Still he would reasonably assume insurance, and the law made him, being the master of the ship, the agent of the companies, in their absence, to protect their interests in this regard. His failure to appeal, if such under the circumstances became his duty, was not the fault of Colombia.

There is still, apparently, another objection to this claim as it is presented on the papers transmitted us. It is prosecuted by Corwin. The papers here fail to show that he ever had other interest in the insurance demands than the portion prosecuted against New Grenada.

The transfer to him by the Atlantic Company was, to wit:

"For the proportion of loss said Government [New Grenada] is liable to pay by reason of the seizure of the cargo of the schooner Mechanic in 1824 by the Colombian privateer General Santander. The said State of New Grenada being liable to pay the one-half part of the loss sustained by said company by reason of such seizure, of the sum of about $6,000, with interest. To have and to hold the said hereby sold and assigned premises unto said Amos B. Corwin, his heirs and assigns, forever."

The transfer by the Hope Company, made at the same time, is in substantially the same terms, save as to the amount of the interest transferred.

But this half so assigned to him was allowed entire by the Bogota Commission in 1862, and, so far as appears, settled by New Grenada.

Corwin's presentation through Minister Culver of a claim in his behalf upon the Venezuelan Government, in 1863, for her 28 per cent. of the insurance, was not based upon any interest held by him so far as disclosed here. He was not a claimant of that portion of the alleged indebtedness within the meaning of the treaty so far as appears. It is proper to say, however, that we should not be disposed to rest the decision upon the present showing in this regard without further inquiry, if the claim were good otherwise. It may be the diplomatic correspondence would supply the deficiency.

Again, even if the Corwin demand in 1863 could be

shown to have been authorized, it seems to us it came too late, under our announcement in case No. 36, if that was its first presentation. Venezuela had then been a state 33 years. The demand was 39 years old. It had been presented to the old Republic and not allowed. Venezuela now could not be supposed to have anticipated its resurrection. The witnesses to the transaction in 1824 had, presumably, passed away, and other means of defence become dissipated. owing to the possible incompleteness of the record in this. regard, we prefer to base our conclusion upon the other grounds stated, assuming proper and timely presentation of the claim against Venezuela.

The claim is disallowed.

But

This claim was submitted to the Caracas Commission, and on the disagreeing votes of the two Commissioners was referred to the Umpire for decision, and by him rejected on the 2d of July, 1868.

The facts briefly are, that the claimant, a naturalized citizen of the United States, was appointed consul to Maracaibo in 1861, and continued to act as such with the approval of Venezuela until the 28th of May, 1862, when he sailed in the barque Clara Rosa Sutil for New York, on a five months' leave of absence on account of ill health. The barque was stranded on the morning of the 1st of June, on the coast of Goagira, which appears to have been subject to the forays of a tribe of Indians residing or roaming within the jurisdiction of Venezuela, but never fully subjected to her authority. These Indians came on board and acted in such a threatening manner that the captain, crew, and passengers thought it was safest to leave the ship and return in the ship's boats to Maracaibo for assistance. The cargo consisted principally of coffee, but among other things on board were twelve trunks and boxes, the property of the claimant, containing a miscellaneous assortment of personal effects, and valuable sketches and drawings of great use in his profession as architect and civil engineer, and also a choice and well-selected library of classical, modern, and scientific literature.

All these things were stolen or destroyed by the Indians, at a loss estimated by the claimant of $13,000. On the raid being reported at Maracaibo, the governor of the province

immediately despatched a war vessel to the scene of the outrage, and by her timely arrival and the use of cannon the Indians were driven off, and much pillage, both of the vessel and her cargo, prevented. Such damage, however, was done to her rigging and sailing apparatus that it was deemed advisable to send to New York for repairs, and the claimant took passage in another vessel bound for that port, where he arrived safely and without further accident on the 6th of July, 1862. Three days afterwards he addressed a communication to the Department of State, complaining of the outrage, insisting that it was permitted by the Government of Venezuela for the want of those necessary and indispensable precautions which the laws of nations exact for the protection of aliens domiciled within a foreign jurisdiction, and especially consuls, and claiming indemnity in the sum before mentioned.

No action, as far as the papers disclose, was then taken by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, and the case appears to have been neglected until revived by the claimant in a communication to the State Department, under date of the 27th of February, 1868, in which redress is again asked, and which was referred by the Secretary to the Legation at Caracas, and by it submitted to the Commission then in session, with the result before stated. It is resubmitted, under the treaty of December 15, 1885, for our action, not, however, on any claim by Mr. Wipperman of the injustice of the previous decision, in which he appears to have acquiesced, but as one of the claims which is entitled to consideration by reason of the sweeping provisions of that convention, which submits all the claims of citizens of the United States for adjudication by this Commission, which were considered by the former one without regard to the fact whether they were allowed or rejected, or whether the claimant was dissatisfied with the decision or not.

The learned counsel for the United States, with his usual industry and ability, has filed a very elaborate brief in sup

port of the claim, with the conclusions of which, however, we regret that, we cannot concur, although we can readily give our assent to most of the general reasoning in which he indulged on the subject of the duty of a foreign government with respect to the protection of official representatives of another sovereignty coming within its jurisdiction. It is perfectly true, as contended by the learned counsel, that the citizens of one State, whether holding office or not, but residing or doing business within the jurisdiction of another State, are entitled to the fullest protection of the laws of that State, both in their persons and property, and that on the authority of the case of the Spanish consul in New Orleans, after the execution of the unfortunate victims of the Lopez expedition, as stated by Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, there would seem to be an additional claim upon this protection growing out of the consular office of the person injured, although it is to be noted that Mr. Webster in the case referred to, observed that the case was a new one, and that the circumstances were such that indemnity would be offered without searching for precedents.

But there can be no possible parallel between the case of a consul residing in a large city inhabited by civilized people, whose house is deliberately invaded in open day, and whose property is pillaged or destroyed by acts of violence, aimed at him in his official capacity and accompanied with studied insults to the government he represents, and all proceeding from a riotous body of persons who, presumably, at least, ought to have been within the preventive or restraining power of the police or the military, and the accidental injury suffered by an individual in common with others, not in his character as consul, but as a passenger on a vessel which has been unfortunate enough to be stranded on an unfrequented coast, subject to the incursions of savages, which no reasonable foresight could prevent.

The case would present more points of comparison if some savage tribe of Indians on the war-path had unexpectedly