chapter, it is now so fixed in the mind that it serves as a mental guide without the visible form-that is, at least, in its complete state-and its capability of dissection and modification is so great that almost

any part or amount may be used without the actual presence of the others, or modifications of them. Its parts are simply geometric forms, which can be varied or augmented indefinitely.

A

FEW weeks ago when reading Mr. James Martineau's essay on Comte's philosophy, I met with several remarks contradictory to what I consider and understand to be the doctrines of Phrenology, upon which, with your permission, I desire to offer a few short comments, leaving the many readers of the JOURNAL to judge of their value.

In the first volume of the essays alluded to, on pages 32 and 33, Mr. Martineau says, "Comte's repudiation of all reflective knowledge is due chiefly to his acceptance of Phrenology, a system which has always taken an infatuated pleasure in knocking out its own brains by denying ab initio the validity of that self-knowledge on which all its own evidence directly or indirectly depends. The arguments on which Comte relies in his criticism on the psychologists are the stock objections of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, namely, that the mind observing and the mind observed being the same, the alleged fact must be gone and out of reach before it is looked at; that a mental state is not a whole fact, but only a part or function of a fact, being as much an outcoming of some cerebral state as the feeling of indigestion is the sensational side of deranged action in the stomach, and that the psychologists have never found anything

out."

On page 34 Mr. Martineau says, "It is not to the discoveries but to the fictions of Phrenology that intellectual philosophy objects, nor can any one familiar with the writings of Descartes and Locke, of Spinoza and Berkley, of Reade, Mill, and Hamilton, deny its habitual eagerness to use to the utmost the results placed at its disposal by the zeal of the anatomist."

On page 40, he further says, "The logical doctrine of Aristotle, the modern theory of vision, the ascertaining of laws of association and abstraction, Butler's exposition of the moral constitution of man, deserve to be ranked among positive achievements of a high order, and are recognized as such by the vast majority of competent judges on this point."

In the first place, sir, we need not concern ourselves with what Mr. Martineau affirms Comte did in respect to Phrenology and reflective knowledge, unless his reception of the doctrines of Phrenology was reasonably the cause of his repudiation of reflective knowledge and was the natural result. We simply have to inquire what the phrenologists themselves have done, and also what Mr. Martineau says they have done; and in directing our attention to these points we must suppose the language used by the essayist as either metaphysical or metaphorical. But whichever way it is considered, it places the phrenologists in a position they never sought, and, indeed, never occupied, for they themselves have not denied the validity of reflective knowledge, so far as I am aware. I can not point to any passage in the writings of the founders of the science where they deny what Mr. Martineau affirms and assumes they do, and which he calls one of their stock objections. In reality the reverse of his statement would be more true; for in determining the functions of some of the organs, self-knowledge, or reflection upon states of the mind and consciousness, have lent a powerful aid in confirming the results of observation. is, therefore, untrue to say that Phrenology "has always taken an infatuated pleasure in knocking out its own brains." But, on the contrary, it is true that it has by obser

It

vation established that the brain constitutes the organ of the mind, and has also demonstrated its functions by incontrovertible evidence, and has also succeeded in correcting

to the discoveries but to the fictions of Phrenology that intellectual philosophy objects," etc., we ask, where are the fictions, and where is the consistency of saying, with

With respect to what Mr. Martineau calls the "stock objections of Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe," I have never seen them stated in anything like the language he applies to them, nor do they appear anywhere in the works of Mr. Combe, to the best of my knowledge.

It is highly probable that the early phrenologists have not denied that a mental state is "the outcoming of some cerebral state," and we should like to be informed of any well-known objection to this doctrine, which has been many times verified where the brain has been exposed to view. The tenor of Mr. Martineau's language indicates that he denies a mental state to be a cerebral state, or the "outcoming" of that state. We should like to know what he would term it.

Phrenologists do not positively affirm that "psychologists have never found anything out." If Mr. Martineau means by "psychologists" the metaphysicians, we are at a loss to know where, in the writings of Mr. Combe, he uses the word "psychologist?" It seems, however, that Mr. Martineau has substituted the word "psychologist" for "metaphysician," at least the reasonable inference points that way, as he speaks of Butler's exposition and the modern theory of vision as psychological achievements.

Phrenologists maintain that metaphysics based upon the reasoning of consciousness alone has, indeed, proved a barren field, and so long as it refuses the light of those truths which have illuminated the philosophy of mind and shown its consonance with the understanding, it will continue till doomsday vainly grasping after creations of the imagination.

Looking at the statement, "that it is not

cager "to use to the utmost the results placed at its disposal by the anatomist." The phrenologists would rather receive this apparent censure as a commendation than otherwise. But for all that appears in the statement to the contrary, Mr. Martineau may regard anatomy as a fiction of the phrenologists, at all events he speaks of it as if the phrenologists were wrong in using its results, or were at variance with themselves in doing so.

He is further inconsistent in confronting us with Mill and Hamilton, as both of them were measurably ignorant of Phrenology, the one having guessed that there might be a philosophy of mind, and the other stoutly denied ocular proof of the fundamental principles of the science. The question is not what Mill and Hamilton have said, but, Is Phrenology true? The phrenologist never denied the value of anatomy or its results, nor have Descartes and Locke, Spinoza, Berkley, Reade, Mill, and Hamilton any more rights to the results of the anatomist than Gall, Spurzheim, and Combe, if as just a claim to them.

The language of Mr. Martineau is exceedingly ambiguous and involved, but it is evident he is not more fortunate in the paragraph quoted from page 40 than in the preceding ones, and the question really is, are the logical doctrines of Aristotle, the modern theory of vision, and the laws of association and abstraction, and Butler's exposition true, or only partially correct, and at the same time antagonistic to the truths of Phrenology, or the doctrines of this science? What the majority of Mr. Martineau's competent judges have to say on the point does not establish their conclusions nor falsify those of the phrenologist on the subject referred to; nor do they prove the value of the deductions of the writers named as opposed in their disagreement to Phrenology.

If Phrenology had been as "guilty of the infatuated pleasure of knocking out its own

Twilight is there, and solemn, changeless calm;

Beauty is there, and tender, healing balmBalm with no root in earth, or air, or sea; Poised by the finger of God, it floateth free, And, as it treadeth the waves, the sound doth rise,

Hither shall come no further sacrifice; Never again the anguish clutch at life, Never again great Love and Death at strife. He who hath suffered all need fear no more, Quiet his portion now for evermore.

Mariner, what of the deep?

Hand doth hold out to hand not help alone, But the deep bliss of being fully known. There is no kindred like the kin of sorrow, There is no hope like theirs who fear no

morrow.

Mariner, what of the deep?

This of the deepThough we have traveled past the line of day, Glory of night doth light us on the way; Radiance that comes we know not how or whence,

Rainbows without the rain, past duller sense, Music of hidden reef and waves long past, Thunderous organ-tones from far-off blast, Harmony, victrice clothed in state sublime, Crouched on the wrecks begemmed with

pearls of time;

Never a wreck but brings some beauty here; Down where the waves are stilled, the sea shines clear;

Deeper than life, the plan of life doth lie.
He who knows all fears naught. Great death
shall die.
Sea and Shore.

R. CORNELIUS G. COMEGYS, lecturer on clinical medicine in the Cincinnati Hospital, delivered last autumn, before the Alumni Society of the medical department of the University of Pennsylvania, an address of great interest to every reflective mind. In this address he discusses the connection between the spiritual and physical parts of man, and shows how, in some respects, human character may be undermined and destroyed through ignorance, imprudence, or lack of discipline; how the brain may retain its normal power and become more powerful and efficient.

MIND.

From the somewhat full report published in the Tribune we extract the following specially pertinent passages:

"What the nature of the impact of the material and immaterial parts of us is we can not at all explain, but there are laws of correlation which we do know, and in the possession of these we are capable of exhibiting the results of their violation in the same way as those of other great organs of the body. The concerns of a State, so multiplied and so vast, are often under the guidance of a single individual, and history presents abundant testimony of the ruin of

people, otherwise prosperous and powerful, because of the indulgence of the ruler in licentiousness, tyranny, and an inappeasable thirst for conquest, whose character in the beginning exhibited self-denial, justice, and peace. Autocrats exist, also, in the general affairs of a people, exercising powers which are often nearly as large, for good or evil, as those possessed by him who sits upon a throne and rules an empire. We have seen in our time a fiscal autocrat, who assumed to control the movements of our business world; and a railroad king who undertook to bind the shores of our two oceans in his bonds of steel. In far less conspicuous instances large communities find themselves involved with an individual who has gradually risen from humble beginnings to a position of such supreme importance that his good or bad fortune involves them in his weal or woe. Such men possess, naturally, strong powers of mind, and slowly gain their lofty stations by industry, abstemiousness, the faithful discharge of all trusts; by the wisdom of their counsels and the display of constructive ability and general administrative powers. Thus beginning, full of capacity for great undertakings, they gain positions where they wield unusual power; and now their danger begins and the public peril.

"The brain is the material basis of the mind, and is subject to all the physiological and pathological laws of the other viscera. It has a great range of capacity as an organ. It needs a simple supply of blood for mere nutritive changes in its structure, but a much greater and momentary one when supporting mental actions. The vital chemistry must nowhere else have so free play as here. It must have rest, too; it becomes fatigued even by ordinary and unexciting uses; but when inordinately employed for excessive periods, the balance or nutritive changes is disturbed—it wears excessively and loses ability for the normal manifestation of mind. The mind is builded by the gradual formation of ideas, the material of which are derived from the senses, but shaped into concepts by an innate faculty. The accumulation and retention of these are the raw material of our

intelligence. These factors, great and small, are stored away in associate forms, and constitute our isolated judgments of things, more or less compound and complex. They are, also, inseparably connected with our emotions and moral and religious sentiments, which constantly guide us in the discharge of our duties. A man in a controlling position should be able to employ all these resources calmly and sagaciously. His sagacity for sound judgment and selfgovernment rests upon his control of his intellectual possessions and the due restraint of his affective nature which underlies them. He should have coolness for reflection, and ableness to compare and combine them for the study of propositions of great enterprise; and the emotion which accompanies intellection must be so restrained that it incite not to baleful ambition. Now, this due exercise of mind for our self-direction depends upon the integrity of that dominant faculty which distinguishes man from all other animals-I mean the will. Under this autonomy we possess powers for generalization, or abstraction of our conceptual stores; we can arrange and compare our notions, advance or restrain suggestions, eliminate or aggregate factors, suppress or stimulate emotion, and hold in check our baleful passions; but if this master-force be in abeyance we lose our autonomy, and become creatures of mere impulse-may not I say mere automata? All the fine powers for analysis or synthesis are shattered, and what remains of mind is a mere exhibition of 'association of ideas,' in forms more or less inco-ordinate. The treasures of knowledge are still held, but no longer coherent and under discipline; neither illusions nor delusions can be detected. Like a ship under full canvas, with no hand at the helm, filling, backing, moving ahead, but the voyage is a mere drift; or like a great army without an adequate commander to direct its march or its battles-weak and dangerous in its vastness.

"This supreme mental force is no transcendental entity to be considered apart from physical existence, but may be said, in its fullness, to be the correlative of the