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Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

Shaw I that because districts created with a view to satisfying §2 do not involve "racial subjugation," post, at 1055, and may in a sense be "benign[ly]" motivated, Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 685 (SOUTER, J., dissenting), strict scrutiny should not apply to them. We rejected that argument in Shaw I, and we reject it now. As we explained then, see id., at 653, we subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that scrutiny is necessary to determine whether they are benign-as JUSTICE STEVENS' hypothetical of a targeted outreach program to protect victims of sickle cell anemia, see post, at 1032, would, no doubt, be—or whether they misuse race and foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without a compelling justification. We see no need to revisit our prior debates.

Both dissents contend that the recognition of the Shaw I cause of action threatens public respect for, and the independence of, the Federal Judiciary by inserting the courts deep into the districting process. We believe that the dissents both exaggerate the dangers involved, and fail to recognize the implications of their suggested retreat from Shaw I.

As to the dangers of judicial entanglement, JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent makes much of cases stemming from state districting plans originally drawn up before Shaw I, in which problems have arisen from the uncertainty in the law prior to and during its gradual clarification in Shaw I, Miller, and today's cases. See post, at 1037-1038 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). We are aware of the difficulties faced by the States, and by the district courts, in confronting new constitutional precedents, and we also know that the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the districting process, are such that bright-line rules are not available. But we believe that today's decisions, which both illustrate the defects that offend the principles of Shaw I and reemphasize the importance of the States' discretion in the redistricting process, see supra, at 978-979, will serve

Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

to clarify the States' responsibilities. The States have traditionally guarded their sovereign districting prerogatives jealously, and we are confident that they can fulfill that requirement, leaving the courts to their customary and appropriate backstop role.

This Court has now rendered decisions after plenary consideration in five cases applying the Shaw I doctrine (Shaw I, Miller, Hays, Shaw II, and this suit). The dissenters would have us abandon those precedents, suggesting that fundamental concerns relating to the judicial role are at stake. See post, at 1035, 1038, 1041 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); post, at 1047, and n. 2, 1052, 1064, 1074, 1076–1077 (SouTER, J., dissenting); Shaw II, ante, at 919-920, 922-923, and n. 3, 929 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); but see ante, at 932-933 (noting that the judicial task of distinguishing race-based from non-race-based action in Shaw I cases is far from unique). While we agree that those concerns are implicated here, we believe they point the other way. Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis, especially in such sensitive political contexts as the present, where partisan controversy abounds. Legislators and district courts nationwide have modified their practices—or, rather, reembraced the traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before the 1990 census-in response to Shaw I. Those practices and our precedents, which acknowledge voters as more than mere racial statistics, play an important role in defining the political identity of the American voter. Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes. See, e. g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 59 (1992) (“[T]he exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party"); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991) ("If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recog

Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

nize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury"); Powers, 499 U. S., at 410 ("We may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law condemns"); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) (“[A] prosecutor's 'assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black'. . . violates the Equal Protection Clause"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 104 (1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes"). We decline to retreat from that commitment today.

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The judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

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