herself, as fully as if she had been born such, or had been naturalized by an act of Parliament. Reg. v. Manning, 2 Carr. & Kir., 886 (61 Eng. C. L.) Indeed, this construction was carried so far as to hold that an alien woman married to a citizen of the United States, who had become such by naturalization, and who, on his death, afterwards married an alien domiciled but not naturalized in the United States, had acquired by the first marriage a status which qualified her to prosecute a claim against the United States or a citizen thereof for injury done to her property during the interval covered by her second marriage. "It was the intention of Congress," says the opinion, "to bestow upon her a permanent status of citizenship defeasible only as in the case of other persons." S. F. Phillips, Sol. Gen., 15 Opin. A. G., 600, case of It will be observed in all these cases, however, that the right sought to be enforced, or the responsibility established, concerned matters wholly within the undisputed jurisdiction of the sovereignty creating the status, and that terms are used in most of the cases which, perhaps, would have been more satisfactory had they been restrained by express qualifications in the first instance, instead of leaving that duty to be performed by necessary implication afterwards. In the last case cited, for instance, if Mrs. De Ambrogia had been by birth a citizen of Venezuela, and had by virtue of her acquired status as a citizen of the United States of America, sought to enforce a claim against the Government of Venezuela, the question would at once have occurred whether it was competent for the United States to create a status of citizenship, the use to be made of which was to enforce a claim against another sovereignty claiming the natural allegiance of the claimant herself, and with this question prominently before the mind, a distinction would have been taken, perhaps, between a mere municipal or civil status with a limited internal operation, and a political status with an extra-territorial operation and effect. Persons made citizens by this act, born abroad and residing abroad, subject to the obligation to bear arms either in wars of defence or offence, at the call of the sovereignty within whose jurisdiction they reside, without question on the part of the sovereignty to which they owe what may be called the artificial status of citizenship, cannot in the nature of things be citizens of the United States as fully as if they had been born in that country, unless it can be held that a native citizen of the United States is subject to any foreign jurisdiction that may have the opportunity to seize and impress him into its military service. The point, however, is more speculative than real in this case, because it is very clear that whatever may be the status of Mrs. Willet or of her children with respect to their citizenship of the United States, whether full or limited, there can be no doubt whatever, that her husband and their father was a citizen at the time the injury in this case occurred, and continued to hold a claim against the Government of Venezuela until he died intestate in 1862. This being the case, Mrs. Willet claimed before the old Commission as administratrix and clearly had the right to represent a claim of a citizen of the United States, whatever may have been her own personal status. The functions of an executor and administrator are very much the same; one represents the testator by virtue of his will, the other an intestate by virtue of the law. To appoint an executor is to place one in the stead of the testator, who may enter to the testator's goods and chattels, and who has an action against the testator's debtors. (Williams' Ex., 1, pp. 226.) "The executor," says Lord Cake, "doth more actually represent the person of the testator than the heir doth the person of the ancestor, for if a man bindeth himself, his executors are bound though they be not named, but so it is not of the heir." and this is true, also, he says, of the administrator. (Co. Lit., p. 2009.) Elsewhere he says that the administrator stands in loco parentis with same powers as executor by statute of 31 Ed., 111-2, Blacks., p. 510. Hensloe's Case, 9 Rep., p. 40. It has been held in England that an alien may be executor, and it has even been questioned whether an alien enemy may not act as such because the effects to be distributed are not his but anothers. 1 Williams, pp. 229-30. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the Common Law, But another and distinct ground of objection was taken by Venezuela based upon the proposition that the warehouse was lawfully seized and occupied by her military forces for defensive purposes, and that the subsequent pillage and destruction of the stock of goods was a necessary and unavoidable incident of such seizure and occupation, and that the damage occasioned by it in consequence must be treated as damnum absque injuria, and therefore remediless. In this view we do not concur. Admitting fully the doctrine that the safety of the state is the supreme law, and that the property and person of the citizen are subject to be taken for the public service whenever the exigency is sufficient to justify it, of which the state itself by the necessity of the case, must be the only judge, yet we cannot perceive that there was any necessary connection between the seizure of the warehouse for purposes of defence and the consequent pillage and destruction of the property which ensued. Besides, while the seizure of the building was lawful in the first instance for the purpose of repelling an attack or guarding the arsenal which was in the near neighborhood, no reason has been assigned for its con tinued use and occupation as barracks, long after the emergency had ceased to operate. The Government of Venezuela recognized the justice of this proposition by admitting a claim on this account, and making payment in part. Indeed, we believe that such claims are universally recognized as constituting exceptions to the general rule which protects governments from making indemnity. It was also contended that a citizen of one country domiciled in another could have no greater rights than the citizens of the country where he chose to cast his lot; and that as a citizen of Venezuela would have had no claim on the justice of his government for reclamation in such a case as this, neither could the original claimant, who was a citizen of the United States. But from what we have said there ought to be no doubt that the Government of Venezuela would have respected such a claim if made on the part of one of her own citizens, and therefore the contention assumes what we do not admit to be true. On the whole, therefore, we are of the opinion that an allowance ought to be made in this case on the basis heretofore laid down, that is to say, for 50,000 pesos, on which we will allow interest at 5% from the 2d of August, 1859, deducting, of course, whatever sum Venezuela has paid on account of any of the certificates founded on the original award. The peso will be estimated at seventy-five cents expressed in the gold coin of the United States of America. After the dissolution of the old Confederacy of Colombia composed of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador, it appears that provision was made by treaty in the year 1834, for the payment of the public debt, by allotting a certain percentage to each of these countries. Under this agreement Venezuela was to pay 28%, New Granada 50%, and Ecuador 21%. The present claim grows out of a "vale bond, or certificate, as it is variously styled, for 5,000 pesos, issued out of the Treasury of Colombia under date of 26th of July, 1826, in payment of supplies furnished, consisting of cattle and money, by various parties who transferred their rights in the claim to a Mr. Robert H. Weyman. The documentary evidence in support of this claim, and on which it was allowed, was submitted, so the certificate recites, by Mr. Beaufort T. Watts, and then appears the following endorsement on the certificate: "Pay to the order of R. H. Weyman. "Witness: "ROBERT WILSON GIBBS." "B. T. WATTS. [L. S.] "R. H. WEYMAN. The proportion which Venezuela is bound to pay, if bound at all, under the allotment referred to, is 28. Under the Mixed Commission between the United States and Ecuador, organized under the Treaty of November 25, 1862, an award was made against Ecuador for the proportion of this claim by the Umpire, who fixed the amount due on the basis of |