Opinion of the Court "good-faith effort to achieve population equality" required of a State conducting intrastate redistricting does not translate into a requirement that the Federal Government conduct a census that is as accurate as possible. First, we think that the Court of Appeals understated the significance of the two differences that it recognized between state redistricting cases and the instant action. The court failed to recognize that the Secretary's decision was made pursuant to Congress' direct delegation of its broad authority over the census. See Art. I, §2, cl. 3 (Congress may conduct the census "in such Manner as they shall by Law direct"). The court also undervalued the significance of the fact that the Constitution makes it impossible to achieve population equality among interstate districts. As we have noted before, the Constitution provides that “[t]he number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000 persons; each State shall have at least one Representative; and district boundaries may not cross state lines." Montana, 503 U. S., at 447-448. While a court can easily determine whether a State has made the requisite "good-faith effort" toward population equality through the application of a simple mathematical formula, we see no way in which a court can apply the Wesberry standard to the Federal Government's decisions regarding the conduct of the census. The Court of Appeals found that Wesberry required the Secretary to conduct a census that would "achieve voting-power equality," which it understood to mean a census that was as accurate as possible. 34 F. 3d, at 1129. But in so doing, the court implicitly found that the Constitution prohibited the Secretary from preferring distributive accuracy to numerical accuracy, and that numerical accuracy-which the court found to be improved by a PES-based adjustment—was constitutionally preferable to distributive accuracy. See id., at 1131 ("[T]he Secretary did not make the required effort to achieve numerical accuracy as nearly as practicable, . . . the burden thus shifted to Opinion of the Court the Secretary to justify his decision not to adjust..."). As in Montana, where we could see no constitutional basis upon which to choose between absolute equality and relative equality, so here can we see no ground for preferring numerical accuracy to distributive accuracy, or for preferring gross accuracy to some particular measure of accuracy. The Constitution itself provides no real instruction on this point, and extrapolation from our intrastate districting cases is equally unhelpful. Quite simply, "[t]he polestar of equal representation does not provide sufficient guidance to allow us to discern a single constitutionally permissible course." Montana, supra, at 463. In Montana, we held that Congress' "apparently goodfaith choice of a method of apportionment of Representatives among the several States ‘according to their respective Numbers'" was not subject to strict scrutiny under Wesberry. Montana, supra, at 464. With that conclusion in mind, it is difficult to see why or how Wesberry would apply to the Federal Government's conduct of the census-a context even further removed from intrastate districting than is congressional apportionment. Congress' conduct of the census, even more than its decision concerning apportionment, "commands far more deference than a state districting decision that is capable of being reviewed under a relatively rigid mathematical standard."8 Montana, supra, at 464. Rather than the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals, we think that it is the standard established by this 8 Nor do we think that strict scrutiny applies here for some other reason. Strict scrutiny of a classification affecting a protected class is properly invoked only where a plaintiff can show intentional discrimination by the Government. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239-245 (1976). Respondents here have not argued that the Secretary's decision not to adjust was based upon an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Indeed, in light of the Government's extraordinary efforts to include traditionally undercounted minorities in the 1990 census, see Pet. App. 78a, 321a-322a, we think that respondents here would have had a tough row to hoe had they set out to prove intentional discrimination by the Secretary. Opinion of the Court Court in Montana and Franklin that applies to the Secretary's decision not to adjust. The text of the Constitution vests Congress with virtually unlimited discretion in conducting the decennial "actual Enumeration," see Art. I, §2, cl. 3, and notwithstanding the plethora of lawsuits that inevitably accompany each decennial census, 10 there is no basis for thinking that Congress' discretion is more limited than the text of the Constitution provides. See also Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 361 (1982) (noting broad scope of Congress' discretion over census). Through the Census Act, Congress has delegated its broad authority over the census to the Secretary.11 See 13 U. S. C. § 141(a) (Secretary shall take "a decennial census of [the] population . . . in such form and content as he may determine . . ."). Hence, so long as the Secretary's conduct of the census is "consistent with the 9 We do not decide whether the Constitution might prohibit Congress from conducting the type of statistical adjustment considered here. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94-1614, pp. 40-42. 10 See, e. g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 790 (1992) (“As one season follows another, the decennial census has again generated a number of reapportionment controversies"); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Brown, appeal pending, No. 94-5312 (CADC) (argued Oct. 6, 1995) (challenging Census Bureau's procedures for finding and counting homeless persons); Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F. 2d 834 (CA2 1980) (seeking order directing Census Bureau to adopt certain processes for counting persons); Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F. 2d 575 (CA3 1971). 11 We do not here decide the precise bounds of the authority delegated to the Secretary through the Census Act. First, because no party here has suggested that Congress has, in its delegation of authority over the conduct of the census to the Secretary, constrained the Secretary's authority to decide not to adjust the census, we assume here that the Secretary's discretion not to adjust the census is commensurate with that of Congress. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 94-1614, p. 24, n. 19 (stating that "Congress did not enact any . . . legislation . . . to compel . . . statistical adjustment" of the 1990 census). Second, although Oklahoma argues that Congress has constrained the Secretary's discretion to statistically adjust the decennial census, see 13 U. S. C. § 195, we need not decide that question in order to resolve this action. Opinion of the Court constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation," Franklin, 505 U. S., at 804, it is within the limits of the Constitution. In light of the Constitution's broad grant of authority to Congress, the Secretary's decision not to adjust need bear only a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the population, keeping in mind the constitutional purpose of the census. In 1990, the Census Bureau made an extraordinary effort to conduct an accurate enumeration, and was successful in counting 98.4% of the population. See 58 Fed. Reg. 70 (1993); Brief for Federal Parties 28. The Secretary then had to consider whether to adjust the census using statistical data derived from the PES. He based his decision not to adjust the census upon three determinations. First, he held that in light of the constitutional purpose of the census, its distributive accuracy was more important than its numerical accuracy. Second, he determined that the unadjusted census data would be considered the most distributively accurate absent a showing to the contrary. And finally, after reviewing the results of the PES in light of extensive research and the recommendations of his advisers, the Secretary found that the PES-based adjustment would not improve distributive accuracy. Each of these three determinations is well within the bounds of the Secretary's constitutional discretion. As we have already seen, supra, at 18, the Secretary's decision to focus on distributive accuracy is not inconsistent with the Constitution. Indeed, a preference for distributive accuracy (even at the expense of some numerical accuracy) would seem to follow from the constitutional purpose of the census, viz., to determine the apportionment of the Representatives among the States. Respondents do not dispute this point. See Brief for Respondents 54 ("Distributive accuracy is an appropriate criterion for judging census accuracy because it calls attention to a concern with the uses Opinion of the Court to which census data are put"). Rather, they challenge the Secretary's first determination by arguing that he improperly "regarded evidence of superior numeric accuracy as 'not relevant' to the determination of distributive accuracy." Id., at 39 (quoting Pet. App. 201a); see also Brief for Respondents 51-54. In support of this argument, respondents note that an enumeration that results in increased numerical accuracy will also result in increased distributive accuracy. We think that respondents rest too much upon the statement by the Secretary to which they refer. When quoted in full, the statement reads: "While the preponderance of the evidence leads me to believe that the total population at the national level falls between the census counts and the adjusted figures, that conclusion is not relevant to the determination of distributive accuracy." Pet. App. 201a. In his decision, the Secretary found numerical accuracy (in addition to distributive accuracy) to be relevant to his decision whether to adjust. See id., at 157a. Even if the Secretary had chosen to subordinate numerical accuracy, we are not sure why the fact that distributive and numerical accuracy correlate closely in an improved enumeration would require the Secretary to conclude that they correlate also for a PESbased statistical adjustment. Turning to the Secretary's second determination, we previously have noted, and respondents do not dispute, the importance of historical practice in this area. See Franklin, supra, at 803-806 (noting importance of historical experience in conducting the census); cf. Montana, 503 U. S., at 465 ("To the extent that the potentially divisive and complex issues associated with apportionment can be narrowed by the adoption of both procedural and substantive rules that are consistently applied year after year, the public is well served ..."). Nevertheless, respondents challenge the Secretary's second determination by arguing that his understanding of historical practice is flawed. According to respondents, the Secretary assumed that the census traditionally was con |