some, such as the Committee must have noticed. with reprobation; but there are others of a different character; and your Committee conceive, that much useful information would be obtained, if parish officers would, whenever their returns exhibit a remarkable variation, whether of excess or diminution, from the preceding year, give some explanation of the causes of the variation.

And here your Committee cannot avoid observing, that returns, stating merely the gross amount of the expenditure, fall very short of what is necessary to enable the House to judge of the nature and causes of the variation in the amount. For that purpose it would be necessary to have accounts, shewing the different circumstances under which relief has been afforded, and the rate and principle of relief adopted in each district. The ablebodied entirely out of employ; the able-bodied earning wages not sufficient for the maintenance of his family; the married, the single, the sick and impotent, the aged, the labourer in husbandry, and the manufacturer or mechanic, should all be distinguished. And it should be known whether the relief is afforded at the discretion of the parishes themselves, or by order of the justices of the peace.

The Committee are not of opinion that returns in this detail could conveniently be called for by order of the House.

It is for the House to consider whether overseers, in rendering their accounts under the act 50 Geo. III. c. 49, should be required, by a new law, to state these or any other particulars, in a prescribed form, so that a more complete and useful account of the expenditure of the poor-rates than any which has hitherto appeared, might be rendered periodically to parliament. July 10, 1821.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED BY HIS MAJESTY TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT OF WEIGHTS and Measures.

May it please your Majesty, We, the commissioners appointed by your Majesty for the purpose of considering the subject of weights and measures, have now completed the examination of the standards which we have thought it necessary to compare. The measurements which we have lately performed upon the apparatus employed by the late Sir George Shuckburgh Evelyn, have enabled us to determine with sufficient precision the weight of a given bulk of water, with a view to the fixing the magni tude of the standard of weight; that of length being already determined by the experiments related in our former reports; and we have found by the computations, which will be detailed in the Appendix, that the weight of a cubic inch of distilled water, at 62 deg. of Fahrenheit, is 252.72 grains of the parliamentary standard pound of 1758, supposing it to be weighed in a vacuum.

We beg leave, therefore, finally to recommend, with all humility, to your Majesty, the adoption of the regulations and modifications suggested in our former reports, which are principally these:

1. That the parliamentary standard yard, made by Bird in 1760, be henceforth considered as the authentic legal standard of the British empire; and that it be identified by declaring that 39.1393 inches of this standard, at the temperature of 62° of Fahrenheit, have been found equal to the length of a pendulum supposed to vibrate seconds in London, on the level of the sea, and in a vacuum.

2. That the parliamentary standard Troy pound, according to the twopound weight made in 1758, remain unaltered; and that 7000 Troy grains be declared to constitute an avoirdupois pound; the cubic inch of distilled water being found to weigh at 62 deg. in a vacuum, 252.72 parliamentary grains.

3. That the ale and corn gallon be restored to their original equality, by taking, for the statutable common gallon of the British empire, a mean value, such that a gallon of common water may weigh ten pounds avoirdupois in ordinary circumstances, its content being nearly 277.8 cubic inches; and that correct standards of this imperial. gallon, and of the bushel, peck, quart, and pint, derived from it, and of their parts, be procured without delay for the exchequer, and for such other offices in your Majesty's dominions as may be judged most convenient for the ready use of your Majesty's subjects.

4. Whether any further legislative enactments are required, for enforcing a uniformity of practice throughout the British empire, we do not feel our selves competent to determine; but it appears to us that nothing would be more conducive to the attainment of this end, than to increase, as far as possible, the facility of a ready recurrence to the legal standards, which we apprehend to be in a great measure attainable by the means we have recommended. It would also, in all probability, be of advantage to give a greater degree of publicity to the appendix of our last report, containing a comparison of the customary measures employed throughout the country.

5. We are not aware that any further services remain for us to perform, in the execution of the commands laid upon us by your Majesty's commission; but if any superintendence of the re

VOL. XIV. PART II.

Foreign Office, Jan. 19, 1821.

SIR,-I should not have felt it necessary to have made any communication to you, in the present state of the discussions begun at Troppau, and transferred to Laybach, had it not been for a circular communication which has been addressed by the Courts of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to their several missions, and which his Majesty's government conceive, if not adverted to, might (however unintentionally) convey, upon the subject therein alluded to, very erroneous impressions of the past, as well as of the present, sentiments of the British government.

It has become, therefore, necessary to inform you, that the King has felt himself obliged to decline becoming a party to the measures in question.

These measures embrace two distinct objects:-1st, The establishment of certain general principles for the regulation of the future political conduct of the allies in the cases therein described. 2dly, The proposed mode of dealing, under these principles, with the existing affairs of Naples.

The system of measures proposed under the former head, if to be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of this country. But, even if this decisive objection did not exist, the British government would nevertheless regard the principles on which these measures rest, to be such as could not be safely admitted as a system of international law. They are of opinion that their adoption would inevitably sanction, and, in the hands of less beneficent monarchs, might hereafter lead to, a much more frequent and extensive interference in the internal transactions of states, than they are persuaded is intended by the august parties from whom they proceed, or can be reconcilable either with the general interest, or with the efficient authority and dignity, of independent sovereigns. They do not regard the alliance as entitled, under existing treaties, to assume, in their character as allies, any such general powers; nor do they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be assumed, in virtue of any fresh diplomatic transaction among the allied courts, without their either attributing to themselves a supremacy incompatible with the rights of other states, or, if to be acquired through the special accession of such states, without introducing a federative system in Europe not only unwieldy, and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most serious inconveniences.

With respect to the particular case of Naples, the British government, at the very earliest moment, did not hesitate to express their strongest disapprobation of the mode and circumstance under which that revolution was understood to have been effected; but they, at the same time, expressly declared to the several allied courts, that they should not consider themselves as either called upon, or justified, to advise an interference on the part of

this country; they fully admitted, however, that other European states, and especially Austria and the Italian powers, might feel themselves differently circumstanced; and they professed that it was not their purpose to prejudge the question as it might affect them, or to interfere with the course which such states might think fit to adopt, with a view to their own security, provided only that they were ready to give every reasonable assurance that their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandizement, subversive of the territorial system of Eu. rope, as established by the late trea ties.

Upon these principles, the conduct of his Majesty's government, with regard to the Neapolitan question, has been, from the first moment, uniformly regulated, and copies of the successive instructions sent to the British authorities at Naples for their guidance, have been from time to time transmitted for the information of the allied governments.

With regard to the expectation which is expressed in the circular above alluded to, of the assent of the courts of London and Paris to the more general measures proposed for their adop tion, founded, as it is alleged, upon existing treaties; in justification of its own consistency and good faith, the British government, in withholding such assent, must protest against any such interpretation being put upon the treaties in question, as is therein as sumed.

They have never understood these treaties to impose any such obligations; and they have, on various occasions, both in parliament and in their intercourse with the allied governments, distinctly maintained the negative of such a proposition. That they have acted with all possible explicitness upon this subject, would at once appear from reference to the deliberations at

1

Paris in 1815, previous to the conclusion of the treaty of alliance, at Aixla-Chapelle, in 1818, and subsequent ly in certain discussions which took place in the course of the last year. After having removed the misconception to which the passage of the circular in question, if passed over in silence, might give countenance; and having stated in general terms, with out, however, entering into the argument, the dissent of his Majesty's government from the general principle upon which the circular in question is founded, it should be clearly understood that no government can be more prepared than the British government is, to uphold the right of any state or states to interfere where their own im. mediate security or essential interests are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state. But as they regard the assumption of such right as only to be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby, they cannot admit that this right can receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular state or states, or be made prospectively the basis of an alliance. They regard its exercise as an exception to general principles, of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case; but they, at the same time, consider, that exceptions of this description never can, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule, as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations.

As it appears that certain of the ministers of the three courts have already communicated this circular despatch to the courts to which they are accredited, I leave it to your discretion to make a corresponding com

munication on the part of your government, regulating your language in conformity to the principles laid down in the present despatch. You will take care, however, in making such communications, to do justice, in the name of your government, to the purity of intention which has, no doubt, actuated these august courts in the adoption of the course of measures which they are pursuing. The difference of sentiment which prevails between them and the court of London on this matter, you may declare, can make no alteration whatever in the cordiality and harmony of the alliance on any other subject, or abate their common zeal in giving the most complete effect to all their existing engagements. I am, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

DOCUMENTS ISSUED AT THE BREAKING UP OF THE CONGRESS AT LAY

BACH.

DECLARATION.

Europe is acquainted with the motives of the resolution taken by the allied sovereigns, to suppress conspiracies, and to terminate disorders, which menaced the existence of that general peace, the establishment of which had cost so many efforts, and so many sacrifices.

At the very moment when their generous objects were accomplished in the kingdom of Naples, a rebellion of a still more odious character, if possible, burst forth in Piedmont.

Neither the ties which had, for so many generations, united the reigning house of Savoy with the people, nor the benefits of an enlightened government, administered by a wise prince, and under paternal laws, nor the sad

prospect of calamities to which the country was exposed, could restrain the disaffected from their designs.

The plan of a general subversion was prepared. In this combination against the repose of nations, the conspirators of Piedmont had their parts assigned them; they were eager to perform it.

The throne and the state were betrayed; oaths were violated; military honours tarnished; and the contempt of every duty soon produced the scourge of every disorder.

Everywhere the pestilence exhibited the same character; everywhere one uniform spirit directed these fatal revolutions.

Not being able to assign plausible motives in their justification, nor to obtain national support to maintain them, it was in false doctrines that these contrivers of anarchy sought an apology: they founded upon criminal associations a still more criminal hope. In their eyes, the salutary supremacy of the laws, was yoke which must be destroyed. They renounced those sentiments which are inspired by a true love of one's country, and, substituting for known duties arbitrary and undefined pretences for a universal change in the constituent principles of society, they prepared endless disasters for the world.

The allied sovereigns saw the dangers of this conspiracy in all their full extent, but they had also discovered the real weakness of the conspirators, in spite of their veil of declamation and deceit. Experience has verified their anticipations. The resistance which legitimate authority has encountered, has been useless; and crime has disappeared at the sight of the sword of justice. It is not to accidental causes-it is not even to the conduct of men who behaved so ill in the hour of battle, that this easy success should be attributed; it has resulted from a more

consolatory principle-from one more worthy of attention.

Providence struck with terror the consciences of men so guilty; and the censure of the public, whose fate was compromised by these artificers of mischief, caused the arms to fall from their hands.

Solely employed to contend with, and to put down, rebellion, the allied forces, far from pursuing any exclusive interests, have arrived to the aid of the people who were subjugated; and the people themselves have regarded the employment of those troops as a support in favour of their liberty, not as an aggression upon their independence. From that moment the war ceased; from that moment the states which revolution had assailed, became the friendly states of those powers, which never wished anything but their tranquillity and their prosperity.

In the midst of these grave occurrences, and in a situation thus delicate, the allied sovereigns, in concert with the King of the Two Sicilies and the King of Sardinia, have judged it indispensable to adopt temporary measures of precaution, indicated by prudence, and called for by the general good. The allied troops, whose presence was necessary for the restoration of order, have been placed in suitable positions, solely for the purpose of protecting the free exercise of legitimate authori ty, and to assist it in preparing, under this ægis, those benefits which may efface every vestige of such portentous misfortunes.

The justice and disinterestedness which have prevailed in the deliberations of the allied monarchs, will always continue to regulate their policy. In future, as during the past, they will ever prescribe to themselves the preservation of the independence and of the rights of each state, such as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The issue, even of such an