Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy
Oxford University Press, 1982 - 432 էջ
When Strategies of Containment was first published, the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Ronald Reagan was president of the United States, and the Berlin Wall was still standing. This updated edition of Gaddis' classic carries the history of containment through the end of the Cold War.
Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt's postwar plans, Gaddis provides a thorough critical analysis of George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment, NSC-68, The Eisenhower-Dulles New Look, the Kennedy-Johnson flexible response strategy, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente, and now a
comprehensive assessment of how Reagan-- and Gorbachev-- completed the process of containment, thereby bringing the Cold War to an end.
He concludes, provocatively, that Reagan more effectively than any other Cold War president drew upon the strengths of both approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. A must-read for anyone interested in Cold War history, grand strategy, and the origins of the post-Cold War world.
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LibraryThing ReviewՀաճախորդի կարծիքը - chellinsky - LibraryThing
This exceedingly dense book recounts the Cold War policies of the United States from Truman through Reagan. This is one of the better history book I have read as it refuses to repeat the same themes ... Read full review
Prologue Containment Before Kennan
George F Kennan and the Strategy of Containment
NSC68 and the Korean War
Eisenhower Dulles and the New Look
Implementing the New Look
Kennedy Johnson and Flexible Response
Implementing Flexible Response Vietnam as a Test Case
Nixon Kissinger and Détente
Epilogue Containment after Kissinger
Acheson action administration affairs allies American appeared approach areas August balance become China Chinese commitment communism communist concept conference containment continued costs course danger December decision defense Department Diary differences difficulty Dulles early economic effect effort Eisenhower Europe existing fact February File forces Foreign Policy Henry Kissinger ibid idea important increase initiative interests involved January John Johnson July June Kennan Kennedy Kissinger later less limited major March means meeting memorandum military Moscow National Security necessary negotiations never Nixon noted November nuclear objective October peace Planning political position possible President problem question reason regard relations response result Rostow Russians Secretary Senate September situation Soviet Union speech Staff strategy strength thought threat tion Truman United Vietnam Washington weapons West Western White House York