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Kandahar, compelled to quit the country because no one has sent to invite him to Kabul. Following him, an agent ' of Russia with letters highly complimentary and promises more than substantial, has experienced no more civility than is due by the laws of hospitality and nations. It may be urged by some that the offers of one or both were fallacious, but such a dictum is certainly premature; the Amír of Kabul has sought no aid in his arguments from such offers, but declared that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, which he never will desert as long as there is a hope of securing one." There is much more in a similar strain-much more cancelled from the published correspondence-which we are compelled from such an article as this reluctantly to omit. The system of garbling the official correspondence of public men-sending the letters

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of a statesman or diplomatist into the world mutilated,

emasculated-the very pith and substance of them cut out by the unsparing hand of the state-anatomist-can not be too severely reprehended. The dishonesty, by which lie upon lie, a century of lies, is palmed upon the world, has not one redeeming feature. If public men are, without reprehension, to be permitted to lie in the face of nations -wilfully, elaborately, and maliciously to bear false witness against their neighbours, what hope is there for private veracity? In the case before us the suppressio veri is virtually the assertio falsi. The character of Dost Mahommed has been lied away; the character of Burnes has been lied away. Both, by the mutilation of the correspondence of the latter, have been fearfully misrepresented-both have been set forth as doing what they did not, and omitting to do what they did. We care not whose knife-whose hand did the work of mutilation. We deal with principles, not with persons; --and have no party ends to serve. The cause of truth must be upheld. Official documents are the sheet-anchors of historians-the last courts of appeal to which the public resort. If these documents are tampered with-if they are made to declare historical figments, the grave of truth is dug and there is seldom a resurrection. It is not always that an afflicted parent is ready to step forward in behalf of an injured child, and lay a memorial at the feet of his sovereign, exposing the cruelty by which an honorable man has been represented, in state documents, as doing that which was abhorrent to his nature. In most cases, the lie goes down, unassailed, and often unsuspected to posterity; and in place of sober History we have a florid Romance.

But still, in spite of the declarations of Burnes that Dost Mahommed had little to hope from the operations of the British Government in the east, the Russian mission made but little progress at Kabul. Alluding to the negociations of our agent, Vickovich wrote some time afterwards, "all this has occasioned Dost Mahommed Khan to conduct himself very coldly towards me; and then, as he daily converses with Burnes, from my arrival here to the 20th of February, I have hardly been two or three times in his presence." The fact is that the Russian mission was scurvily treated, up to this time, as we are assured on the concurrent testimony of the British and the Russian agents. But on the 21st of February, letters were received from the Governor-General, stating in the most decisive language-that there was no intention to accede to the propositions of the Amír, regarding Peshawurand then, but not till then, the conduct of Dost Mahommed underwent a change, and the Russian mission began to rise in importance. On the 2nd of March, Jubbar Khan visited Burnes, and a long discussion ensued relative to the intentions of the British Government, which Burnes again explicitly stated! And on the following day, Abdúl Sami Khan waited upon him, and went over nearly the same ground. He alleged Dost Mahommed "had often written to the British Government about his affairs, and in return they replied to him about their own;" and recurred to the expectations which the Dost had formed of receiving aid from the British and rendering service to them in return. Burnes attended to a message that had been sent to him, stating that the Amír would not wait longer than the vernal equinox in the hope of receiving British assistance, after which time he would consider himself at liberty to listen to the overtures of any other power. For this Abdul Sami Khan apologised; but repeated, in general terms, the demands of the Dost, and the expectations he had formed of coming to a friendly understanding with the British. On the 4th, the Nawab Jubbar Khan again waited on Burnes. The discussion which ensued, was much the same as that of the preceding day, with the exception of something very much like a proposition from the Nawab to betray his brother; but on the 5th he again appeared with a string of specific demands, dictated by the Amir. "These consisted of a promise to protect Kabul and Kandahar from Persia; of the surrender of Peshawur by Runjit Singh; of the interference of our Government to protect, at that city, those who might return to it from Kabul, supposing it to be restored to Súltan Mahommed Khan; with several other proposals." Upon this

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Burnes with an expression of astonishment, declared that, on the part of the British Government, he could accede to none of these propositions; and added that as he saw no hope of a satisfactory adjustment, he should request his dismissal. "The Nawab," said Burnes, "left me in sorrow."

Upon his departure, the British agent sate down, and drew up a formal letter to the Amír, requesting leave to depart for Hindustan. In spite of what had taken place, the letter somewhat startled the Amír, who summoned a meeting of his principal advisers, "which lasted till past midnight." The conference was resumed, on the following morning; and about mid-day Mírza Sami Khan waited on Burnes and invited him to attend the Amír in the Balla Hissar. The Dost was even more gracious and friendly than usual, he expressed his regret that the Governor-General had shewn so little inclination to meet his wishes; but added that he did not even then despair of forming an alliance advantageous both to England and Affghanistan. A long argument then ensued-but it led to nothing. The old ground was travelled over, again and again. Burnes asked for everything he could; but promised nothing, for he had no power to make any concessions; and the meeting, though it ended amicably, was productive of no good results. Burnes took his departure from the Balla Hissar. He might as well have departed from Kabul.

On the 21st of March, the Amír wrote a friendly letter to Lord Auckland, imploring him, in language almost of humi

It is probably of this meeting, or one shortly preceding it, of which General Harlan, who has not much more regard for dates than Mohan Lal, speaks in the following passage. We must premise that Harlan had by this time quitted Runjit Singh's service and "taken the shilling" from Dost Mahommed. “The document (Lord Auckland's ultimatum) was handed to me amongst others. I satisfied myself, by the Governor-General's signature, of its_authenticity, surveying the contents with extreme surprise and disappointment. Dost Mahommed was mortified, but not terrified The Governor-General's ultimatum was handed round and an embarrassing silence ensued. A few minutes elapsed when Abdul Sami Khan recalled the party from abstraction..... He proclaimed that the Governor-General's ultimatum left no other alternative than the dismission of the English agent, for the spirit of the Kuzzilbash party was supercilious and unyielding, though full of duplicity....... Nieb Mahommed Amir Khan Akhúnd-Zadah openly opposed the Kuzzilbash party and urged many weighty arguments in favor of a pacific settlement of the Amir's relations with the British Government, which had now assumed a position so inauspicious; he concluded his oration with these words, addressing the Amir. "There is no other resource for you but to introduce Mr. Harlan in the negociations with Mr. Burnes, and he, through his own facilities and wisdom, will arrange a treaty, according to their European usage, for the pacific and advantageous settlement of your affairs, and to this proposition the council unanimously assented." The proposition, it appears, was made to Burnes, but Burnes declined. Harlan says that he then wrote to the British envoy offering to negociate upon his own terms;" but Burnes sent "a reply personally friendly," but evincing a deficiency of knowledge of first principles concerning the rights of independent powers, in political negociations." Burnes says nothing about this in his official letters. It is not difficult to perceive why.

lity, to "remedy the grievances of the Affghans," to "give them a little encouragement and power." It was the last despairing effort of the Affghan chief to conciliate the good will of the British Government. It failed. The fiat had gone forth. The judgment against him was not to be reversed. Other meetings took place-but Burnes knew them to be mere formalities. He remained at Kabul with no hope of bringing matters to a favorable issue; but because it was convenient to remain. He was awaiting the return from Kúndúz of Dr. Lord and Lieutenant Wood. The month of March passed away and the greater part of April; but these officers did not rejoin the mission and Burnes determined to depart without them. Accordingly, on the 20th of April, he turned his back upon Kabul.*

The mission had failed. What wonder? It could by no possibility have succeeded. If utter failure had been the great end sought to be accomplished by the mission the whole business could not have been more cunningly devised. Burnes asked every thing; and promised nothing. He was tied hand and foot; he had no power to treat with Dost Mahommed; all that he could do was to demand on one hand and refuse on the other. He talked about the friendship of the British Government. Dost Mahommed asked for some proof of it; and no proof was forthcoming. The wonder is not that the Amír at last listened to the overtures of others; but that he did not seek other assistance before: no better proof of his earnest desire to cement an alliance with the British Government need be sought for than that involved in the fact of his extreme reluctance to abandon all hope of assistance from the British and to turn his eyes in another direction. It was not until he was driven to despair by resolute refusals from the quarter whence he looked for aid, that he accepted the offers so freely made to him by other states and set the seal upon his own destruction. "Our Government," said Burnes, "would do nothing; but the Secretary of the Russian legation came with the most direct offers of assistance and money, and as I had no power to counteract him by a similar offer, and got wigged for talking of it at a time when it would have been ' merely a dead letter to say Affghanistan was under our protection, I was obliged of course to give in." What better

Mr. Masson says, that before its departure, the mission had fallen into contempt and that the assassination of Burnes was talked of; he explains, too, what, according to his account, were the real causes of Burnes' departure without his companions-but it does not come within our province to investigate, in this article, Masson's charges against the envoy.

result Lord Auckland could have anticipated, it is hard to say. If the failure of the mission astonished him, he must have been the most sanguine of men.

But we are not about to consider the conduct of the Governor-General of India, but that of the ruler of Kabul. We have endeavored to state with the utmost fairness the principal circumstances attending the failure of the British mission, under Captain Burnes; and we cannot, upon a deliberate review of all these circumstances, come to a conclusion that there was any thing unreasonable-any thing that can fairly be interpreted into an indication of hostile feeling-in the conduct of Dost Mahommed. That, from the very first, he was disappointed, there is no doubt. He had formed exaggerated ideas of the generosity and munificence of the British Government in the East, and, doubtless, expected great things from the contemplated alliance. The mission had scarcely been a day in Kabul, when the feelings of the Amír were shocked-the exuberance of his hopes somewhat straitened and his dignity greatly offended, by the paltry character of the presents of which Burnes was the bearer. No one ignorant of the childish eagerness with which oriental princes examine the ceremonial gifts presented to them by foreign potentates, and the importance which they attach to the value of these presents as indications of a greater or less degree of friendship and respect on the part of the donor, can appreciate the mortification of Dost Mahommed, on discovering that the British Government, of whose immense resources and boundless liberality he had so exalted a notion, had sent him nothing but a few trumpery toys. Burnes had been directed to "procure from Bombay such articles as would be required to be given in presents to the different chiefs." And it had been characteristically added,-" They ought not to be of a costly nature; but should be chosen particularly with a view to exhibit the superiority of British manufactures." Accordingly the envoy had provided himself with a pistol and a telescope for Dost Mahommed, and a few trifles for the inmates of the Zenana, such as pins, needles, and play-things."

Harlan's account of the reception of these presents is at least amusing, and we see no reason to question its veracity;" when the English Agent," he writes, "whọ visited Kabul in 1837-38, produced his presents for the Amir's haram (a breach of etiquette most inexcusable in any one pretending to a knowledge of oriental customs) they were distributed by the Sultanah-mother, and it may be readily conceived that a more onerous duty could not have been imposed upon her ladyship, although the value of these donations was inconsiderable and adapted only to the frivolous tastes of savages, or the wretched fancies of rude infatuated Africans. They consisted of pins, needles, scissors, pen-knives, silk-handkerchiefs, toys,

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