embraces every opportunity of speaking to the commendation of the House of Huntly. After mentioning the generosity of the Earl in relieving the prisoners taken at the battle of Pinkie, the MS. records an anecdote descriptive of the attachment borne to that nobleman by his followers.

"And heir is worthie to be remembred the gret favor qlk ane certane of the said erlis friendis and gentill men to the number of ane hundreth or thairby bure towart him the time of his extremitie, and wald on no wyis leave him quha perceaving ye hoil army of Scotland to have gevin backis [at Pinkie] and gret slauchter maid on euerie pairt be ye Inglismen in the chase, and ye said erle being on fuit charged wt ane weichtie stand of harnes, quhairwt he had travelled so far on fuit yat he had no breath, and theairfoir gawe frome him his heid pece for fear that he should haif bene wt ye hatt y'of discomfitte. Quhilk moued one of his trustie gentill men called dauid dumbar to giue him his owin steill bonet qlk he pat on the erlis heid for his sauftye and remaned him self bairheidit. but suddentlie the said dauid for laik of the samin wes slayne be the straik of ane masse apoun the heid. The rest faucht stoutlie for sauftie of ye erle and slew syndrie of the Inglismen quha first did assailye thame, bot in ye end ye most pairt of theme all wer slayne, in the erlis presence be quhais defence his lyf was saufeit, or ellis he had gone the same way throw ye gret furie and rage qlk pntlie was vsed be ye inglismen."

The Scottish work is often more minute than the Latin in detailing the skirmishes and sieges during the warfare which followed the battle of Pinkie. For example, the defeat of the English in Fife by the Laird of Weems, which is referred to in p. 472 of the printed History, is very circumstantially described in the MS.

In relating the journey of the Queen Dowager to France, in 1551, the MS. gives an account of a conspiracy to poison the young Queen of Scots, which is not mentioned in the printed work, nor, as far as I recollect, in any of our histories.

"Quhill ye quene Regent was in france thair was ane treassonable practise devised & interprised to be execut for poysoning of the quene of scotland in france. qlk was tryed furt and reveled be ane scottisman callit James hendersoun at that tyme resident in Ingland be quhais advertisment the princepall auch (author?) callit stewart being ane archear (archer ?) of ye king of france gard quha had takin upon land (hand) to execut ye same was aprehendit in ye towne of blaisse in france and efter dyvers tor

mentis was hangit and quarterit for ye same."

To this may be added the following notice respecting a learned native of

Scotland.

66

arier and Lordis Thair came ane ye nobilitie During the tyme that ye Quene douof scotlande was in france* doctour phisitiane callit ramsay scottisman furt of turing in pyedmount to france being of gret aige and guid lerninge and experience quha seruit all the nobill men of scotland and thair hoill cumpanye wt sic things as was necessar for yame frelie apoun his awin charges moved onely for ye zeill he bure toward his countrey swa that he wald not suffer yame to cum onder ye cuir and medicine of strangers, in case thay my haif hapinit in sum onrecoverabill incōvenient ather be euill droggis or onlerned mixto yairof as hapinit to ye nobill men quha come to the mariage of the quene in france in the fiftie aught yeiris of god thaireftir."

There is a marked difference between the manner in which the Protestant opinions are spoken of in the Latin and in the Scottish work. We are at no loss to perceive that the author of the MS. is attached to the Roman Catholic religion; but he preserves far greater moderation on this topic in it than he has done in his printed history. To account for this, it is perhaps sufficient to recollect, that the former was written in Scotland or in England, whereas the latter was composed and printed at Rome, and dedicated to the Sovereign Pontiff. This circumstance may also serve, in part, to account for the different way in which the author has expressed himself in the two works, respecting the death of Queen Mary of England and the succession of Elizabeth. the printed history, after recording the deaths of great men, and the prodigies which prognosticated "the overthrow of every monument of religion in both kingdoms, by the audacity and fury of the heretics," the Bishop says, the 15th of the calends of December,' Mary Queen of England, a woman adorned with every virtue, and every way worthy to be admitted to divine bliss upon leaving this world, rendered her soul to God, to her great advantage, but to the unspeakable loss of the church. Upon this, Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry VIII. by Anne

In

"On

* The transcriber has here repeated some words and transposed others. The sentence should run thus: "During the tyme that the Quene Douarier and Lords of Scotlande was in France, thair came ane," &c.

Boleyn, assumed the government; and having induced many good men to believe that she was friendly to the Catholic religion, was consecrated with oil, and with the other ceremonies of the church, by the hands of Catholic bishops. But soon after, contrary to what was expected by many, she used every effort to overthrow the Catholic religion, and to establish the monstrous Luthero-Calvinian doctrine," &c. In the MS. the Bishop describes the same events in the following terms:

"About ye middis of the monethe of November Marie quene of Ingland partlie throuche gret maloncalie for the lose of calice and partlie throt cosumptione of seiknes endit hir lyf the xvij day of the same monethe and in hir place ane beutifull & verteous princes Lady Elizabethe was proclamed quene of Inglande quha Jvyses ye

same to thir daies."

I beg leave, in the first place, to say two words on the objection so often brought against the Philosophy of the Mind; and which, though not urged in the article under consideration, is discussed at some length in a former article, to which reference is made,— that it is of little or no practical utility. According to Mr Stewart's principles, the present would not seem to be an age in which this question can be brought to the test of experience. The minds of men are too much oc

If the writings of Mr Stewart be really entitled to the kind of approbation which is usually bestowed upon them in this part of the world, as being not merely the best metaphysical works of the present day, but almost the only works in which the true object of the Philosophy of the Human Mind is distinctly and accurately laid down, and the method of attaining it steadily and systematically pursued,—it may seem like doubting of the ultimate prevalence of truth over error, to betray any anxiety in regard to their fate, or to undertake their defence against any attacks to which they may be exposed.

The observations which follow, on some of the reasonings contained in the Review of his last work in the Quarterly Review, are not, however, stated with the hope either of strengthening his philosophy, or of converting his antagonists, but merely with the view of taking off, in some degree, the impression which so elaborate, and in some respects able, an article may have made on that portion of the public whom inclination or business prevent from taking more than a cursory view of metaphysical controverBies.

The animadversions on Mr Stewart's writings, contained in the ReVOL. II.

customed to strong interests;-metaphysicians are too busy in settling the foundations of their science, and defining its appropriate objects; erroneous ideas, on the last subject, have still too strong a hold of the public mind; metaphysical controversies, of no practical use, are in consequence too frequent; and the mode of inquiry, and kind of knowledge, in regard to the mind, on which Mr Stewart rests his hopes of the ultimate usefulness of the study, are too rare, to allow us the means of judging with confidence on the subject.

But I think it may be farther observed, on this point, that as the moving spring of philosophical inquiry is not the desire of happiness, but the principle of curiosity, so the first object of philosophy is not power, but knowledge. Every part of the works of nature, which it is in the power of the human understanding to explore, is an object of curiosity to the mind; and when it finds itself unable to gratify this desire, then the limits of the understanding themselves become an object of equal interest. In pursuing these objects, it is not to be expected, and it is surely still less to be wished, that the mind will ultimately be restrained by any consideration whatever, save only the consciousness of its own imperfection.

The interest which has in all ages been taken, not indeed by the bulk of H

mankind, but by thoughtful and contemplative men, in the Philosophy of the Mind, is at once a proof of the existence of a strong curiosity upon this subject, and a pledge for the disposition of future generations in regard to it; and whoever has really been instrumental, either in fixing the limits, or in extending the range, of this department of science, however much his labours may be obscured by the clouds of ancient prejudice, or neglected amid the splendour of passing events, acts under the assurance that the value of these labours will be duly appreciated by after ages, when the progress of time and of knowledge shall have brought them into view. The sublime sentiment of Kepler, I may well be an age without a reader, since God Almighty has been six thousand years without an observer like me-was uttered by almost the only individual of the human race who could utter it without unpardonable presumption; but enough of the spirit which dictated those words remains, to animate, in all time to come, the exertions of those philosophers who outstrip their contemporaries, and leave their fame to posterity.

66

The first and heaviest charge which is brought against Mr Stewart, in the article in question, relates to the errors which are conceived to be mixed up in his very conception of the proper aim of metaphysical philosophy." In proof of this, we are referred, first, to a former article in the

same Review,-and next, to a subsequent passage in the same article. In the Review of the 2d Volume of Mr Stewart's Elements, there are many objections stated to particular doctrines contained in that work; but the only arguments which can be considered as directed against the object, and the method of his philosophy in general, are contained between p. 287 and p. 291 of the 12th Volume of the Review, and these I shall now consider.* "In any inquiry into the Natural History of the Human Understanding," it is said, “it is plain that two paths present

* In order to abridge this article as much as possible, I quote only those sentences from the Review which seem to me to contain the substance of the arguments; but as I refer to the places where the arguments are contained at length, it is in the power of the reader to judge whether in any point I have misunderstood them.

themselves to our choice: Either we may consider the mind as it is in itself, or as it is in the objects about which it is convers

ant.

The first may be termed, the method by inquiry into the subjects of our consciousness; the latter, the method by inquiry into the objects of it. In the one case, to use the phraseology of Mr Stewart, our aim is, to ascertain the simple and uncompounded faculties, or the simple and uncompounded principles,' of which the mind consists; in the other case, it is to ascertain the nature, the certainty, and the limits of object of our inquiry, in the first of these the knowledge which it possesses. As the instances, is real existence, it would seem at first sight to be a proper subject for experimental or inductive reasoning. In the other instance, however, the immediate end which we propose to ourselves is not real existence, but abstract truth; and accordingly it is evident that our investigations in this direction must be carried on, not by obserrelations in which all the objects of human vation of facts, but by tracing the various knowledge stand to us and to each other. In both cases, real existence may be considered as the basis of our reasoning, but in other respects they are extremely different in the one, our inquiry terminates with the establishment of a fact, whereas it is precisely at this point that it commences in the other. For example, when we have ascer tained that all persons possess the notions of solidity, extension, motion, and so forth, the object of philosophy is so far accomplished, according to Mr Stewart; but according to Mr Locke, the existence of these notions is taken for granted, and the nature of them, the origin of them, and so forth, is the point at which metaphysical philosophy would here begin. Which of these question; our aim at present is to shew, may be the more correct, is another that the idea of applying the inductive logic to this science depends entirely upon a particular theory as to the proper objects of it."

views

;

I have quoted this paragraph entire, because, after all the attention I have been able to bestow on it, I am not satisfied that I understand the nature of the distinction here stated between the subjects and the objects of our consciousness. By the former term, I conclude, from some subsequent passages, that we are to understand the powers or faculties which have been ascribed to the mind. But the precise sciousness, I do not comprehend; and meaning of the term, Objects of Conthe difficulty is much increased by the account given in another passage, of the "objects about which the understanding is conversant," which term appears to be used as synonimous with the other.

"It is obvious that these are not like the objects of sense: they cannot be put, like pieces of gold, into a crucible: whether they be ideas, or notions, or conceptions, or abstractions (it matters not by what name we

call them), it is plain they are not subjects susceptible of experiment; and whatever knowledge we may hereafter arrive at, concerning the various metaphysical peculiarities and relations by which they are distinguished from each other, must be acquired, most assuredly, by general reasoning, and not, as Mr Stewart supposes, by inductive analysis."

It is here plain, that by this term the Reviewer means ideas, or notions, or conceptions, or abstractions, but in no case objects of sense.

Now it must be remembered, that the Reviewer has expressly renounced the Ideal Theory, according to which, ❝ideas in the mind are the objects of our thoughts in every operation of the understanding." "This theory," he says, in the same article, p. 293, "it is the great praise of Dr Reid to have most ably and most successfully refuted." He must therefore, one should think, assent to the observations in the following passages from Reid, which contain nearly the whole substance of his doctrine on this subject.

"When I imagine a lion or an elephant, the lion or elephant is the object imagined. The act of the mind, in conceiving that ob

ject, is the notion, or conception, or imagination of the object. If, besides the object, and the act of the mind about it, there be something called the idea of the object, I know not what it is." Essays, p. 183. "In perception, in remembrance, and in conception or imagination, I distinguish three things the mind that operates, the operation of the mind, and the object of that operation. That the object perceived is one thing, and the perception of that object another, I am as certain as I can be of any thing. The same may be said of conception, of remembrance, of love and hatred, desire and aversion. In all these, the act of the mind about its object is one thing, the object is another thing. There must be an object, real or imaginary, distinct from the operation of the mind about it. Now if in these operations the idea be a fourth thing, different from the three I have mentioned, I know not what it is, nor have been able to learn from all that has been written about ideas. And if the doctrine of philosophers about ideas confounds any two of these things which I have mentioned as distinct; if, for example, it confounds the object perceived with the perception of that object, such doctrine is altogether repugnant to all that I am able to discover of the operations of my own mind; and it is repugnant to the common sense of

mankind, expressed in the structure of all languages." Ibid. p. 184.

If the Reviewer assent to these remarks, there is a manifest inconsistency in his speaking of notions, or conceptions, or abstractions, as "objects about which the mind is conversant. And whether he assent to them or not, if the remarks be true, as I think they are, there is a manifest absurdity in such language; and this error obviously infects almost all his subsequent reasoning.

It is not my object, however, to examine the kind of metaphysics which this writer would substitute for the philosophy of Mr Stewart, but merely the grounds on which he would reject that philosophy, and "follow up the study of the mind by some other organ than that which he proposes."

I. He tells us, in the first place, that 66 as the mind is not conscious of its own existence, so neither is it conscious of those separate and independent faculties with which it is considered as being endowed;" that we cannot infer, from our internal feelings, the separate existence of those particular attributes, in the same manner that we infer the existence of some thinking substance in general; that whether the mental operations be performed by the distinct agency of various simple and uncompounded faculties, or whether it be only one indivisible and homogeneous power, operating merely on different objects, "this is a point on which Consciousness is able to afford no information whatever."

On this passage I would observe, first, that it obviously proceeds on a misconception in regard to the meaning of the term, Faculties of the Mind. When it is said that the mind possesses the faculties of Memory, Judgment, or Volition, all that is meant is, that, under certain circumstances, it remembers, judges, or wills. words apply, not to distinct existences in the mind, but to distinct modes in which the mind acts on different occasions.

The

suppose any thing to operate which has no power to operate, is absurd. But there is no absurdity in supposing a being to have the power to operate, when it does not opeThus I may have the power to walk when I sit, or to speak when I am silent. Every operation, therefore, implies power, but the power does not imply the operation." Essays, p. 14.

rate.

When Mr Stewart uses the term "simple and uncompounded faculties," his language, like almost all the language that can be used in speaking of the mind, is metaphorical; but he is careful here, as in many other parts of his writings, to " vary from time to time the metaphors he employs, so as to prevent any one of them from acquiring an undue ascendant over the others, either in his own mind or those of his readers." And he accordingly observes, in the very next sentence, "These faculties and principles are the laws of our constitution.”

But, secondly, in fulfilling the objects which Mr Stewart proposes to himself, in "ascertaining the laws of our constitution, so far as they can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our consciousness, and afterwards applying these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phenomena of the understanding," it is surely quite immaterial, whether the "thinking substance," which acts according to these laws, be considered as one indivisible and homogeneous power, or as composed of various independent powers, provided only that the laws themselves are uniform. All that is obtained in generalizing the properties of matter, is merely a knowledge of the general laws, according to which that unknown thing which we call matter exhibits certain phenomena to our senses; and all that is obtained in generalizing the operations of mind is, in like manner, only a knowledge of the general laws, according to which the unknown thing which we call mind exhibits phenomena to our consciousness. Whether the unknown substance in either case be indivisible and homogeneous, or consist of various separate existences, is a question which we have no means of deciding; but the decision of which, either way, cannot affect the validity of the laws according to which it is found that the phenomena are exhibited. It is, in fact, one of those questions concerning the nature of the mind, on which

Mr Stewart set out with observing, "that they are as widely and obviously different from the view which I propose to take of the human mind in the following work, as the reveries of Berkeley concerning the non-existence of the material world are from the conclusions of Newton and his followers." Elements, Introduction.

It is next stated by the Reviewer, with regard to Mr Stewart's method of Philosophy,

"Should we be curious to know why the same property in the sun occasions so many dissimilar effects as we are daily witnesses to, it would surely be in vain, like the schoolmen of old, to institute inquiries into the nature and essence of heat, consider

ed as it is in itself; all that we can learn of it, is from the specific differences which we may observe among the objects themselves on which heat is seen to operate. It is precisely the same in the case of mind; if we should be desirous of investigating the nature of our understanding, and of our intellectual operations, it is not to them that analogy would direct our attention, but solely to the objects about which they are

conversant."

And again:

"In the same manner, as all that Philosophy can teach us concerning heat is from the objects which it acts upon, so all that it can teach us concerning the human understanding, is from the objects about which it is conversant."

The word objects, as formerly noticed, is obscure; and investigating the nature of our understanding is not the end of the Philosophy of the Mind; but making allowance for these inaccuracies, the only meaning that I can annex to this passage is so far from being any argument against the application of induction to the science of mind, that it refers to the very circumstance, the relative nature of our notions of mind, as well as of matter, -on which the necessity of employing that mode of inquiry depends. If we knew the nature of the mind, we might be able to deduce from that, by general reasoning, the laws according to which it acts; and our ignorance of its nature is the very reason why we must have recourse to another mode of inquiry. To take the illustration that is offered, what is it that makes heat a proper subject for inductive inquiry? Is it not the circumstance, that it is the unknown cause of known effects? What is it, in fact, that makes the material world, in general, a proper subject for inductive inquiry? Is it