quite unnecessary to refer in detail to them all. They extend from Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Co. (1791) 1 Ves. Jr. 371, 2 Ves. Jr. 56, down to Cook v. Sprigg [1899] A. C. 572, 68 L. J. C. P. N. S. 144, 81 L. T. N. S. 281, 15 Times L. R. 515, As a great deal of argument was addressed to us upon the latter case, we think it right to say that, although it was contended that the actual decision was not in harmony with the views of the American courts upon analogous matters, no authority was cited, or, as far as we know, exists, which throws any doubt upon that part of the judgment which is in the following words: "The taking possession by her Majesty, whether by cession or by any other means by which sovereignty can be acquired, was an act of state and treating Sigcau as an independent sovereign, which the appellants are compelled to do in deriving title from him. It is a well-established principle of law that the transactions of independent states between each other are governed by other laws than those which municipal courts administer. It is no answer to say that by the ordinary principles of international law private property is respected by the sovereign which accepts the cession and assumes the duties and legal obligations of the former sovereign with respect to such private property within the ceded territory. All that can be properly meant by such a proposition is that, according to the well-understood rules of international law, a change of sovereignty by cession ought not to affect private property, but no municipal tribunal has authority to enforce such an obligation." We do not repeat the citations of Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee (1859) 13 Moore, P. C. C. 22, 7 Moore, Ind. App. 476, 7 Week. Rep. 722, and Doss v. Secretary of State for India (1875) L. R. 19 Eq. 509, 32 L. T. N. S. 294, 23 Week. Rep. 773, referred to in the judgment in Cook v. Sprigg, supra. They form part of the chain of authorities to which we have referred, and we observe in passing that we are not to be considered as throwing any doubt upon the correctness of the decision itself in Cook v. Sprigg. The case of Rustomjee v. [410] Reg. (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 487, 45 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 249, 34 L. T. N. S. 278, 24 Week. Rep. 428; 2 Q. B. D. 69, 46 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 238, 36 L. T. N. S. 190, 25 Week. Rep. 333, affirmed in the Court of Appeal, deserves, however,

one word of comment. There the British government had received from the Chinese government a sum of money in respect of certain claims made upon that government by persons, of whom the petitioner was one. A petition of right was brought in order to enforce payment by our government of those claims out of the sum so received by the British government. From some points of view that case may be considered much stronger in favor of the suppliant than the present, the money having been received by the Crown under a treaty specifically on account of the debts due to British subjects. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Lord Coleridge used language which has a strong bearing on the present case. He said (2 Q. B. D. at p. 73): "The Queen might or not, as she thought fit, have made peace at all; she might or not, as she thought fit, have insisted on this money being paid her. She acted throughout the making of the treaty and in relation to each and every of its stipulations in her sovereign character, and by her own inherent authority; and, as in making the treaty, so in performing the treaty, she is beyond the control of municipal law, and her acts are not to be examined in her own courts." It was contended by Lord Robert Cecil that the view we are taking was inconsistent with certain American decisions and with certain decisions of our own Court of Chancery, to which we think it right to refer. A careful examination of these cases satisfies us that rightly understood no such inconsistency exists. The American cases were a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States respecting the rights of the owners to landed property in territories formerly forming part of independent countries which had been ceded to or annexed by the United States. The particular cases cited were United States v. Percheman (1833) 7 Pet. 51, 8 L. ed. 604; Mitchel v. United States (1835) 9 Pet. 711, 9 L. ed. 283; Smith v. United States (1836) 10 Pet. 326, 9 L. ed. 442, and Strother v. Lucas (1838) 12 Pet. 410, 9 L. ed. 1137. These cases arose respecting the rights of landed property in Florida, Louisiana, and Missouri. They [411] were all cases of cession, and in all of them the treaties of cession and subsequent legislation of the United States protected the rights of owners of private property as they existed at the time of cession, and the sole question was whether, under

the circumstances of each individual case, private rights of property existed and could be enforced as against the United States. No question of duty of the country, to whom the territory passed, of fulfilling the obligations of the original country in any other respect arose; and the language of Marshall, Ch. J., (7 Pet. at p. 86, and of Baldwin, J., 9 Pet. at p. 733; 10 Pet. at p. 329), all of which is to the same effect, must be construed solely with reference to the rights of private property in individuals, such property being locally situated in a country annexed by another country. We asked Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Hamilton whether they had been able to find any case in which a similar principle had been applied to personal contracts or obligations of a contractual character entered into between a ceding or conquered state and private individuals. They informed us that they had not been able to do so, nor do we know of any such case. It must not be forgotten that the obligations of conquering states with regard to private property of private individuals, particularly land as to which the title had already been perfected before the conquest or annexation, are altogether different from the obligations which arise in respect of personal rights by contract. As is said in more cases than one, cession of territory does not mean the confiscation of the property of individuals in that territory. If a particular piece of property has been conveyed to a private owner or has been pledged, or a lien has been created upon it, considerations arise which are different from those which have to be considered when the question is whether the contractual obligation of the conquered state towards individuals is to be undertaken by the conquering state. The English cases on which reliance was placed were United States v. Prioleau (1865) 2 Hem. & M. 559, 35 L. J. Ch. N. S. 7, 11 Jur. N. S. 792, 13 L. T. N. S. 92, 13 Week. Rep. 1062, in which a claim was made by the United States government to cotton which had been the property of the Confederated States; United [412] States v. McRae (1869) L. R. 8 Eq. 69, 38 L. J. Ch. N. S. 406, 20 L. T. N. S. 476, 17 Week. Rep. 764, which recognized the right of the government suppressing rebellion to all moneys, goods, and treasures which were public property at the time of the outbreak. Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1887) 36 Ch. D. 489,

56 L. J. Ch. N. S. 1081, 57 L. T. N. S. 337, 36 Week. Rep. 217, and Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus (1888) 38 Ch. D. 348, 57 L. J. Ch. N. S. 536, 58 L. T. N. S. 433, 36 Week. Rep. 492. The only principle, however, which can be deduced from these cases is that a government claiming rights of property and rights under a contract cannot enforce those rights in our courts without fulfilling the terms of the contract as a whole. They have, in our judgment, no bearing upon the propositions which we have been discussing. We are aware that we have not commented upon all the cases which were cited before us,— we have not failed to consider them; and any arguments which could be founded upon them seem to us to be covered by the observations already made. We are of opinion, for the reasons given, that no right on the part of the suppliants is disclosed by the petition which can be enforced as against his Majesty in this or in any municipal court; and we therefore allow the demurrer, with costs.

Judgment for the Crown.

Solicitors for suppliants: Waltons, Johnson, Bubb, & What

ton.

Solicitor for the Crown: Solicitor to the Treasury.

Note.-Duty of conquering state with respect to obligations of conquered state.

Summarized, the opinion of the court in the above case (apart from the preliminary observation upon the sufficiency of the pleading) amounts to this: (I.) That international law, in the sense that it is the sum of the usages which "have received the express sanction of international agreement, or gradually have grown to be part of international law by their frequent practical recognition in dealings between various nations," forms part of the law of England; (II.) that “matters which fall properly to be determined by the Crown by treaty or as an act of state are not subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts, and that rights supposed to be acquired thereunder cannot be enforced by such courts" (p. 409); and that the obligation of which an adjudication was sought by petition of right in the present case, assuming it to be one recognized by international law, falls within this category; but (III.) that there is no sufficient evidence to show that it is an established rule of international law that a

conquering state, in the absence of an express limitation of the obligations to be taken over, becomes bound to fulfil the obligation of the conquered.

Although this note, in view of Lord Alverstone's extended discussion of the third proposition, is principally concerned therewith, something may be said with reference to the first and second as well.

I.

Not the least element of interest in WEST RAND CENT. GOLD MIN. Co. v. REX is the concurrence of the court in the proposition that the established principles and usages of international law form part of the law of England. For an interesting discussion of this case and the earlier English decisions on the question, see article by Professor Westlake, entitled "Is International Law a Part of the Law of England," in 22 Law Quarterly Review, 14.

In the United States, international law has been considered as part of the law of the land, not only in admiralty and prize cases (see Talbot v. Seeman (1801) 1 Cranch, 1, 2 L. ed. 15, s. c. on former appeal 4 Dall. 34, 1 L. ed. 730; Murray v. The Charming Betsy (1804) 2 Cranch, 64, 2 L. ed. 208; 30 Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle (1815) 9 Cranch, 191, 3 L. ed. 701; The Nereide (1815) 9 Cranch, 388, 3 L. ed. 769; The Antelope (1825) 10 Wheat. 66, 6 L. ed. 268; The Scotia (1871) 14 Wall. 170, 20 L. ed. 822; The Habana (1899) 175 U. S. 677, 44 L. ed. 320, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290; United States v. The Active (1814) 4 N. C. (2 Car. Law. Repos. 192), Fed. Cas. No. 14,420), but also in cases of a purely municipal character (see Respublica v. De Longchamps (1784) 1 Dall. 111, 1 L. ed. 59; Kennett v. Chambers (1852) 14 How. 38, 14 L. ed. 316; Underhill v. Hernandez (1895) 38 L.R.A. 405, 13 C. C. A. 51, 26 U. S. App. 573, 65 Fed. 577, affirmed in 168 U. S. 250, 42 L. ed. 456, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Hatch v. Baez (1876) 7 Hun, 596).

Accordingly, it has been held that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Murray v. The Charming Betsy (1804) 2 Cranch, 64, 2 L. ed. 208; Ex parte Blumer (1865) 27 Tex. 734.

So, also, in Hilton v. Guyot (1894) 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, it is declared by Mr. Justice Gray that "international law in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination."