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The following speech of the Hon. John C. | tionable right to prescribe the qualifications Calhoun, of South Carolina, was delivered in of voters, as proposed by the Senator from the Senate of the United States, April 2, 1836, on the motion of Senator Porter, of Louisiana, to recommit the bill to establish the Northern boundary of Ohio, and for the admission of Michigan into the Union.

The speech will be found in vol. 2d of the Works of Mr. Calhoun, page 496 to 559.

Mr. Calhoun said:

I regret that my colleague has thought proper to raise the question, whether a state has a right to make an alien a citizen of the state. The question is one of great magnitude-presented for the first time, and claiming a more full and deliberate consideration than can be bestowed on it now. It is not necessarily involved in the present question. The point now at issue is, not whether a state or territory has a right to make an alien a citizen, but whether Congress has a right to prescribe the qualifications of the voters for members of the convention to form a constitution, preparatory to the admission of a territory into the Union. I presume that even my colleague will not deny that Congress has the right. The Constitution confers on Congress the power to govern the territories, and, of course, to prescribe the qualifications of voters within them-without any restriction-unless, indeed, such as the ordinance and Constitution may enforce a power that expires only when a territory becomes a state.

The practice of the government has been in conformity with these views; and there is not an instance of the admission of a territory into the Union, in which Congress has not prescribed the qualifications of the voters for members of the state, on its admission. The power which Congress has thus invariably exercised, we claim to exercise on the present occasion, by prescribing who shall be the voters to form the constitution for the government of Michigan, when admitted into the Union. Michigan is not yet a state. Her constitution is not yet formed. It is, at best, but in an incipient state, which can only be consummated by complying with the constitution which we may prescribe for her admission. A convention is to be called, under this bill, to agree to these conditions. On motion of the Senator from New York (Mr. Wright), a provision was introduced into the bill, giving the right to the people of the territory at large-without limitation or restriction, as to age, sex, color, or citizenship-to

Kentucky, and that the exercise of such right does not involve, in any degree, the question whether a state has a right to confer on an alien the rights of citizenship, I must repeat the expression of my regret, that my colleague has felt it to be his duty to raise a question so novel and important, when we have so little leisure for bestowing on it the attention which it deserves. But, since he considers its decision as necessarily involved in the question before us, I feel it to be my duty to state the reasons why I cannot concur with him in opinion.

I do not deem it necessary to follow my colleague and the Senator from Kentucky, in their attempt to define or describe a citizen. Nothing is more difficult than the definition, or even description, of so complex an idea; and hence all arguments resting on one definition, in such cases, almost necessarily lead to uncertainty and doubt. But though we may not be able to say, with precision, what a citi zen is, we may say with the utmost certainty, what he is not. He is not an alien. Alien and citizen are correlative terms, and stand in contradistinction to each other. They, of course, cannot coexist. They are, in fact, so opposite in their nature, that we conceive of the one but in contradistinction to the other. Thus far all must be agreed. My next step is not less certain.

The Constitution confers on Congress the authority to pass uniform laws of naturaliza tion. This will not be questioned; nor will it be, that the effect of naturalization is to remove alienage. I am not certain that the word is a legitimate one.

(Mr. Preston said, in a low tone, it was.) My colleague says it is. His authority is high on such questions, and with it, I feel myself at liberty to use the word. To remove alienage is simply to put the foreigner in the condition of a native-born. To this extent the act of naturalization goes, and no further.

The next position I assume is no less certain: that when Congress has exercised its authority, by passing a uniform law of naturalization (as it has), it excludes the right of exercising a similar authority on the part of the state. To suppose that the states could pass naturalization acts of their own, after Congress had passed an uniform law of naturalization, would be to make the provision of the Constitution nugatory. I do not deem it necessary to dwell on this point, as I understood my colleague as acquiescing in its cor

rectness.

vote for the members of the convention. The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay), while the I am now prepared to decide the question amendment of the Senator from New York which my colleague has raised. I have shown was pending, moved to amend the amend- that a citizen is not an alien, and that alienment by striking out people, and inserting age is an inseparable barrier, till removed, to free white citizens of twenty-one years of age, citizenship; and that it can only be removed thus restricting the voters to the free white by complying with the act of Congress. It citizens of the United States, in conformity follows, of course, that a state cannot, of its with what has been usual on such occasions. own authority, make an alien a citizen withBelieving that Congress had the unques-out such compliance. To suppose it can, in

aliens, and it will follow, as a necessary conse quence, that we might have among our constituents persons who have not the right tc claim the protection of the government, or to league if he would willingly bear the relation of representative to those who could not claim his aid, as Senator, to protect them from oppression, or to present à petition through hin to the Senate, praying for a redress of grievance? And yet such might be his condition on the principle for which he contends.

volves, in my opinion, a confusion of ideas, which must lead to innumerable absurdities and contradictions. I propose to notice but a few. In fact, the discussion has come on so unexpectedly, and has been urged on so pre-present a petition to it. I would ask my col cipitately, through the force of party discipline, that little leisure has been afforded to trace to their consequence the many novel and dangerous principles involved in the bill. I, in particular, have not had due time for reflection, which I exceedingly regret. Attendance on the sick-bed of a friend drew off my attention till yesterday, when, for the first But a still greater difficulty remains. Suptime, I turned my thoughts on its provisions. pose a war should be declared between the The numerous objections which it presented, United States and the country to which the and the many and important amendments alien belongs-suppose, for instance, that South which were moved to correct them, in rapid suc- Carolina should confer the right to vote on cession, until a late hour of the night, allowed alien subjects of Great Britain residing within but little time for reflection. Seeing that the her limits, and that war should be declared majority had pre-determined to pass the bill, between the two countries; what, in such with all its faults, I retired, when I found my event, would be the condition of that portion presence could no longer be of any service, of our voters? They, as alien enemies, would and remained ignorant that the Senate had be liable to be seized under the laws of Conrescinded the order to adjourn over till Mon- gress, and to have their goods confiscated, and day, until a short time before its meeting this themselves imprisoned, or sent out of the counmorning; so that I came here wholly unpre- try. The principle that leads to such conse pared to discuss this and the other important quences cannot be true; and I venture nothquestions involved in the bill. Under such ing in asserting that Carolina, at least, will circumstances, it must not be supposed that, never give it her sanction. She never will in pointing out the few instances of what ap- assent to incorporate, as members of her body pear to me the absurdities and contradic-politic, those who might be placed in so detions necessarily resulting from the principle graded a condition, and so completely under against which I contend, there are not many the control of the general government. But others equally striking. I but suggest those which first occurred to me.

let us pass from these (as it appears to me conclusive) views, and inquire what were the Whatever difference of opinion there may objects of the Constitution in conferring on be as to what other rights appertain to a citi-Congress the authority of passing uniform zen, all must at least agree that he has the laws of naturalization-from which, if I misright to petition, and also to claim the protec- take not, arguments not less conclusive may tion of his government. These belong to him be drawn in support of the position for which as a member of the body politic, and the pos- I contend. session of them is what separates citizens of In conferring this power the framers of the the lowest condition from aliens and slaves. Constitution must have had two objects in To suppose that a state can make an alien a view: One to prevent competition between the citizen of the state-or, to present the ques-states in holding out inducements for the emi tion more specially, can confer on him the right of voting-would involve the absurdity of giving him a direct and immediate control over the action of the general government, from which he has no right to claim the protection, and to which he has no right to present a petition. That the full force of the absurdity may be felt, it must be borne in mind that every department of the general government is either directly or indirectly under the control of the voters in the several states. The Constitution wisely provides that the voters for the most numerous branch of the legislature in the several states, shall vote for the members of the House of Representatives-and, as the members of this body are chosen by the legislatures of the states, and the Presidential electors either by the legislatures or voters in the several states, it follows, as I have stated, that the action of the general government is either directly or indirectly under the control of the voters in the several states. Now, admit that a state may confer the right of voting on all

gration of foreigners, and the other to prevent their improper influence over the general gov ernment, through such states as might naturalize foreigners, and could confer on them the right of exercising an elective franchise, before they could be sufficiently informed of the nature of our institutions, or were interested in their preservation. Both of these objects would be defeated, if the states may confer on aliens the right of voting and the other privileges belonging to citizens. On that supposition, it would be almost impossible to conceive what good could be obtained or evil prevented by conferring the power on Congress. The power would be perfectly nugatory. A state might hold out every improper inducement to emigration as freely as if the power did not exist; and might confer on the alien all the political rights and privileges be longing to a native-born citizen; not only to the great injury of the state, but to an improper control of the government of the Union. To illustrate what I have said-suppose the

passing uniform laws of naturalization, or, as I have shown, simply to remove alienage. To this extent it may clearly go under the Constitution; and it is no less clear that it cannot go an inch beyond without palpably transcending its powers, and violating the Constitution. Every other privilege, except those which ne cessarily flow from the removal of alienage, must be conferred by the Constitution and the authority of the state. My remarks are, of course, confined to the states; for within the territories the authority of Congress is as complete in this respect as that of the states within their respective limits, with the exception of such limitations as the ordinance to which I have referred may impose.

dominant party in New York, finding politi- Congress the right of prescribing who should cal power about to depart from them, should, or should not be entitled to vote in the state, to maintain their ascendancy, extend the right and exercise the other privileges belonging to of suffrage to the thousands of aliens of every citizens; and portrayed in strong language language and from every portion of the world, the danger to the rights of states from such that annually pour into her great emporium-authority. If his views are correct in this how deeply might the destiny of the whole respect, the danger would indeed be imminent, Union be affected by such a measure! It might but I cannot concur in their correctness. Unin fact, place the control over the general gov-der the view which I have taken, the authority ernment in the hands of those who know of Congress is limited to the simple point of nothing of our institutions and are indifferent as to the interests of the country. New York gives about one-sixth of the electoral votes in the choice of President and Vice President; and it is well known that her political institutions keep the state nearly equally divided into two great political parties. The addition of a few thousand votes either way might turn the scale, and the electors might, in fact, owe their election, on the supposition, to the votes of unnaturalized foreigners. The Presidential election might depend on the electoral vote of the state, and a President be chosen in reality by them; that is, they might give us a king, for, under the usurpations of the present chief magistrate, the President is in fact a king. I ask my colleague if we ought wil- But to pass to the question immediately belingly to yield our assent to a principle that fore us. This, as I have stated, does not involve would lead to such results, and if there be any the question whether a state can make an danger on the side for which I contend, com- alien a citizen; but whether Congress has a parable to those which I have stated? I know right to prescribe the qualifications to be pos how sincere he is in the truth of the position sessed by those who shall vote for members of for which he contends, and that his opinion a convention to form a constitution for Michiwas founded anterior to this discussion. We gan. Reason and precedent concur that Conhave rarely differed in our views on the ques- gress has the right. It has, as I have stated, tions which have come before the Senate; and been exercised in every similar case. If the I deeply regret, as I am sure he does, that we right does not exist in Congress, it exists noshould differ on this highly important sub-where. A territory, until it becomes a state, ject. * is a dependent community, and possesses no My colleague cites the example of Louisi-political rights but what are derived from the ana, which was admitted into the Union without requiring the inhabitants, at the time, to conform to the act of naturalization. I must think the instance is not in point. That was the case of the incorporation of a foreign community, which had been acquired by treaty, as a member of our confederacy. At the time of the acquisition they were subjects of France, and owed allegiance to that government. The treaty transferred their allegiance to the United States; and the difficulty of incorporating Louisiana into the Union arose, not under the act of naturalization, but the right of acquiring foreign possessions by purchase, and the right of incorporating such possessions into the Union. These were felt, at the time, to be questions of great difficulty. Mr. Jefferson himself, under whose administration the purchase was made, doubted the right, and suggested the necessity of an alteration of the Constitution to meet the case; and if the example of the admission is now to be used to establish the principle that a state may confer citizenship on an alien, we may all live to regret that the Constitution was not amended according to the suggestion.

*

My colleague insists that to deny the right for which he contends, would be to confer on

community on which it depends. Who shall or shall not exercise political power? and what shall be the qualifications possessed by them? and how shall they be appointed? are all questions to be determined by the paramount community; and in the case under consideration, to be determined by Congress, which has the right under the Constitution, to prescribe all necessary rules for the government of the territories not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. This very bill, in fact, admits the right. It prescribes that the people of Michigan shall vote for the convention to form her constitution on becoming a state. If it belongs to the territory of Michigan (she is not yet a state) to determine who shall vote for the members of the convention, this attempt on our part to designate who shall be the voters would be an unconstitutional interference with her right, and ought to be objected to, as such, by those opposed to our views.

But if, on the other hand, the view I take be correct, that the right belongs to Congress, and not to the territory, the loose, vague, and indefinite manner in which the voters are described in the bill affords a decisive reason for its recommitment. I ask, who are the people

of Michigan? Taken in the ordinary sense, it means everybody, of every age, of every sex, of every complexion, white, black, or red, aliens as well as citizens. Regarded in this light, to pass this bill would sanction the principle that Congress may authorize an alien to vote, or confer that high privilege on the runaway slaves from Kentucky, Virginia, or else where; and thus elevate them to the condition of citizens, enjoying under the constitution all the rights and privileges in the states of the Union which appertain to citizenship. But my colleague says that this must be acquiesced in, if such should be the case, as it results from the principles of the constitution. I know we are bound to submit to whatever are the provisions of that instrument; but surely my colleague will agree with me, that the danger of such a precedent would be great; that the principles on which it is justified ought to be clear and free from all doubt; and I trust I have, at least, shown that such is not the fact in this case.

But, we are told that the people of Michigan means, in this case, the qualified voters. Why, then, was it not so expressed? Why was vague and general language used, when more certain and precise terms might have been employed? But, I would ask, who are the qualified voters? Are they those authorized to vote under the existing laws established for the government of the territory, or are they those who, under the instrument called the constitution, are authorized to vote? Why leave so essential a point in so uncertain a condition, when we have the power to remove the uncertainty? If it be meant by the people of Michigan, the qualified voters under her incipient constitution (as stated by the Senator from New York), then are we sanctioning the rights of aliens to vote. Michigan has attempted to confer this right on that portion of her inhabitants. She has no authority to confer such right under the constitution. I have conclusively shown that a state does not possess it-much less a territory, which possesses no power except such as is conferred by Congress. Congress has conferred no such power on Michigan--nor, indeed, could confer it-as it has no authority, under the Constitution, over the subject, except to pass uniform laws of naturalization.

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 6TH AND 11TH, 1858, ON THE QUESTION OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE, AS ALLOWED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MINNE

SOTA.

Mr. WILLIAM SMITH, of Virginia, said: What is requisite to give a foreigner the right of suffrage? He must make his declaration; he must be five years in the country, and that must be proved by two citizens of the United States; he must show himself to be a man of

probity and good demeanor, and to have borne an unquestionable character; he must show that he is acquainted with our institutions, and attached to the principles of our Government. Suppose that the foreigner should ask to be naturalized, and should fail in any of these requisites, can he acquire the right of citizenship? Suppose that he turns out to be a man of bad character; suppose it is notorious that he is anything but friendly to our free institutions; suppose, instead of showing he is attached to the principles of our Government, that it is shown that he is still a monarchist: he cannot acquire the rights of naturalization; and thus it is, sir, he may be rejected in the very last moment, after having been five years in the country, and when he appears in court to perfect his right to citizenship. Congress, then, does not lose its hold of him until the last hour: and, until he becomes an American citizen, the State has no power to confer upon him the rights of suffrage in any Federal election. I think that this is one of those propositions which cannot be controverted; and I think that, as Congress controls him until all the conditions required by the naturalization laws are fully complied with, it is conclusive evidence that the State has no power to confer upon him any political right under the Federal Constitution whatever.

It is said, in this connection, that the States have always exercised this power. That was said by some gentlemen who have preceded me in this debate. Allow me to say, that I think that is a great mistake. You know that this subject anxiously engaged the attention of those who preceded us; and without dwelling upon it, I beg leave to call the attention of the House to what, in debating the naturalization laws in 1795, Mr. Gallatin said. The question came up in connection with the right of suffrage in his own State. There were many persons naturalized under the State law who were excluded from all the rights of United States citizenship. I get what I extract from Gales & Seaton's Annals:

"Mr. GALLATIN wished to know whether the provisions of this act are intended to extend to persons who were in the country previous to the passing of the law of January, 1795, which requires a residence of five years before an alien can become a citizen, but who have neglected to become citizens, as well as to all those aliens who have come to this country since January, 1795 ?

66

Again, he said, one reason which led him to mention this circumstance was, that there are a great number of persons in the state of Pennsylvania, and many in the district from whence he came, who, though they are not citizens of the United States, really believe they are. This mistake has arisen from (an error common to most of the districts of the United States) a belief that an alien's being naturalized by the laws of a state government, since the act of 1790, made him a citizen of

the United States. He always thought that construction to be wrong, Congress having the power to pass, and having passed, a uniform naturalization law, which, in his opinion, excluded the idea of admission to citizenship on different terms by the individual states. But he knew the contrary opinion, till lately, generally prevailed. Indeed, he knew that at the late election in that city, the votes of respectable merchants, who had obtained American registers for their vessels, on a presumption of their being citizens, were refused on this ground. The same mistake had extended to other parts of the Union.

"Mr. G. supposed that since the year 1790, from ten to fifteen thousand emigrants had come into the state of Pennsylvania, twothirds of whom believed, till lately, that they were citizens of the United States, from their having been naturalized by the laws of that state. It has now been discovered that they are not citizens; but since that discovery was made, they have not had an opportunity of being admitted according to the law of the United States."

Here you see, in reference to naturalization under State laws, Mr. Gallatin concedes that those thus naturalized were not citizens, and that consequently the right of suffrage should be denied them. He himself was of foreign birth, and of course interested in the question, and would not hastily have decided as he did. Mr. BLISS. Will the gentleman yield to me for a moment?

Mr. SMITH, of Virginia. Certainly.

Mr. BLISS. I rise simply for the purpose of asking the gentleman from Virginia to give us, if he has the act before him, the language of the Pennsylvania statute upon that subject.

Mr. SMITH, of Virginia. I have it not. I have read from the debate of 1795.

Mr. BLISS. I asked the question because I did not know exactly what that statute was. Mr. SMITH, of Virginia. The debate was upon the subject of naturalization.

Mr. BLISS. The question is this: whether the Pennsylvania statute, to which the gentleman refers, conferred the elective franchise, or undertook to naturalize generally?

Mr REAGAN. I desire to say a word upon the point on which the gentleman from Ohio has interrupted the gentleman from Virginia. I will call the attention of the gentleman from Virginia to the fact that, by an early decision of the courts of Pennsylvania, it was held that a State had concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government in the matter of the naturalization of foreigners; and to the debate growing out of that matter, I apprehend that the clause which the gentleman read referred. It did not relate to the question of the right of a citizen to vote, but related alone to the power to naturalize.

Mr. SMITH, of Virginia. What is naturalization? It is the giving to foreigners rights

which they did not previously possess, and among them the right to vote. Did the Pennsylvania law confer that right? If it be the decision of a statute, I care not; but did the Pennsylvania law give that right. The answer is at hand. Says Mr. Gallatin:

"Indeed, we know that, in the late election in this city, the votes of respectable merchants, who had obtained American registers for their vessels on a presumption of their being citizens, were refused on this ground. The same mistake had extended to other parts of the Union."

On what ground were they refused the right of suffrage? Gentlemen talk about this Pennsylvania law not conferring the right of suffrage; and yet here it is expressly said that it did confer the right of suffrage, and these men sought to exercise that right under the Pennsylvania naturalization law. I may not understand it; but here it is, and "he who runs may read." If a man who came forward to vote under the provisions of that law, was excluded, he was excluded upon the ground that he was not a citizen of the United States; and if he was permitted to vote, it would be upon the presumption that he was a citizen of the United States; and I undertake to say, and I have no doubt such will be the fact, that this Pennsylvania law was passed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. It was, no doubt, the old Pennsylvania Constitution regulating this question, which was superseded, as was decided in a case in the State of Maryland, by the adoption of the Federal Constitution. That will no doubt be found to be the state of things, and those respectable merchants were denied the right of suffrage, though located permanently in the country, because they were not citizens of the United States, and not because of any other provision, citizenship being the funda mental condition to the exercise of this high attribute of popular sovereignty. I think it will be found that this is the clew to the subject.

But without dwelling at large upon this subject, let me proceed. In a case which came directly before the Supreme Court of the United States, as reported in second Wheaton, the court went into a discussion of the question of property, and they superseded the law of the State of Maryland, and gave the property a different direction from what it would have taken if the party claiming it had been a citizen of the United States. And why? Because it was the purpose of the founders of the Republic to confine the right of suffrage, that great fundamental political right of popular liberty, to those who were citizens of the United States, whether native or foreign born.

I will now proceed to call the attention of the House to the sentiments of our fathers.Gentlemen have extraordinary notions upon this subject. They have the notion that anybody who comes here is at once entitled to par

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