conviction he called upon their lordships to fupport the address.

Three times had his majesty's minifters gone to the utmoft verge that prudence or honour would admit, in the hope of ending this unexampled conteft by negotiation: the refult was well known; and he was at a lofs to imagine a reafon for our embaffador having been received, unless it was to afford the jacobin party in France an opportunity of adding infult to injury. It had been stated from high authority, that a point of honour was almoft the only rational caufe of war: a difpute for trade, or territorial poffeffion, might be easily compromifed, or given up; but the honour of a country gone, its importance muft fall with it, and it would foon become the derifion of mankind. Had the object of the war been changed? Certainly not: the means of carrying it on had varied, but the prefervation of Great Britain had from its commencement been the one grand pursuit.

The aim of France was univerfal dominion; and whether they purfued it by war or treaty, the object had been never varied.

With profeffions of juftice, good faith, humanity, they had thought no actions too atrocious to be committed; and indulging their imaginations in ideal victory over this country, they already confidered it as a conquered enemy, and would liften to no terms but fuch as they fhould dictate. The laws which they had made applied only to themselves; occafional poffeffion created of itself indefeasible right; but when this doctrine came under difcuffion with their adverfaries, it was exactly reverfed as applied to them, and they inftantly demanded a previous unconditional reftitution of every thing that had been taken either from themselves or their pre

tended allies. Had thefe haughty terms been acceded to, our dis honour would have been fealed, but peace would have been yet more diftant. No negotiator could have propofed fuch conditions but with a view of forcing a continuance of the war. So much for the justice of their theory and practice.

His lordship faid it would be waste of time to comment on their good faith, either in the treaties they had dictated and broken, or the alliances they had formed and abufed; but it would be well if Europe would take warning, from thefe treaties and alliances, of what they might expect.

Far different had been the conduct of this country: the state of the funds, the pecuniary difficulties under which we had exerted and maintained our public credit, must have convinced our allies of the efforts we made to fupply their wants: we had more than fulfilled every engagement, and in the negotiation we propofed, their interefts had been combined with our

own.

Perhaps it was wife to learn by negotiation the extent of the infolent demands of the faction in France; perhaps it was neceffary to prove to this country that peace was impoffible, in order to roufe that vigorous exertion which its intereft and honour required. The minifters had gone to every length which prudence and dignity permitted-if not farther; and after the reception of such advances, the nation would be degraded in the eyes of the world, if it hefitated one moment in refenting the infult, and accepting the challenge.

Earl Fitzwilliam rofe, and with much warmth concurred in the fame opinion; but there were fome words in the addrefs, he faid, to which he could not agree, because,

he

he faid, he conceived that they tended to weaken the principle upon which the house might wish to come forward with their fupport of his majefty. Every expreffion implying approbation of the fteps which had been taken to reflore peace fhould be omitted; nor would he ever lend his fanction to the carrying on a negotiation with a power fo anomalous, fo dangerous to the fafety of Europe, as the French republic.

His lordship much lamented that his majefty had been advised to make a declaration two feflions ago, affirming that France was then in a ftate to maintain the relations of peace and amity; whereas between that government and ours there fubfifted no common principles; and only the restoration of monarchy could render it capable of exiftence with fafety to the other powers of Europe. He believed this declaration had contributed to the continuance of the war, had weakened energy, had engendered diftruft amongst the allies, and that its confequence had been the treaty of Udina.

He wished particularly to call the attention of the house to the object of the French government: it was the luft of univerfal empire; it had debased their old establishment; it diftinguished their new. It was unneceffary, he said, to trace its revolutionary progrefs in all their conquefts, intrigues, and negotiations; but all were ftrongly and incontestably marked with this characteristic feature. He begged their lordships to recollect the profeffions of liberty and equality with which the Dutch and all their dependencies had been amufed and deceived; their conduct to Avignon (and Avignon had never been their enemy); neither did Geneva ftand in that fituation; the neutra

lity of Venice, and the complaifance of Genoa towards the French goverument,did not protect them from the rage of jacobin profelytifm. Their treatment of the Italian

ftates alfo, and their conduct to America, demonftrated their aim. Friendly as well as neutral powers had been deprived of their rights by Buonaparte, on no other pre

tence than the convenience or advantage of the republic. Difor ganisation in all its extent had uaiformly fucceeded every establishment they had been able to overthrow. An incompatibility of coalefcing with any power whatever was their own incommunicable prerogative; it was for the privi lege of regenerating the conftitutions of other nations, and profelyting other states, that they threw away all their old forms, burst upon every people in their vicinity, and convulfed them with their enthufiafm; and wherever they penetrated by art or arms the revolu tionary mania followed them.

Never had fuch fwarms of banditti iffued (continued his lordship) as had iffued from the cultivated empire of France, and overfpread the furrounding kingdoms with madness and with guilt! And was this the nation with which England was ready to make engagements? The character of its rulers evinced what we might expect from their warmeft profeffions. These were formed upon the fpirit of the people, and had prefented within these two months a dreadful picture of the cant of liberty, and the horror of defpotifm. Was not their late profcription of 65 deputies, and their disfranchifement of 33 departments, for whofe reprefentation they had arbitrarily and openly fent creatures of their own to the council of five hundred, an inftance of this? In fact, the councils were A 4

not

not the reprefentatives of the people, but of the directory; and this pretended representation extended even to the fubordinate municipal officers. Of this primary principle in democracy how much had they boasted, and how little had they realised it!

Was the expulfion of fuch a number of those chofen by their conftituents meant to exemplify their doctrine, or to explain it did equality confist of fuch out rages on the rights and feelings of each other? and had we any reafon to expect better conduct than they adopted amongst themselves? Here, therefore, his lordfhip faid, he was pledged to the house and to the public to make no peace where peace could neither be honourable nor lafting. It deferved confideration, whether it were not better to profecute the war on its original ground, or, by ending the one, bafely to relinquish the other? The war, it was true, had coft this country many millions; but the taxes were paid, our refources rifing, our trade increased, and our commerce flourishing. What was the fituation of the enemy in this respect? All the armies they had raifed, all the magazines they had filled, all the treasures they had expended, all that they had done, had been effected, not by any well digefted plan of equal contribution, but by making the property of individuals anfwerable to the exigence of the state. With our revenue it was far otherwife; more money had been offered to government than the minifter had occafion for; and any fum might have been obtained to carry on a war, of which the people felt the juftice and neceffity. In fact, all its refources had rather improved than diminished. Where were not our manufactures exported? in what

fea was not the British navy triumphant? and were all these instances of our glory to be furren. dered for the amity of a government incapable of accepting, cementing, or realising it? Could we hope for better treatment than any of their other allies? Had they indeed been true to each other, had they been animated with as much zeal to defend, as the French to attack, this war might have been terminated happily long ago: by our own mifmanagement, by mutual jealoufy, we had ruined the cause we wished to have protected, and the defertion of one led to that of another; but though left in the field alone, we yet occupied fuch vantage ground as might enable us to hold them for a length of time in perfect defiance. Was not the emperor (the most relied on continental bulwark !) a beacon to the people of this country? He, whofe duty it was to have preferved the empire, inftead of proving himself the father of his people, was actually, by the afcendancy of the French in his councils, become a jacobin: the king of Pruffia might alfo turn fuch, and fall in with the schemes of this ambitious republic, which already called out for a Transrhenane republic on the borders of Auftria and Pruffia!

Earl Fitzwilliam concluded with exhorting their lordships, if they venerated patriotifm, liberty, or laws, to refift all terms of coa lefcence with this regicide government. He reminded them of his majesty's words in a former fpeech, "that we fought for order, morality, and religion;" nor could we confiftently fubmit to conditions of peace, until the old monarchy was restored in France, and an he reditary fovereign feated upon the throne of his ancestors.

Lord Grenville profeffed himfelf

to

to be entirely of opinion with his Roble friend, that there was no fafety for any people by being at peace with the French; and the horrible picture which he had fo eloquently drawn of the nature of their friendship was justified by the hiftory of their conduct towards the nations whom they had ruined. The calamities they had endured were not fo much occafioned by making peace, as by continuing at peace with France: they had fought afety in a temporifing fyftem; and, by ignominious compliances with bad principles, had laid themselves open to the miferies which had followed.

It was not by compromifes, however humble, nor facrifices, however extravagant, that fecurity could be obtained against fuch a fyftem; it was by a vigorous refiftance of their principles, a manly difregard of their threats, and a zealous maintenance of our own constitution, that we could fecure to ourselves the bleffings of our eftablished government.

But he differed from the noble earl as to the inference he had drawn, that this country never could with safety make peace with the French republic. For himself, he never once encouraged fuch an idea, or expreffed fuch a fentiment; on the contrary, he believed that peace might now be both practicable and permanent, and obtained upon conditions confiftent with the honour of this empire; nor had his majesty's minifters declared that no peace could or ought to be made with the republic, only, that it was more likely to be durable under a monarchy. His lordship dwelt fome time upon this point, affirming that however we might have preferred to treat with one kind of government rather than another, we had never made any

government a fine qua non of nego. tiation. He objected to the amendment which would make the revival of the old monarchy in France the condition of our treaty, and he confidered it as oppofite to the very part in the addrefs which the houfe would with to fupport; viz. 'a declaration that they highly approved of his majefty's endeavours to ne gotiate with the French republic in order to reitore peace; and that it now was evident, from the infolent fpirit of the enemy, to whom the continuance of the war was to be attributed.

The marquis of Landfdowne, in an animated fpeech (wherein he deplored the precipice on which we ftood), entreated their lordships to furrender up their prejudices, and contemplate the danger of their fituation. The declaration, he faid, had made a ferious impreffion on his mind; unaccompanied as it was with documents, he read it with a perfect confidence that the main facts ftated were true; but what did they prove? That the French directory had no intention. to make peace with us, but were implacably hoftile to the government of this country! This was a most important matter, for then the question was, what were we to do in that predicament? The noble earl fays, continue the war;— but how? Great Britain was not to be placed on a footing with the petty tates which the drunkenness of the French revolution had difturbed; nor ought we to be diverted from the contemplation of our own cafe by fuch references. He left them, with all the predictions which had fo fatally deluded their lordfhips, of the impoffibility of the French continuing their fyftem. We were come to that point when we were to act for ourfelves; and it was needlefs to remind the houfe

of

of the principle of thofe who had carried on the war, which had been, that we could not make ary impreffion on France without a continental ally. If this were true, what muft we do when the French had made a jacobin of the emperor.

The marquis obferved, that he fhould not have prefumed to have called his imperial majefty by this name, but he borrowed the expreffion from the noble earl.

Could we go on without an ally for any purpose of offence? We could not hope to recover the king of Pruffia; he might become a jacobin alfo; he long ago had wifdom to quit the fcene, and now we found that even the emperor had withdrawn. He hoped, however, that we fhould find him a man of honour in his engagements; and that the money advanced in this country, which our minifters had conftantly declared was not a fubfidy, but a folemn loan, would be paid with punctuality and honour. But the confideration which he particularly wifhed to imprefs, was, that we were called upon to perfevere in the conteft, without the means fo frequently stated as effential to its fuccefs. Our refources were affirmed to be rifing; but were they actually fo? The papers which he had read refpecting the trade with Portugal, and the wine trade, afforded proof of a lamentable decay; it was not merely that they were not productive, but that they were deficient. It was not then because our failors had conquered, because we had demonftrated to all the world the character of our natural strength, that therefore we had the means of carrying on an offenfive war against France without a continental ally. Our failors, indeed, had fhown the true vis animi of the British marine; they had shown that the country

could rife, in fpite of the mifmanagement of minifters, like the natural ftrength of youth, which in a cafual fickness refifts all the blunders of phyficians. But what could our naval exploits avail in fuch a conteft? They made us masters of the fea indeed, but where fhould we land? If we had the feas, France had its ports: it was neceffary to the circuit of commerce that the markets fhould be open. What then was our relative fituation? We had ships that traversed and commanded the ocean; the French had armies that traversed and commanded the fhores: we could fhip our manufactures, but where could we expofe them to fale? What fea was there between Paris and Hamburgh, or Paris and Hanover, or Paris and Lisbon? The French occupied, and they would occupy, every point of contact with the main land of Europe. We had talked of a counter-revolu tion; were we yet weak enough to cherish this puerile expectation? if fo, he begged leave to refer their lordships to a moft able pamphlet, written by a late comptroller-general of France. Monf. de Calonne afferted (and his authority was of weight), that the affignats and mandats had produced the contrary effect to what was expected; that it was quite ridiculous to talk about the property of a nation, where all its property was afloat. Its very paper, which we idly fuppofed the fource of ruin, was not merely a genuine refource for the time it lafted, but by our attacks upon it became the principle of falvation to France; it worked out its own cure; and that country, from having more paper than all the world put together, had now lefs than ours.

The marquis declared folemnly he was himfelf no jacobin; he