not only incompetent to interchange reciprocities with the American States, but likewise her own situation in America will at all times render her extremely jealous of her neighbours. The only activity which Spain has exerted in the war, has been to procure a barrier against the American States, by annexing West Florida to her former acs quisition of New Orleans; thereby embracing the mouth of the Mississipi, and by means of that river jointly with her landed possessions, establishing a strong and jealous boundary against any future progress of the American States in those parts Spain therefore cannot be looked upon by the American States as a suitable object of their election to become a permanent ally and friend to them Portugal likewise labors under all the disabilities of language, manners, monopolies, government, and system of commerce. Her national power and importance would be likewise insufficient to constitute a strong and perma+ nent ally to the American States. All these nations will undoubtedly be found to have many commodious qualities for participation in commerce, but the preeminent faculties necessary to constitute a firm and permanent ally to the American States will be found deficient in them.

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As to the Italian States, or any other powers in the Mediterranean, they are certainly not adequate to any competition of political alliance with the rising States of America. They will also form very commodious links and connexions in the general circuit of commerce, but beyond these considerations they have no share in the present question. The several States of the Germanic body are in the same predicament.ied a

As to the Northern powers, viz. those in the Baltic,

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they are not favored either by vicinity or climate, for a frequent or facile intercourse of commerce with America. And even respecting several material articles of commerce, jealousies and competitions might arise. As to political alliances, there are no such in prospect from them to the American States, even if there were any superfluity of force in any of them, beyond the necessities of their respective domestic situations. The extreme distance would be conclusive against any possible applica tion of such power as a political alliance favorable to the establishment and confirmation of the American States.

The only maritime State on the continent of Europe remaining to be discussed as a competent candidate for commerce or connexion with America, is the republic of the United Netherlands, conimonly called Holland. In respect to American commerce, the Dutch have among themselves every facility combined, which the separate States of Europe possess distinctively in their own concerns, or nearly. Their industry, frugality, and habits of commerce may even carry them so far as to make them rivals to the Americans themselves, in the transportation of European merchandise to America. These faculties of commerce would have been of infinite importance to the American States, if the war had continued between Great Britain and them. But upon the event of peace it becomes a matter of the most perfect indifference to America, whether each European State navigates its own commerce into the ports of America, which will be open to all, or whether the commercial faculties of Holland enable her to exceed in rivalship her Furopean neighbours, and thereby to navigate European goods to America beyond the proportion of her national share. The faculties of

a nation of carriers may be fortunate for the marine of that nation, but considered in themselves, and with res pect to other nations, they are but secondaries in commerce. They give no ground of reciprocities, or participation. That one nation should say to another, You shall navigate all our rivers, harbours, lakes, ports, and places, if we may do the same in yours, is a proposition of reciprocity, but that Holland should say to America, We will bring European goods to you, or you may be your own carriers, is neither concession nor reciprocity. Holland is not a nation of rivers, harbours, lakes, ports, and places, for the distribution of goods and manufactures for internal consumption, and therefore her reciprocities must be very scanty. Holland is the market place of Europe, and the Dutch seamen are the carriers appertaining to that market place. The admission of American ships to that market place, freely to import and to export, is undoubtedly an act of reciprocity on the part of Holland, as far as it goes, but in no degree adequate to the unlimited participation of American commerce, throughout all the rivers, harbours, lakes, ports, and places of that vast continent. The commercial reciprocities of Holland therefore being inferior on her part towards America, the next point of view, in which Holland is to be considered, as relevant to this question, is as a nation of power, capa ble of becoming an effectual and permanent ally and guarantee to the American States; for that is the great object, which America, as a wise nation, recently arisen into independence, ought to keep in view. Holland has certainly been a nation of great and celebrated naval force. She remains so still, but having for many years suspended her exertions of force, and having directed the faculties of

her people into the commercial line, she seems not to have any superfluity of force beyond the necessity of providing for her own security, and certainly no such redundance of power as to extend to the protection of distant nations as allies, or guarantees. It appears therefore upon the whole of this argument, that Holland, although a commercial nation, cannot even interchange commercial reciprocities with America, upon an equal footing, and that her faculties of force are înadequate to those which America ought to expect in the permanent allies and guarantees of her country.

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The independence of the American States being established, their first consideration ought to be, to determine with what friendships and alliances they will enter into the new world of nations. They will look round them, and cast about for some natural permanent and powerful ally, with whom they may interchange all cementing reciprocities, both commercial and political. If such an ally be to be found any where for them, it is still in Great Britain; at least it is certain that, in looking round Europe, no other is to be found. There is no inherent impossibility to prevent such a connexion from taking place, it must depend upon the free will and common interest of the parties. There are all possible faculties on both sides to give and to receive all adequate and beneficial reciprocities, which are practicable, and more likely to be permanent between independent parties, than between two parties of which one is dependent on the other. Great Britain is undoubtedly the first of European nations in riches, credit, faculties, industry, commerce, manufactures, internal consumption and foreign export, together with civil liberty, which is the source of

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all, and naval power, which is the support of all. The dominions appertaining to the crown of Great Britain are large and fertile, its colonies still extensive and in close vicinity to the American States; Great Britain being an American as well as an European power, and all her empire connected by her naval force. 120

The territories of the American States, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mississippi, contain an inexhaustible source of riches, industry, and future power. These will be the foundation of great events in the new page of life. Infinite good or infinite evil may arise according to the principles upon which the intercourse between Great Britain and America shall be arranged in its foundation. Great Britain and America must be still inseparable, either as friends or foes. This is an awful and important truth.. These are considerations not to be thought of slightly, not to be prejudged in passion, nor the arrangements of them to be hastily foreclosed. Time given for consideration may have excellent effects on both sides. The pause of peace, with friendly intercourse, returning affection and dispassionate inquiry, can alone decide these important events, or do justice to the anxious expectations of Great Britain and America.

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HENRY LAURENS, ESQ. TO THE AMERICAN MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY.

I had the honor of addressing you the 10th, immediately after my landing at Dover. As early as possible after my arrival here I obtained an interview with Mr. Secretary Fox, who was pleased to read to me part of his latest dispatches to Mr. Hartley, which he supposed