unanimity, and act promptly."

in open war; and to incorporate Texas, was to incorporate the war at the same time. All this the Senator was then for, immediately after his own gratuitous cession of Texas, and long before the invention of the London abolition plot came so opportunely to his aid. Promptness and unanimity were then his watchwords. Immediate action-action before Congress adjourned-was his demand. No delay. Delays were dangerous. We must vote, and vote unanimously and promptly. I well remember the Senator's look and attitude on that occa

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The Three Million Bill.

[FEBRUARY, 1847.

sion-the fixedness of his look, and the magis- | disturbance. It then woke up, and with a sudteriality of his attitude. It was such as he often denness and violence proportioned to its long favors us with, especially when he is in a crisis, repose. Mr. Tyler was then President: the and brings forward something which ought to Senator from South Carolina was potent under be instantly and unanimously rejected-as when his administration, and soon became his Secrehe brought in his string of abstractions on tary of State. All the springs of intrigue and Thursday last. So it was in 1836-prompt and diplomacy were immediately set in motion to unanimous action, and a look to put down oppo- resuscitate the Texas question, and to reinvest sition. But the Senate were not looked down it with all the dangers and alarms which it had in 1836. They promptly and unanimously re- worn in 1836. Passing over all the dangers fused the Senator's motion; and the crisis and of annoyance from Texas as possibly non-slavethe danger-good-natured souls!-immediately holding, foreseen by the Senator in 1836, and postponed themselves until wanted for another not foreseen by him in 1819, with all the need occasion. of guardianship then foreshadowed, and all the arguments then suggested: all these immediately developed themselves, and intriguing agents traversed earth and sea, from Washington to Texas, and from London to Mexico:passing over all this, as belonging to a class of evidence, not now to be used, I come at once to the letter of the 17th of January, from the Texan Minister to Mr. Upshur, the American Secretary of State; and the answer to that letter by Mr. CALHOUN, of April 11th of the same year. They are both vital in this case; and the first is in these words:

The peace of the country was then saved; but it was a respite only; and the speech of the Senator from South Carolina, brief as it was, becomes momentous, as foreshadowing every thing that has subsequently taken place in relation to the admission of Texas. In this brief speech we have the shadows of all future movements, coming in procession-in advance of the events. In the significant intimation, qualified with the if- "the Texans prudently managed their affairs, they (the Senate) might soon be called upon to decide the question of admission." In that pregnant and qualified intimation, there was a visible doubt that the Texans might not be prudent enough to manage their own affairs, and might require help; and also a visible feeling of that paternal guardianship which afterward assumed the management of their affairs for them. In the admonitions to unanimity, there was that denunciation of any difference of opinion, which afterwards displayed itself in the ferocious hunting down of all who opposed the Texas treaty. In the reference to southern slavery, and annoyance to slave property from Texas, we have the germ of the "self-defence" letter, and the first glimpse of the abolition plot of John Andrews, Ashbel Smith, Lord Aberdeen-I beg pardon of Lord Aberdeen for naming him in such a connection and the World's Convention, with which Mexico, Texas, and the United States were mystified and bamboozled in April, 1844. And, in the interests of the manufacturing and navigating states of the north and east, as connected with Texas admission, we have the text of all the communications to the agent, Murphy, and of all the letters and speeches to which the Texas question, seven years afterwards, gave rise. We have all these subsequent events here shadowed forth. And now, the wonder is, why all these things were not foreseen a little while before, when Texas was being ceded to a nonslave-holding empire! and why, after being so imminent and deadly in May, 1836, all these dangers suddenly went to sleep, and never waked up again until 1844! These are wonders; but let us not anticipate questions, and let us proceed with the narrative.

The Congress of 1836 would not admit Texas. The Senator from South Carolina became patient: the Texas question went to sleep; and for seven good years it made no

"SIR: It is known to you that an armistice has been proclaimed between Mexico and Texas; that that armistice has been obtained through the intervention of several great powers mutually friendly; and that negotiations are now pending, having for their object a settlement of the difficulties heretofore existing between the two countries. A proposition of the United States, through you, for the annexlikewise having been submitted by the President ation of Texas to this country, therefore (without indicating the nature of the reply which the President of Texas may direct to be made to this proposition) I beg leave to suggest that it may be apprehended, should a treaty of annexation be concluded, Mexico may think proper to at once terminate the armistice, break off all negotiations for peace, and again threaten or commence hostilities against Texas; and that some of the other Governments who have been instrumental in obtaining their cession, if they do not throw their influence into the Mexican scale, may altogether withdraw their good offices of mediation, thus losing to Texas their friendship, and exposing her to the unrethese things, I desire to submit, through you, to strained menaces of Mexico. In view, then, of his excellency the President of the United States, this inquiry: Should the President of Texas accede to the proposition of annexation, would the President of the United States, after the signing of the treaty, and before it shall be ratified and receive the final action of the other branches of both Governments, in case Texas shall desire it, or with her consent, order such number of the military and naval forces of the United States to such necessary points or places upon the territory or borders of Texas or the Gulf of Mexico, as shall be sufficient to protect her against foreign aggression?

"This communication, as well as the reply which you may make, will be considered by me entirely official correspondence to my Government, but enconfidential, not to be embraced in my regular closed direct to the President of Texas for his information.

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The Three Million Bill.

"With assurances of my great regard, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient

servant."

[29TH CONG, | invited Texas to this negotiation, will at once, and before any negotiation is set on foot, place a sufficient naval force in the Gulf to protect the coast of Texas, and hold a sufficient force of cavalry, or other description of mounted troops, on the southwestern border of the United States, in readiness to protect, or aid in the protection of Texas pending the proposed negotiation for annexation. trust my Government will at once see the propriety of this course of policy; for I found it impossible to induce this Government to enter heartily into the measure of annexation without an assurance that my Government would not fail to guard Texas against all the evils that are likely to assail Texas the wishes of the United States." in consequence of her meeting and complying with

I

Denial of the knowledge of the existence of the armistice, and the opening of negotiations, was, therefore, impossible. Mr. Upshur, to whom the letter of the 17th of January was addressed, gave it no answer at all. During the forty days that his life was spared, he answered not; and I mention this particular in justice to the memory of a gentleman who is no more. Mr. Nelson, the Attorney-General, his temporary successor in the Department of State, did not answer it to the Texan Minister in Washington, but he did to Mr. Murphy in Texas, in reply to his communication to the same effect with the letter. Mr. Nelson's letter is dated the 11th of March, and is in these words:

This letter reveals the true state of the Texan question in January, 1844, and the conduct of all parties in relation to it. It presents Texas and Mexico, weary of the war, reposing under an armistice, and treating for peace; Great Britain and France acting the noble part of mediators, and endeavoring to make peace: our own Government secretly intriguing for annexation, acting the wicked part of mischiefmakers, and trying to renew the war; and the issue of its machinations to be unsuccessful unless the United States should be involved in the renewed hostilities. That was the question; and the letter openly puts it to the American Secretary of State. The answer to that question, in my opinion, should have been, that the President of the United States did not know of the armistice and the peace negotiations at the time that he proposed to Texas to do an act which would be a perfidious violation of those sacred engagements, and bring upon herself the scourge of renewed invasion and the stigma of perfidy-that he would not have made such a proposal for the whole round world, if he had known of the armistice and the peace negotiations-that he wished success to the peacemakers, both for the sake of Mexico and Texas, and because Texas could then come into the Union without the least interruption to our "Of the anxiety of the President to provide for friendly, commercial, and social relations with the annexation of the territory of Texas to that of our sister republic of Mexico; and that, as to the United States, you have been heretofore apsecretly lending the army and navy of the prised; and of his readiness, by negotiation, United States to Texas to fight Mexico while promptly to effectuate this desire, you are well we were at peace with her, it would be a crime aware. He regards the measure as one of vital imagainst God, and man, and our own constitu-portance to both parties, and as recommended by tion, for which heads might be brought to the block, if Presidents and their Secretaries, like constitutional Kings and Ministers, should be held capitally responsible for capital crimes. This, in my opinion, should have been the answer. But the first part of it-that of the scienter upon the point of the armistice and the peace negotiations-could not be given in point of fact; for the Department of State was full of communications giving that informationone of them from the agent, (Murphy,) in these words:

"The powers to be given to General Henderson are to be of the fullest and most complete character, so that no impediment shall be found requiring further or other powers, or further or other instructions. But, inasmuch as the Commissioners of Texas now in Mexico, in treaty or negotiation touching an armistice, are supposed not to have concluded their labors, and it is clear to the President of Texas that so soon as this negotiation in relation to annexation is known to the Government of Mexico, all negotiation on that and all other questions between Texas and Mexico will cease, and that the President of Mexico will instantly commence active hostilities against Texas, which Texas is wholly unprepared, by sea or land, to resist, it is understood that the Government of the United States, having

the highest considerations of a sound public policy.

"Entertaining these views, the President is gratified to perceive, in the course you have pursued the evidences of a cordial co-operation in this cherin your intercourse with the authorities of Texas, ished object of his policy: but instructs me to say, that whilst approving the general tone and tenor of that intercourse, he regrets to perceive, in the pledges given by you in your communication to the Hon. Anson Jones of the 14th February, that you have suffered your zeal to carry you beyond the line of your instructions, and to commit the President to measures for which he has no constitutional authority to stipulate.

"The employment of the army or navy against a foreign power, with which the United States are at peace, is not within the competency of the President; and whilst he is not indisposed, as a measure of prudent precaution, and as preliminary to the proposed negotiation, to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico, and on the southern borders of the United States, a naval and military force to be directed to the defence of the inhabitants and Territory of Texas at a proper time, he cannot permit the authorities of that Government, or yourself, to labor under the misapprehension that he has power to employ them at the period indicated by your stipulations.

"Of these impressions, Mr. Van Zandt, the chargé d'affaires of the Texan Government, has

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The Three Million Bill.

[FEBRUARY, 1847.

been, and General Henderson, who is daily expected | purpose. Should the exigency arise to which you here, will be fully advertised. In the mean time, refer in your note to Mr. Upshur, I am further dithe President desires that you will at once counter-rected by the President to say, that during the mand your instructions to Lieutenant Davis, as far as they are in conflict with these views.

"In any emergency that may occur, care will be taken that the commanders of the naval and military forces of the United States shall be properly instructed. Your request that they may be placed under your control cannot be gratified."

This is very constitutional and proper language and if it had not been reversed, there would have been no war with Mexico. But it was reversed. Soon after it was written, the present Senator from South Carolina took the chair of the Department of State. Mr. Pinckney Henderson, whom Mr. Murphy mentions as coming on with full powers, on the faith of the pledge he had given, arrived also, and found that pledge entirely cancelled by Mr. Tyler's answer through Mr. Nelson; and he utterly refused to treat. The new Secretary was in a strait; for time was short, and Texas must be had; and Messrs. Henderson and Van Zandt would not even begin to treat without a renewal of the pledge given by Mr. Murphy. That had been cancelled in writing, and the cancellation had gone to Texas, and had been made on high constitutional ground. The new Secretary was profuse of verbal assurances, and even permitted the Ministers to take down his words in writing, and read them over to him, as was shown by the Senator from Texas, (General HOUSTON,) when he spoke on this subject on Thursday last. But verbal assurances, or memoranda of conversations, would not do. The instructions under which the ministers acted required the pledge to be in writing, and properly signed. The then President, present Senator from Texas, who had been a lawyer in Tennessee before he went to Texas, seemed to look upon it as a case under the statute of frauds and perjuries-a sixth case added to the five enumerated in that statute-in which the promise is not valid, unless reduced to writing, and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by some other person duly authorized by him to sign for him. The firmness of the Texan Ministers, under the instructions of President Houston, prevailed; and at last, and after long delay, the Secretary wrote, and signed the pledge which Murphy had given, and in all the amplitude of his original promise. That letter was dated on the 11th day of April, 1844, and was in these words:

"GENTLEMEN: The letter addressed by Mr. Van Zandt to the late Secretary of State, Mr. Upshur, to which you have called my attention, dated Washington, 17th January, 1844, has been laid before the President of the United States.

"In reply to it, I am directed by the President to say that the Secretary of the Navy has been instructed to order a strong naval force to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico, to meet any emergency; and that similar orders have been issued by the Secretary of War, to move the disposable military forces on our south-western frontier, for the same

pendency of the treaty of annexation, he would deem it his duty to use all the means placed within his power by the constitution to protect Texas from all foreign invasion. I have the honor to be, &c."

Mr.

This is the answer given by Mr. Secretary Calhoun to the demand; and, although a little delphic in its specification of the emergencies and the exigencies in which our forces were to fight the Mexicans, yet, taken in connection with the terms of the letter to which it was an answer, and to which it refers, it is sufficiently explicit to show that it is a clear and absolute promise to do the thing which Murphy had promised, and which President Tyler, through fused to do, because it involved a violation of the Attorney-General, (Mr. Nelson,) had rethe Constitution of the United States. The promise was clear and explicit to lend the army and navy to the President of Texas, to fight the Mexicans while they were at peace with us. That was the point-at peace with us. Calhoun's assumpsit was clear and explicit to that point; for the cases in which they were to fight were to be before the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, and consequently before Texas should be in our Union, and could be constitutionally defended as a part of it. And, that no circumstance of contradiction or folly should be wanting to crown this plot of crime and imbecility, it so happened, that on the same day that our new Secretary here was giving his written assumpsit to lend the army and navy to fight Mexico while we were at peace with her, the agent Murphy was communicating to the Texan Government, in Texas, the refusal of Mr. Tyler, through Mr. Nelson, to do so, because of its unconstitutionality. Here is the letter of Mr. Murphy:

"SIR: The undersigned, chargé d'affaires of the United States near the Government of the republic of Texas, has the honor of informing Mr. Jones, that whilst his Government approves of the general tone and tenor of his intercourse with the Government of the republic of Texas, a regret is felt in perceiving that his zeal for the accomplishment of objects alike beneficial and interesting to both countries, had led him beyond the strict line of his instructions; that the President of the United States considers himself restrained by the constitu tion of the Union, from the employment of the army and navy against a foreign power with whom the United States are at peace; and that whilst the President of the United States is not indisposed, as a measure of prudent precaution, and as preliminary to the proposed negotiation, to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico and on the southern borders of the United States a sufficient naval and military force, to be directed to the defence of the inhabitants and territory of Texas at a proper time, he is unwilling that the authorities of Texas should apprehend that he has power to employ this force at the period indicated in my note to you of the 14th of February last."